

MAY 17 1948

D
**THE
RUSSIAN
REVIEW**

PERIODICALS ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.



*An American Journal
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present*

*Spring
1948*

Vol. 7, No. 2

Price \$1.00

Contributors to This Issue

NICHOLAS BERYAIEV, Russian religious thinker, is the author of *The Destiny of Man* (Eng. tr. 1937); *The Origin of Russian Communism* (Eng. tr. 1937); *Spirit and Reality* (Eng. tr. 1939); *The Russian Idea* (Eng. tr. 1948); and many other works.

RUTH FISCHER, former Chairman of the Politburo of the German Communist Party and Deputy to the Reichstag; resigned from the Party in 1926; her book, *Stalin and German Communism*, is to be published in July by the Harvard University Press.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, foreign correspondent in Soviet Russia for the *Christian Science Monitor* 1932-1933, is the author of well known works on the Soviet Union of which the latest is *The Russian Enigma*.

A. LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY is Professor of History at the University of Michigan and author of *Russia and Asia, 1933*; *The Grinding Mills: Reminiscences of War and Revolution, 1913-1920*, 1935; *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825*, 1947.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE has been writing and lecturing on Russia for many years; at present is engaged in writing a history of the Russian Revolution to be published in 1948.

I. A. POSIN, Associate Professor of Russian at Stanford University, was the head of the Russian Department of the Navy Language School at the University of Colorado in 1944-46.

PIERRE ROUTSKY, Russian diplomat, was Consul in New York from 1913 to 1928; subsequently was Director of the Service Bureau for Russian Refugees in New York City and, since 1933, has been Executive Secretary of the Russian Student Fund.

W. CHAPIN HUNTINGTON, formerly Commercial Attaché, American Embassy, Petrograd (1916-1918), and American Embassy, Paris (1920-1922), is author of *The Homesick Million: Russia Out of Russia*, 1933, and *Prospects of American Trade with the Soviet Union*, 1935; at present is Editor of the Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Journal Devoted to Russia
Past and Present

Vol. 7

SPRING 1948

No. 2

★ ★ ★

Russia and the New World Era, <i>Nicholas Berdyaev</i>	3
Background of the New Economic Policy, <i>Ruth Fischer</i>	15
Dostoevsky: Prophet and Psychologist, <i>William Henry Chamberlin</i>	34
Anglo-Russian Relations Through the Centuries, <i>A. Lobanov-Rostovsky</i>	41
Gapon and Zubatov, <i>Bertram D. Wolfe</i>	53
Russian Studies in American Colleges, <i>J. A. Posin</i>	62
A Page from the Past, <i>Pierre Routsky</i>	69
The Russian Translation Project Three Years Later, <i>W. Chapin Huntington</i>	76

BOOK REVIEWS

The United States and Russia, <i>by Vera M. Dean, Michael Karpovich</i>	88
Russia: A Handbook, <i>ed. by Warren Walsh, D. von Mohrenschildt</i>	92
Russia: The Giant that Came Last, <i>by Joshua Kunitz, Frederick Barghoorn</i>	92
Russia and Europe 1789-1825, <i>by A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Walther Kirchner</i>	95

(Continued on page II)

Potemkin, <i>by</i> George Soloveytchik, <i>Albert Parry</i>	96
Soviet Literature Today, <i>by</i> George Reavey, <i>Gleb Struve</i>	98
Dimitri Shostakovich, <i>by</i> Ivan Martynov; The Musorgsky Reader, <i>ed. and tr. by</i> Jay Leyda and S. Bertensson, <i>Frederick Sternfeld</i>	100

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1947, <i>Emily Carter</i> <i>and Mary Thompson</i>	103
Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7	115
Fellowships for Slavic Studies	126
New Books Received	127
Announcement	128

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Editors:

Michael Karpovich
Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Managing Editor

ADVISORY EDITORIAL BOARD

James Donald Adams
Arthur P. Coleman
Stephen Duggan
H. H. Fisher
Waclaw Lednicki

Clarence Manning
Alexander Nazaroff
George R. Noyes
Peter Pertzoff
Michael Rostovtzeff
Alexander Tarsaidzé

Lucy E. Textor
Countess A. Tolstoy
Edmund Wilson
Alexis Wiren
Nicholas Wreden

The aim of "The Russian Review" is to present a non-partisan interpretation of Russian history, civilization, and culture. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article in this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

All dates pertaining to Russia prior to the introduction of the new style (Gregorian Calendar) on February 1, 1918, are according to the old style. The emblem on the cover of "The Russian Review" is an original design by M. V. Dobujinsky, representing "Alkonost," a mythical figure, half-woman, half-bird, popular in Russian folklore.

Copyright 1948, and published semi-annually in November and April, by "The Russian Review," 215 West 23rd Street, New York 11, N. Y. Subscription rates: \$2.00 a year in the United States; Canada \$2.20; foreign \$2.50; single copy \$1.00. The contents of this publication cannot be reprinted without the permission of the editors. Unsolicited manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Russia and the New World Era*

By NICHOLAS BERDYAEV

EVERYONE, with but rare exceptions, agrees that the world is entering a new era. Many will agree, furthermore, that this era, like the Hellenistic era, will be universalist. Yet, never has the world found itself in such a state of universal discord and fear. Soviet Russia and the Western world, Europe and America, are mutually suspicious of each other and are engaged in a cold war. The West is stricken with two diseases: fear of Communism and fear of the powerful Russian Empire. These are the convulsions of the old world on the point of death. The Marxist plan concerning the capitalist countries of the West is correct in part only and deals primarily with the economic structure and the psychology of certain classes. In the West there are intellectual and spiritual movements which are not connected with the capitalist order and the bourgeois psychology. However, most of the new movements, though at times very interesting and clever, strike one by their futility. This article attempts to discover what Russia might bring to the new era that is original and fecund. When I say "Russia," I have in mind not only Soviet, revolutionary Russia, but also eternal Russia.

In the persons of her most noteworthy writers, poets, religious and social thinkers, Russia of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries was inspired with a prophetic spirit turned towards the new world of the future. There does not exist in the world a more prophetic literature than the Russian. Hostility towards the bourgeois mind of the West and the certainty that Russia will never be bourgeois, characterized Russian thought of the nineteenth century. The revolutionary Herzen and the reactionary Leontiev agreed on this point. Not only the Russian Socialists, representatives of the intelligentsia of the Left, but also Chaadaev, the Slavophiles, a rightist like N. Danilevsky, and finally Dostoevsky, believed that Russia would solve the social problem and carry out social justice better and sooner than the peoples of the West. The backward character of Russia, economically and socially, the embryonic state of capitalistic industry in Russia, the absence of a bourgeoisie and of a proletariat of any importance, were considered as arguments in favor of this thesis. The Russian people do not carry

*Translated from the French by Marie-Louise Hall.

as heavy a burden of historical past as that of the peoples of the West and should be, consequently, freer in their efforts to shape the future. Russian prophesy had anticipated the particular character of the Russian Revolution which skipped the capitalist and bourgeois phase. It was accomplished, not according to the classical plan of Marx, but in the Russian manner. The Russian Revolution, however, possessed a dual character, and this duality is linked with the fact that the Russian prophesies themselves had a double origin: one religious, the other social. These two elements found themselves separated in the Russian Revolution. But the religious prophesies were not disproved by the Revolution; they were only twisted. The religious energy was detoured and oriented in another direction. It would be wrong to believe that what is commonly called totalitarianism was an invention of the Bolsheviki, copied afterwards, for other purposes, by their sworn enemies—the Fascists.

Totalitarianism is an old Russian tradition. It conforms to the needs of the leftist intelligentsia, and particularly, to the revolutionary intelligentsia which aspired to a totalitarian doctrine, solving all the problems of life, and indissolubly bound to the policy intended to create a new world. This totalitarian attitude towards life also encompassed moral life, determining all the vital values to the minutest detail. The old revolutionary Russian Socialists did not accept politics as an autonomous sphere of life; politics was their religion. Totalitarianism is always a substitution for religion. Modern Christianity is in decadence because it has been relegated into a recess of the human soul and has ceased to teach a totalitarian attitude towards life as it should. But totalitarianism has also been the characteristic of other Russian trends: it existed among the Slavophiles; it was in existence with V. Soloviev; it existed, naturally, with Fedorov, that is to say among consciously religious thinkers. All of them wished to link their politics with a totalitarian doctrine, encompassing all life; all of them aspired towards the total transfiguration of life. But Russian totalitarianism has also manifested itself in a much more remote past, in entirely different conditions. The Tsardom of Moscow was totalitarian, and the Soviet State resembles it in a formal, morphological fashion. Ivan the Terrible was convinced that he not only had the duty to rule over Russia, but also to save the peoples' souls. The Moscow civilization was conditioned by the Orthodox faith; all those who were Orthodox belonged to it. It was an isolated state, without ties with the rest of the world. Even the Greek faith did not seem altogether Ortho-

dox. The entire West was considered as heretical, having betrayed the real faith. The word "Latin" almost had a derogatory meaning.

The Soviet state is also based on an obligatory doctrine of a quasi-religious character. The orthodoxy in Soviet Russia almost possesses the same importance as in the old Muscovite kingdom. Soviet materialism is practically a faith.

The Communist state is also isolated and protects itself from the rest of the world. The Western world is again considered as heretical; only now heresy is identified with the capitalist order. Totalitarianism was always a Russian way, for the Russians cannot bear the idea of the division of life and civilization in separate spheres, and the affirmation of the autonomy of these spheres. The revolutionary intelligentsia has been successful in protecting itself through its intolerant totalitarianism, under very difficult circumstances, during incessant persecutions. It would have been crushed if it had not affirmed its exclusiveness and had not opposed its character to the hostile world.

All this is linked with the fact that the Russian idea (and all great nations have their idea) does not aim at the creation of a civilization in the Western sense, differentiated, but affirms the total transfiguration of life. Doubt concerning the justification of civilization is a specifically Russian doubt, which the nations of the West do not feel in the same degree; it was peculiar to the greatest creative minds of Russia.

In culture and civilization—I use these two words intentionally—they were ready to see an injustice, and even a sin towards the people. Culture is bought at too high a price, at the price of too much human suffering. Lermontov already speaks, in a prophetic poem, of the opposition between "the gift of song" and the road to God. We know enough about the tragedy experienced by Gogol and especially by Tolstoy, who repudiated his work of genius. The same motives tormented Dostoevsky and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, A. Blok. N. Fedorov, an eminently Russian thinker, demanded that one pass from civilization (from individual thought to common work) to universal resurrection and salvation. The *Narodniks*, the socialist-populists of the seventies', like P. Lavrov, considered the cultured class as owing a debt to the people and demanded from them the payment of this debt and the renunciation of the satisfaction which they derived from their cultural work.

This typically Russian theme may be formulated in the following way: one must pass from the creation of perfect works of art (that

is to say of cultural values) to the creation of perfect life, to the purification and transfiguration of life. The religious and social moment takes on, consequently, particular importance. It is the philosophy of history and moral philosophy, that is to say the linking of thought with the destiny of man, of society, of the people, of the world, which hold a preponderant place in Russian philosophy. The totalitarianism of the state is the most vicious form of totalitarianism. Russian totalitarianism is not the particular totalitarianism of the state, but it too can take on perverted and even comic forms. Nevertheless, one must admit that it hides the Russian sufferings and the Russian wealth of integral truth. It is in opposition to the fragmentation, to the breaking up of the Western world and Western civilization. I. Kireevsky and other Slavophiles had indeed guessed it, though expressing it in a manner which today is outmoded. Naturally, this does not mean that there did not exist similar movements in the West, directed towards a whole; the West is a rich world, there are varied currents in its life, and important processes unfold themselves in it on which the destinies of men depend.

In seeking to penetrate intuitively the spiritual type of the Russian people, one arrives at the conclusion that the mission of the Russian people is primarily religious and social, and not the creation of a civilization so far as it is an autonomous domain. But what is tragic, is that the two sides of this mission have been dissociated and have often found themselves at odds, because of the peculiarities of the historical destiny of Russia. At about the time of the Revolution, the religious and social elements in Russia were found to be in bitter conflict; it is only now that it is beginning to be overcome. But one must remember that the problem of Christian society was presented in a totally new manner by Russian religious thought, philosophical and social. This took place in conformity with the community-mindedness of the Russian people, and often took on the appearance of waiting for a new revelation in Christianity, of a revelation of the Holy Ghost. Christianity, too often understood only as a religion of personal salvation, that is to say in an individualistic manner, has need of a revelation concerning society. In many respects, this revelation was being prepared from below, in the revolutionary and Socialist movement which did not consider itself as religious, but which carried in its unconscious side certain religious elements. This problem was discussed in the course of conferences on religious philosophy which took place in 1903-1904

in St. Petersburg, under the presidency of Bishop Sergius, later Patriarch of all the Russias. It is there that the representatives of Russian culture, the Russian writers, met with the dignitaries of the Russian church. This same problem was posed in a still indefinite form by Chaadaev, by the Slavophiles (Khomiakov's doctrine of *sobornost*), and, in a more precise manner, by Bukharev, Dostoevsky, V. Soloviev, and especially by N. Fedorov, in his doctrine of the "common work," as well as by the religious-philosophical movement of the beginning of the twentieth century. But, unfortunately, the two Russian movements, the religious and the social, did not recognize, or recognized insufficiently, the common elements of truth which were contained in both of them.

The tragedy of the Russian Revolution and the militant atheism of its early years are linked to this fact. It is for this reason that the contributions with which Russia and the Russian people can enrich the world, have remained in the dark. The Russian people have leaped over the abyss, and this leap has necessarily brought on fractures and mutilations. The Russian people alone could have made this leap, because of their Christian qualities, because, as a matter of fact, they attach less importance to the riches of this earth than do the nations of the West, more tied down by their conceptions of property, by their fear of risk, by their conservative instinct, by the whole weight of their bourgeois civilization. What is proper to the Russians is not only totalitarianism, that is to say the aspiration towards a whole, towards the complete transfiguration of life, but also eschatologism, that is to say the aspiration towards the end. This eschatologism was natural to the Russian popular movements, and, in particular, to the left wing of the religious dissent, to the Russian sects, as well as to the revolutionary intelligentsia, unconscious of the eschatological character of its aspirations, and to the Russian religious philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the Christian conscience of the West, Catholic as well as Protestant, the prophetic side of Christianity, with rare exceptions, has been completely repressed.

The West, exceedingly cultured and civilized, felt at ease in its mid-way position; it was not painfully tensed towards the goal; it did not live in the hope of a new era of Christianity, of an eschatological era which will know the final revelation of the Holy Ghost. The social Christianity of the West did not expect a new era of Christianity, a new revelation of the truth about society; it was not

borrowed from the new community-mindedness.¹ The religious philosophy of Russia—original product of Russian thought—elaborated the notion of *Theoandristm* (God-manhood) badly understood by Western Christian thought. It is the idea of the union and interaction of the two natures, divine and human, united in the person of Jesus Christ, a union realized in man and humanity, in society, in the new period of history. Human nature is consubstantial with the human nature of Jesus Christ. This fact should not only have an individual expression, but a community expression as well. The idea of *Theoandristm* and the term itself are linked in particular to V. Soloviev, but they are not specifically his and are proper to all the original currents of Russian religious philosophy. This presupposes the special creative activity of man—an activity which possesses not only a cultural meaning, but also a religious meaning. The idea of the social and cosmic purification and transfiguration are linked to it. It is for this reason that the Russian creative conscience can furnish an important contribution to the religious and social conscience of the West, faced with a new world era. The manifestations of the Russian Revolution may elicit various moral objections, but to refuse to accept the fundamental meaning of the Revolution would be equivalent to negating the Russian mission in the world.

II

When one speaks of a new era for the West and for all the modern world, two distinctive features of this era are striking: the extraordinary, almost fantastic, development of technique, of man's power over the elementary forces of nature, the penetration of man into cosmic life, on the one hand, and the appearance on the historical scene, in an active rôle, of broad popular masses, on the other. The spiritual growth of man does not at all correspond to these dynamic processes. Hence, the tormented character of our era. Man finds himself defenseless in front of what is taking place in the world. He is projected outside, he is divided, he has lost his interior center. If a radical social revolution has already taken place in Russia, the West must still expect social transformations, which, in various countries, can be accomplished by different methods. But, in this respect, the influence of Soviet Russia is enormous. The nations of the West

¹The most interesting movement is that of "Esprit." Among the Protestants, it was Blumhardt who was the most interesting.

probably will not become acquainted with Communism in its Russian Soviet form, but a movement in this direction will undoubtedly take place. The Western world has changed a great deal as compared with the state in which it was before the last world war, and especially before the war of 1914-18. The twentieth century likes to oppose itself to the nineteenth, and it is customary to speak contemptuously of the latter. But what new intellectual and spiritual trends does one know of in the West? We have here a phenomenon which might appear strange. Who are the masters of Western thought who are most influential today? Above all, Marx, Nietzsche, Kirkegaard—all men of the nineteenth century, which was very rich intellectually. Marxism is a doctrine evolved a hundred years ago, in social conditions very different from ours. Marxism has become old-fashioned in many respects. The two world wars, in which the proletarians of different nationalities killed each other, dealt a cruel blow to the idea of an international proletariat. Nevertheless, the Marxist doctrine predominates, not only in Russia where, it is true, it has undergone profound russification, but also in Western Europe. Formerly, Marxism was foreign to the French who were not well acquainted with it. The Marxist elements were weak in French Socialism. Marxism was primarily a German and Russian phenomenon. At present, Marxism appears in France as a novelty, almost like the last word of human thought. It is linked with the formation of the Communist Party. This novelty of Marxism may seem queer to the Russians who, like myself, were Marxists at the end of the nineteenth century.² The creative thought of Nietzsche, who also exercises a great influence on our era, was formed in the 60's and 70's of the last century. Marxism influences the social movement of the masses, while Nietzsche exercises an influence over the more refined cultured classes. Existentialism is in part tied up with the influence of Nietzsche. Kirkegaard belongs to the middle of the nineteenth century, but was not appreciated in his time. Since the first world war, his influence on the theological and philosophical trends has become stupendous. One recognizes it in the dialectical theology of Karl Barth. He is directly linked with Existentialism. The anxiety felt by the European, entering into a period of catastrophes, corresponds to that experienced individually by Kirkegaard, solitary and misunderstood. It is from Nietzsche and Kirkegaard that the tragic meaning of life comes, in the past somewhat foreign to the European who was imbued with an optimistic faith

²I was a Marxist, but I was never a materialist.

in the triumph of reason and progress. European rationalism, which the Russian thinkers denounced, is now shaken. One must also note the influence of Dostoevsky in Europe. There have been, in the nineteenth century, prophetic thinkers who have been ahead of their times, and they exercise an influence on our era which has produced no thinkers of equal force. But all this does not yet signify the creative entrance into a new era.

The revolution which took place in physics and chemistry since the quantum theory of Planck and Einstein's theory of relativity, is very characteristic of the new era. And here is what is particularly important: in the second half of the nineteenth century, physics, like all natural sciences, was linked with philosophical theories, having no special scientific value, such as materialism and positivism. Determinism prevailed. But "scientism" is by no means linked with scientific discoveries. It was not a science, but a bad philosophy. Physics of the twentieth century which has made important discoveries, has freed itself from any obligatory ties with materialistic philosophy and has questioned the very existence of the matter which, in the second half of the nineteenth century, seemed so certain. An Eddington is not a materialist, but a mystical Quaker. Surely, de Broglie is not a materialist either. But the new physics which presents a new picture of the natural world, which is not linked with a certain philosophy, while still having great importance for philosophy, has definitely shaken the old conception of the cosmos and is no longer connected with the determinism of the nineteenth century. (It is Heysenberg who is especially typical in this respect.) This is very characteristic of an era in which what seemed eternal is disintegrated. If discoveries are going to be pursued in the domain of atom splitting, a terrible blow will be given to the old stable cosmos. Man penetrates deeper into the cosmic life. The telluric period of his existence comes to an end. The planetary conscience of the earth increases considerably. For man there results a new power and a new servitude. In his book *The Nature of the Physical World*, Eddington formulates the conclusions of modern science in the following manner: "something unknown creates we know not what."

Freud and psychoanalysis also belong to the twentieth century. But psychoanalysis does not limit itself to the discoveries concerning the psychic life and, mainly, the life of the unconscious. Psychoanalysis also reflects the disintegration of the psychic unity of man. It is not only a scientific discovery, it can also become a force dis-

integrating individuality. The same phenomenon is reflected in the French novel, with Proust, Gide, Sartre. The Existentialist philosophy constitutes a new phenomenon in the philosophical thought of the new era. This philosophy comprises several currents which sometimes oppose each other. We know that the Existentialist terminology goes back to Kirkegaard, although modern French Existentialism of the Sartre type is completely removed from it. Heidegger and Jaspers are the most important. The Existentialist philosophy wishes to reflect the new position of man in the world of catastrophe, a situation unstable, menaced, a situation of man projected into a terrifying and alien world. Philosophy becomes more concrete, it studies human anxiety, fear, worry, despair, death. It does not aim to be a rational knowledge by means of concepts, it wants to know the mystery of the world in human existence, to express the existentiality of the knower. It is an actualistic philosophy; it recognizes the primacy of existence over essence. It shows another path to philosophy than the one which comes from Parmenides and Plato, a distinct path from that of the old rationalized empiricism. But Existentialism can take on two different forms: one religious and the other atheistic.

New forms of atheism which do not resemble the atheism of the nineteenth century appear in the modern world. During the last century the dominating forms of atheism were more elementary; it was habitually linked with materialism, with the cult of the natural sciences, with the optimistic faith in progress. It is only with Nietzsche that atheism has become deeper, more tragic, and one still feels today his latent influence. The new forms of modern atheism are in no way connected with materialism, with the optimistic faith in progress; it does not base itself on the naive belief in the all-powerfulness of the natural sciences. Heidegger and Nicholas Hartmann in Germany, and Sartre in France, are from this point of view characteristic. It is interesting to note that Hartmann lays the groundwork for his atheism exactly in the same way that Kant laid the groundwork of his faith in God. Kant believed that one could not prove the existence of God and make of it an object of knowledge. But the existence of God is a moral postulate of practical reason. If God does not exist, moral life crumbles, there is no more liberty, no moral responsibility. Hartmann reasons in the same manner, but with the opposite conclusion. He does not say that we can prove that God does not exist. But we must postulate that God does not exist, for if God exists, moral life crumbles; there is no more

human liberty, no more human responsibility, everything is determined by God. Let us add that Hartmann is in no way a materialist; he recognizes the ideal values which man is called upon to carry out. Heidegger only takes the negative side of Kirkegaard and expresses the atheistic Existentialism. Sartre who follows Heidegger considers that his atheism is more logical than that of the Marxists. The Marxists still believe that the historical processes have a meaning, that reason exists in the material processes which lead towards the perfect Socialist society. In the eyes of the Marxists the world is not absurd, it is a remainder of a faith, not in God, but in the divine; they are still idealists. The atheism of Sartre starts from the idea that the world is absurd and has no meaning. Man would not be able to rely on the historical processes, he himself must create the new life and the new values relying only on himself and his own liberty. Sartre does not accept the determinism which the Marxists and the atheists of the old type accept. But he, too, no more than anyone else, does not succeed in being a logical atheist. His doctrine of liberty recognizes in man an ideal principle, coming out of the natural order. Man must pass through new forms of atheism; it can have a purifying effect. It is the passage of the modern world through an era where man feels abandoned by God, through the darkness which precedes the new religious light. This religious light will reserve another place for man and his creative activity.

The heart-rending way in which the problem of liberty is put forth is characteristic of the modern world and the transformations which it is undergoing. The processes which unfold themselves in the world result in subservience rather than emancipation.³ The social reorganization of the world must liberate the working classes from exploitation and a humiliating position. But this liberation is not accomplished by liberal means, it presupposes the limitation of liberty and violence. The jump from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, mentioned by Marx and Engels, is postponed for an indeterminate period of time. The theme of liberty is a tragic one, especially tragic for the cultural élite which is undergoing a serious crisis. If this élite does not become impregnated with the idea of service, if it stubbornly keeps in a state of self-satisfaction and scorn for inferiors, it will be condemned to extinction. However it may be, liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is through, it is henceforth without strength. And the individualism,

³I have noted this in my book *The New Middle-Ages*, written twenty-three years ago.

which in the past may have been revolutionary, transforms itself into a sterile regret for the past. It is mainly the economic liberalism which becomes the reactionary force supporting a dying capitalism. Liberal democracy also is finished; one still seeks to support it, but it prevents the social reform of society. The future belongs to a new form of democracy—social democracy. The watch-word of liberty may become false and reactionary; it is proclaimed not for any love of liberty, but through fear, hatred of Socialism and Communism which seem menacing. Liberty is championed by those who, not long ago, were enemies of liberty, who loved their own liberty and not anyone else's. Today, not only the left-wing Catholics, but also the right-wing Catholics defend their liberty, pretending to have always done it. But in truth, when they dominated in the past, they were not champions of freedom; they fought against the emancipation movement. One is not able to postulate the problem of liberty in an abstract manner, starting from doctrinal principles. It should be put forth concretely. One must understand the complex dialectics of liberty, one must understand its dynamics. In a deeper sense, liberty is not so much a man's right as a man's duty. What makes this problem tragic is the fact that the limitation of liberty, and particularly, of economic liberty, a necessary limitation for the social reorganization of society and the solution of the "bread" problem, is accompanied by a limitation, furthermore, by a negation of the freedom of the mind and of spiritual creation. It is a badly oriented totalitarianism. The liberty of mind, of conscience, of thought, of speech, of creation, possesses an absolute character and is anchored in the kingdom of God and not in the kingdom of Caesar. But sinful humanity distinguishes with difficulty that which belongs to God from that which belongs to Caesar, and has never been able to make the distinction in a true and logical way. The mind has always been oppressed by the world and continues to be so in different forms. It is the projection outside of the human existence which is the cause of this. If Communism threatens the mind with its totalitarianism, Socialism threatens it with its boredom and its dullness. The problem of boredom is a serious one. The bacillus of boredom exists in all Christian parishes (of every faith), as well as in traditional Christian literature, which in this respect can compete with the Socialist press. The antidote to boredom is creative power, or power of hatred. But our dying world knows of few creative movements.

One cannot imagine the future as whole and united; there will

always be a duality, a spiritual struggle. Perhaps it will become particularly sharp when the social struggle calms down. Then it is that the spiritual problem, dimmed by social disorders and social contradictions, will appear in a pure state. One cannot imagine the future of Russia as determined and fatal; it depends on human freedom. One can foresee an extraordinary development in the economic and political force of Russia, and the birth of an American type of new civilization, dominated by technology and the thirst for earthly goods which, in the past, the Russian people lacked. But the will should be directed towards the creation of another future, where the social problem will be equitably solved, where the religious calling of the Russian people will manifest itself, and where the Russian people will remain faithful to its spiritual nature. The future also depends on our will power and our spiritual efforts. One must say the same thing for the whole world. The part played by Christianity in it cannot but be enormous. But this part will only be enormous on condition that the aged and frozen forms of Christianity be left behind and the prophetic side of Christianity be revealed, from which springs an entirely different attitude in connection with the social problem. Christianity, in the course of history, too often bowed to actual force and power, too often adapted itself to various political and social régimes; the judgment of the Church only revealed itself *post factum*. That signified the loss of the messianic conscience, the exclusive orientation towards the past. A new Christian conscience and a new Christian activity will make its appearance in the new era. This new Christian conscience has been prepared in Russia.

Background of the New Economic Policy*

By RUTH FISCHER

THROUGHOUT the Russian Civil War and for some years afterward there was a strong current toward local power, toward decentralization, toward workers' control of factories and regional armies, toward a federation of independent national units. This was the original October trend, which would be defeated only after it had fought a gradually losing fight within the Party, successively as the Workers' Opposition, the Military Opposition, the Trade-Union Opposition, all of which had their origin in an attempt to establish co-operative Socialism on a local basis.

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY

As they had first recognized and then fostered the peasants' seizure of the land before and during the Revolution, so after it the Bolsheviks conceded for a period the workers' seizure of factories. The economic revolution that was to shake Russia over the next three decades had begun slowly, with a decree on November 14, 1917, concerning workers' control. The old proprietors, still in physical and juridical possession of their property, were to continue production under workers' councils, which were given the right to control production plans and conditions of labor. But this scheme never worked. A series of individual expropriations set in; a red flag flying from a factory indicated that the workers had taken it over and were managing it. Socialism was not felt to be equivalent to the expropriation of private ownership, which was only an essential precondition; nor was the coördination of managers, engineers, and other experts under the control of workers' organizations considered Socialism. The first step toward a Socialist economy was the collective management by the producers themselves. As applied for instance to the railroads, this would mean that they would be controlled by those actually

*Copyright 1948 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. This article is Chapter 6 of *Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party*, by Ruth Fischer, to be published June 24 by the Harvard University Press [Ed.].

working on the trains and in the shops, and not by an expert appointed from the outside, even though he might be a trade-unionist or even a former railroad worker.

These attempts at workers' management were soon blocked by the general poverty and the disintegration of the economy. Large modern plants, isolated units in an agrarian country, were not a sufficient technological base for the small workers' élite to revive and direct production. In May 1918, the All-Russian Congress of Economic Councils opposed the spontaneous expropriation of single factories: the disrupted capitalist economy of Russia needed a more cautious transition to socialist forms. The Bolshevik Party labeled as syndicalist any attempt of the workers to interfere in production. Under the pressure of the German armies in the Ukraine, compulsory measures were intensified. On May 30, martial law was declared in the cities in the Soviet zone. On June 11, committees of poor peasants were set up to facilitate the requisitioning of grain; they continued the agrarian revolution by dividing up the land of the wealthier peasants among themselves. Soon they were joined by bands of armed workers, groups of about seventy-five armed with two or three machine guns, who began to requisition stored grain. For the countryside, these detachments became the personification of War Communism.

On June 28, a decree was passed ordering general nationalization of industry. All factories with a capital of more than one million rubles were confiscated, as well as smaller plants in certain industries—mining, textiles, tobacco, glass and porcelain, cement. The immediate reason for this decree was political, to combat the pressure of victorious Germany; the German army in the Ukraine was advancing to the Don, and if its successes continued the Russian entrepreneurs hoped to regain their status in their factories. In anticipation, many of them transferred their titles to German companies, some of which were set up only for this purpose.

Larin, who was at this time in Berlin on a commercial mission, on the 25th [of June] telegraphed to Lenin that there was a likelihood of the German Ambassador in Moscow lodging a claim with the Soviet Government that certain important Russian enterprises were now owned by German citizens and were accordingly to be exempt from any nationalization decree. Faced with this danger of an important part of Russian industry passing into German hands, the Council of People's Commissaries hastily within the space of forty-eight hours prepared and passed the new decree, while the All-Union Supreme Economic Council at an all-night sitting drew up a list of the enterprises to which the decree should apply. The result was that the decree appeared in *Izvestia*

on the very morning on which, in all probability, Count Mirbach was preparing to deliver his diplomatic note.¹

Thus the first general nationalization decree was a product of both the Civil War and the war with Germany, a strong political gesture without economic content. Most of the important industrial regions were cut off from Moscow—the Ukraine, the Don Basin, the Caucasus—the main industrial centers in this period, the principal reservoirs of vital food stocks and raw materials, of grain, coal, iron. More than half of the transport system was in enemies' hands, which in a country of Russia's continental size laid waste the other part. All economic measures were taken under the spur of military expediency, and as the Red Army gained the lost provinces, within their ruins was created the skeleton of a centralized economic administration. The greater the economic difficulties, the more stringent were the compulsory measures resorted to.

The year 1919 was one of military victories, gained at the cost of increasing want, in food, in raw materials, in production of all kinds. In March 1919, the food situation was so serious that compulsory measures for its distribution by coöperatives were intensified, which meant in substance that the rationing system was made stricter. City populations were forced into cooperatives and were divided for rationing into three categories: workers, their families, and the former ruling classes. For the workers and employees of State enterprises, including the families of soldiers, rationing was alleviated by supplemental distribution from canteens and bonuses in goods; they were also given their lodging and fuel free, as well as, in theory, telephone, gas and electricity, transport. At the end of this period, Russian economy was divided into two unequal halves: a rigidly controlled State economy, functioning poorly and granting only a bare minimum living wage to its workers, and an enormous disorganized agricultural sector.

Capitalism had been displaced, not by a planned economy but by economic anarchy, on which shaky foundation were raised the centralized bureaus. The roots of the structural change in Soviet economy, which matured only in the post N. E. P. period, are all to be found in the Civil War. The two main features—the utter disruption of the economy, and the contrast between the small controlled market with the much larger black market—are the characteristic features of all Europe following World War II.

¹Maurice Dobb, *Russian Economic Development Since the Revolution* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1928), pp. 59-60.

By the beginning of 1920, the Civil War had about come to an end. On January 26, the Entente blockade was abandoned. The result of this political amelioration, however, was not a loosening but a further intensification of economic control, a steady movement toward increased state economy. Total nationalization was decreed on November 29, 1920, when all plants with mechanical power employing five or more workers, or without mechanical power and employing ten or more workers, were nationalized.

With the trend toward nationalization, there was a tendency to abolish money. By a decree of April 30, 1920, all wages were to be paid in goods; in February 1921, six weeks before the inception of the NEP, taxation in money was abolished. The trend was in part an indication of the Bolshevik desire to establish a moneyless economy, and also the result of the breakdown of the currency system and the substitution of barter. On October 6, 1917, according to the figures of the State Bank, there had been 16.2 billion rubles in circulation; by May 1918 this had increased to 41 billion, and by the end of 1918 to more than 230 billion.²

THE RED ARMY AND THE PARTY

During these years of travail, Trotsky grew from one of the revolutionaries to a national leader, second only to Lenin in stature and fame. It was he who organized the Red Army, the most efficacious instrument both in repelling capitalist intervention and in shaping the young Soviet State. The Russia that emerged from the Civil War was the Russia of Lenin and Trotsky.

The Fourth Congress of the Soviets, March 15-17, 1918, appointed Trotsky Commissar of War, head of the Red Army that had been authorized by the Central Committee a month before. After the fall of Simbirsk, it was decided that Trotsky should go to the Volga front. On August 7, not knowing that Kazan had in the meantime fallen to the Czechoslovak legionaries, he left Moscow in a train hurriedly assembled during the night, from which, during the next two and a half years, he organized the Red Army. The train of the *Predrevoyensoviet* (the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet) went to "Samara, Chelyabinsk, Vyatka, Petrograd, Balashov, Smolensk, Samara again, Rostov-on-Don, Novocherkassk, Kiev,

²There were four kinds of rubles circulating; in late 1921 they had approximately the following exchange values: 100 Tsarist rubles = 800 to 1000 Soviet rubles = 500 to 800 Kerensky rubles = 300 to 500 Duma rubles.

Zhitomir, and so on, without end. . . . One of the notes to my military books mentions 36 trips, with a total run of over 105,000 kilometers."³

In organizing the Red Army, Trotsky frequently came into conflict with local workers' units. In the first phase of the Revolution, in each town, in each army unit, on each battleship, workers or soldiers or sailors had risen and established the power of their Soviet. "These detachments frequently had to wage minor wars. Enjoying as they did the sympathy of the masses, they easily became victorious. They received a certain tempering and their leaders a certain authority." These local military units, organized around the industrial units of the area, were coördinated with the workers' councils. They established a local power based on local armies, which might have been able to develop their own administrative and organizational methods even against the Moscow center. "In the beginning," Trotsky writes, "not only provinces but even region after region had its own Council of Peoples' Commissars with its very own Commissar of War."

Against this localist principle of military organization, Trotsky waged a two-year fight in the name of military efficiency.

Accustomed to easy victories, the guerrilla detachments . . . displayed their worthlessness; they did not have adequate intelligence sections; they had no liaison with each other; nor were they ever able to execute a complex maneuver. Hence—at various times, in various parts of the country—guerrillaism met with disaster. It was no easy task to include these separate detachments in a centralized system. The military ability of the commanders was not high, and they were hostile to the old officers, partly because they had no political confidence in them and partly to cover up lack of confidence in themselves.⁴

Trotsky introduced the severest military discipline.

I issued an order which was printed on the press in my train and distributed throughout the army: "I give warning that if any unit retreats without orders, the first to be shot down will be the commissar of the unit, and the next, the commander. Brave and gallant soldiers will be appointed in their places. Cowards, dastards and traitors will not escape the bullet. This I solemnly promise in the presence of the entire Red Army."⁵

Late in 1918, for the first time, a Communist Military Commissar, one Panteleyev, was court-martialed on Trotsky's specific orders and

³Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 414.

⁴Trotsky, *Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence*, edited and translated from the Russian by Charles Malamuth (New York: Harper and Brothers, copyrighted 1941), p. 298.

⁵Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 401.

shot for "violation of military duty." This incident aroused a violent opposition, in which almost all the party leaders joined. Stalin used it in his fight against Trotsky; Bukharin, "a Left Communist and therefore opposed to the employment of 'generals,'" had an article published in *Pravda* intimating that Trotsky shot "the best comrades without a trial." "The centralized army was proclaimed to be characteristic of the imperialist State and in its place the opposition advocated the system of guerrilla detachments."⁶

Opposition to Trotsky's military measures led to serious internal Party strife, which Lenin moderated. He made the Party realize that it owed the salvation of the Revolution and the country to Trotsky's military genius; on the other hand, he countered the centralization of the army by means of greater control of its commanders by the Party. The term "Military Opposition," used by Party historians and Trotsky alike to denote this faction, is inadequate to characterize the fundamental schism between Party power and army power, united under Lenin's command. This conflict is a major element in Stalin's rise, for Lenin protected him against Trotsky's extreme hostility. The improvisation of a modern army from scratch, brilliantly carried out by a Bolshevik newcomer, created in the decisive first three years of the new state a permanent and dangerous friction between the two new cadres in formation, the Red Army officer corps and the Party organizers.

When it took power, the Bolshevik Party was less centralized than any of its Western Social Democratic counterparts; it comprised loose units of men inexperienced in organizing, administering, and governing. The abundant verbalization on Party discipline was in striking contrast to the actual conditions of Party life in revolutionary Russia. Local groups, made up principally of new members, were cut off from the center by the Civil War and had to act largely on their own. Long-distance telephone, cables, airplanes, were at the disposal of only the highest layer of the Party. Rail communications, frequently interrupted by the war, took days and, to the remote provinces, weeks. Even Party literature was curtailed by the scarcity of paper.

Under these conditions there was a gusto in the Bolshevik units for independence and a constant revolt against the military discipline imposed by the state of emergency. Fighting against "petty bourgeois anarchy," Trotsky built up the Red Army with thousands and

⁶Trotsky, *Stalin*, p. 303.

later tens of thousands of old Tsarist officers. This integration of old-régime officers into the army of the Revolution aroused suspicion among the Party organizers. Nurtured in the lessons of the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks watched the amazing performance of their commander-in-chief with constant remembrance of Napoleon Bonaparte. Trotsky is undoubtedly right when he reports in his memoirs the rumors and intrigues against him in Moscow during the two and a half years he commanded the front from his mobile train. Lenin worked for a compromise and repeatedly tried to fill up the higher ranks of the new army with reliable Party members; the conflict is illustrated in an anecdote that Trotsky relates.

During our reverses in the East, when Kolchak was approaching the Volga, . . . Lenin wrote me a note: "What if we fire all the specialists and appoint Lashevich as commander-in-chief?" Lashevich was an old Bolshevik who had earned his promotion to the rank of a sergeant in the "German" war. I replied on the same note: "Child's play!"⁷

The process had gone much too far to be reversed. Later when Lenin again discussed the situation on the front during one of Trotsky's rare visits to Moscow, Trotsky gave him the details about the reconstruction of the army.

"You ask me," I said, "if it would not be better to kick out all the old officers. But do you know how many of them we have in the army now?"

"No."

"Not even approximately?"

"I don't know."

"Not less than thirty thousand."

"What?"

"Not less than thirty thousand. For every traitor, there are a hundred who are dependable; for every one who deserts, there are two or three who get killed. How are we to replace them all?"⁸

As organizer of the Red Army, Trotsky asked for and got increasing control over all available manpower. He was in charge of the rail system, whose reorganization was *the* prerequisite to the mobility of the army. His later program to fuse the trade-unions into the state administration must be put against this background. Rigid labor discipline was installed in all sectors connected with the army, and this decisively changed the climate in the factories. The vanguard of Bolshevik workers suffered this change with clenched teeth as an unalterable but temporary condition to survival, but they did

⁷Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 447.

⁸*Ibid.*

not accept this military discipline of labor as the socialist economy for which they had overthrown Tsarism and capitalism. Trotsky's reorganization of transport was again under the authority of Lenin, who supported him against resistance from all sides and in particular against that crystallizing in the Party into various forms of "Workers' Opposition," the first organized resistance within the Party to the State Party régime.

DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

An early group of this opposition, calling themselves Democratic Centralism, was led by Valerian V. Ossinsky, in 1918 chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, and Timofei V. Sapronov, who submitted an oppositionist platform to the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919. "The hierarchy of the officials follows the old style," they declared. "The Party and the Soviets are degenerating into a bureaucratic system. One single man, Lenin, holds all the strings of power in his hands." Ossinsky attacked especially the institution of the Politburo, then composed of five members. Its decisions on all important matters would gradually eliminate the Party from control. At the same Eighth Congress, the Orgburo (Organizational Bureau), also made up of five members, was founded; Stalin was the only man at once a member of both bureaus.

Ossinsky and Sapronov broadened their criticism of party organization to a general demand for democratization of the Soviet state. They asked for democracy not only in the Party and in the Soviets but also in the state administration and in industrial management. Their key demand was the separation of Party and Soviets, which was equivalent to a demand for the legalization of several parties. Another member of the group, Vladimir M. Smirnov, centered his attack on the too rigid organization of the army.

This faction was headed exclusively by the "Left" Communists of 1918—Ossinsky, Sapronov, Maximovsky, V. Smirnov and others. They used the same arguments against one-man management, against industrial armies, against the militarization of individual branches of industry as were used by the "Left" Communists two years earlier against the establishment of strict discipline in mills and factories, against the abolition of "the full power of the local authorities," against the creation of a strong centralized state apparatus, in fact against the proletarian dictatorship.⁹

⁹N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: International Publishers, 1934), II, 91.

During the Civil War the internal Party conflict was buried under the common will to survive; from March 1919 to March 1920, the Party doubled. The new members were mostly workers, who brought with them immense reserves of energy and *élan*. In this period the revolutionary wave was still rising, and the sacrifices these workers were willing to endure decided the fate of the Soviet state on the battlefield. Parallel with the upsurge of revolutionary enthusiasm, there was a growing desire for another type of Party and State organization.

The Eighth Party Congress, March 1919, rejected as incorrect the interpretation of Democratic Centralism, but it did not eliminate Ossinsky and Saprnov from key posts in Party and Soviet work. The oppositionist leaders included some of the great figures of the Civil War, and their popularity as worker-Bolsheviks lasted into peace time. The growth of the group was such that they were able to get control of the Ukraine—one of the most important provinces.

The natural antagonism between the Moscow center and the Ukraine, and the rapid change of local power there during the Civil War had made this the province where Anarchists, anti-centralist tendencies found most response among the population. Nationalist aspirations were welded together with Anarcho-Syndicalist movements shaped by the peculiarities of their Ukrainian origin. Nestor Makhno, the most important of several Anarcho-Syndicalist peasant leaders, established a type of peasant commune in Southern Ukraine, where he fought during 1918–1919. His attitude toward the Kremlin and the Red Army command was ambiguous. He was not at all an instrument of the Whites, nor was he disposed to submit to Muscovite control; he attempted to maneuver a degree of regional autonomy between the two dominant forces. In the early twenties the Red Army crushed his partisan movement, but the Makhno movement remained a Ukrainian legend.¹⁰

At the Fourth All-Ukrainian Party Congress, meeting in April 1920, the Democratic Centralism group won a majority in the Central Committee. The Ukrainian Communists elected this anti-centralist faction in the hope of reducing Moscow's interference to a minimum. This fusion of national resistance with the anti-state group in the Bolshevik Party was correctly interpreted by the Politburo as a most dangerous symptom and was quickly quelled; by Moscow's order the Saprnov Central Committee was disbanded.¹¹

¹⁰Cf. P. Arshinov, *Die Makhno-Bewegung, 1918–1921* (Berlin, 1923).

¹¹Saprnov and his group combined their fight for collective management and

Another group, calling themselves Workers' Truth, were led by Alexander A. Bogdanov, a Bolshevik veteran and theorist. He developed Sapronov's analysis to the thesis that the Socialist character of the Russian Revolution was completely destroyed. The group demanded democracy, by which they meant freedom of political organization and the elimination of the Communist Party's control of the state.

A third group, called the Workers' Opposition, with a program essentially the same as those of Democratic Centralism and Workers' Truth,¹² was led by Alexandra Kollontai and Alexander G. Shlyapnikov. The group gained importance during 1920-1921.

WAR COMMUNISM AND THE TRADE UNIONS

Lenin had linked the War Communist economy to the improvement of the country's technical equipment by coöperation with revolutionary Germany. His "Electrification plus Soviets equals Socialism" meant a high level of technical development combined with a full unfolding of workers' democracy. Lenin was so much concerned with the technological level as an inalienable premise for council democracy that he called the first step of such an electrification plan "the second program of our Party." The Eighth Congress of the Soviets, December 22-29, 1920, adopted an electrification program, which was bound to one for the reconstruction of industry. The year 1920, which marked the virtual close of the Civil War, was also the climax of a trend toward planned centralized economy.

One aspect of this trend was the proposal to use large-scale labor armies. The peasants' sons were not to be sent home to the country-

Soviets independent of the State Party with one to protect the Ukrainian peasant from rigid measures of the Moscow center. Thus, in the later exegeses of Party history, the Bolshevik worker Sapronov appears as an agent of the kulaks.

"At the Fourth All-Ukrainian Conference a group of supporters of 'Democratic Centralism,' led by Sapronov, came forward as the political exponents of the ideas of certain groups within the Party which had succumbed to the direct influence of petty-bourgeois and kulak elements. They emphatically opposed the independent organization of the poor peasants, the formation of Committees of Poor Peasants in the Ukraine. Yet without such organization, it would have been impossible to expropriate the land of the powerful class of Ukrainian kulaks, it would have been impossible to carry out in the Ukrainian villages the socialist revolution which had been effected in the Russian villages in the summer and autumn of 1918.

"By fighting against the socialist revolution in the Ukrainian countryside, the Sapronov group acted, in effect, as the agents of the Ukrainian kulaks." (Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, II, 87.)

¹²Alexandra Kollontai, *Die Plattform der Arbeiteropposition* (Berlin, 1921).

side, where misery and starvation prevailed, but were to work as labor battalions wherever manpower was needed. During the Civil War, following Lenin's appeal, volunteer labor brigades (called *Subbotniks*, from the Russian word for Saturday) cleared roads and maintained railroad lines. Now this method was to be extended; the disrupted Russian economy was to be conquered by the same man, Trotsky, and with the same methods that had proved so efficacious in defeating the enemy. It was planned to militarize labor completely, if temporarily; not only was the Red Army to be maintained and transformed into a labor army, but it was to be enlarged through a draft of peasant workers. On January 15, 1920, the first labor army was formed out of the Third Red Army Corps, followed soon afterward by two others.

Four months later, with the verve of a great revolutionary tribune, Trotsky defended the project. Of the 1,150,000 industrial workers, he said, only 850,000 were working. "Where are the 300,000? They have gone away. Where to? To the village? Perhaps to other industrial occupations. Perhaps they are busy with speculation. Thus, in a military sense, as against 800,000 workers there are 300,000 deserters." Like soldiers, workers must be forced to do their duty. The trade-unions have an enormous task to mobilize the workers, but it is a different matter with the peasants because there is no trade-union apparatus to carry out the militarization of the village.

We must first, Trotsky continued, concentrate on the production of the means of production. "Only then, when we have the means of production, can we go over to the production of consumers' goods directly for the masses." Once having overcome the initial poverty, economic development will proceed by leaps and bounds, overtaking capitalist development. Important branches of industrial and home economy, for example, will be electrified without passing through the steam age.

"The bourgeois axiom" that compulsory work is not productive is correct only if free voluntary labor is compared with the feudal system. It is true that productivity of the labor armies is low and was at first even lower. Thirteen to fifteen soldiers, sometimes as many as thirty, cut only as much timber as three to four men before the war, or as much as one man in the northern provinces. But men of the first labor armies who had to cut timber spent a good portion of their time with transport; many of them did not know how to cut down a tree or cut it up, and there had been no instruction and no

tools. "These circumstances are sufficient to explain the low productivity of labor."

We must draft a minimum number of peasants, and try to replace militarization by the concept of the duty of labor. However, we must fight against deserters with the methods of the army. "We cannot wait until every peasant and every peasant woman understand. We must compel everyone to stand at the place where he belongs. . . . If there is unified party consciousness and party will, we will fulfill the greatest task in world history."¹³

Enthusiastically the planners, Larin Kritzmann, and others, enlarged this proposal to a general scheme for the reconstruction of Russian industry by militarization of all labor. This plan to reconstruct Russia by labor armies never materialized. In practice it amounted to using a portion of the army for such emergency tasks as the clearing of roads and railroad tracks and various reconstruction projects. Already in disintegration because of the continued "desertion" of peasant-soldiers, the plan ended completely with the installation of the N. E. P.

In this concept of state economy, there was no place for worker management and shop stewards. At the head of each of the new state enterprises was a single manager, in most cases a technician. In the early period these specialists were subordinated to Communist commissars, whose duties referred not only to labor relations but to production plans proper. The new period of war economy had been opened with a mighty drive against workers' interference with production; the state manager had to be fully empowered to direct the enterprise. In this period trade-union membership became compulsory.

Parallel with the opposition of Bolshevik workers to the Party rule, there was resistance in the trade-unions, which numbered in this period about three million members. Once poverty and Civil War had made one-man management the rule, the question became who would designate this man in the Party, the army, or the unions. The program of the Workers' Opposition groups¹⁴ had had a wide re-

¹³Trotsky, "Ueber die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben des wirtschaftlichen Aufbaus," speech to the Ninth Party Congress, April 1920, *Russische Korrespondenz*, July 1920, No. 10, pp. 11 ff.

¹⁴"Workers' Opposition groups" here include not only the group of Shlyapnikov and Kollontai, but also the two previous factions, Democratic Centralism and Workers' Truth, and various other groupings expressing part of a general ideological trend against the monopoly of the State Party.

sponse, but it was becoming obvious that now Lenin and the Party would resist a return to the collective management of the early revolution. Russian trade-unionism announced its claim, to counter Trotsky's and the Party's.

In contrast to the Western labor movement, Russian unions were a young organization. Under the Tsar, their growth had been handicapped by long underground periods. This is not to say that the Russian working class went into the revolution without experience in mass organization. Since the turn of the century, and particularly in the period around 1905, there had been a mass of educational societies, sick-benefit groups, cultural organizations, and especially co-operatives—all groups that served more or less as a school for trade-unionism. Immediately after the February Revolution, unions were organized on a nationwide scale in the millions, in contrast to the hundreds of thousands in the Party. Beside its proletarian core the Party included peasants, intellectuals, and civil servants; but the unions were much more limited. More than any other Russian organization, their growth indicates the growth of economic awareness in industrial centers during these years. Throughout the Civil War, they were bound to the Party and army in intimate relation, but the influence of the Mensheviks was greater in the unions than in other Soviet institutions.

The proposals of the various Workers' Opposition groups were the topic of general discussion in 1919-21. The union organizers demanded that they be given the task of managing industry; this in their view was the specific rôle of trade-unions in a Socialist society. The fact that the unions were already centralized and disciplined would avoid the disadvantages of localism; on the other hand, that they represented a far broader stratum than the Party would give them, in this key position, a rôle of counter-balancing its monopolistic aspirations. Though this trade-union platform and that of the Workers' Opposition group can be separated in Party histories, in practice they were often supported by the same group of men. Both of the platforms were intended as a counter-plan to Trotsky's labor army and the Party dictatorship. The discussion reached a culmination in the proposal of Shlyapnikov for a congress of producers, which would be the real government of the country. In a buffer group, Bukharin proposed the milder compromise that trade-union nominations to economic and administrative posts be binding for the Party. This "trade-union question" was the topic around which the Ninth Party Congress, in March-April 1920, revolved; the discussion

reached its apex in November, at the Fifth All-Russian Trade-Union Congress.

The principal opponent of the unions was Trotsky, who wanted to transform them into a branch of a militarized economy.

In the system of War Communism in which all the resources are, at least in principle, nationalized and distributed by government order, I saw no independent rôle for trade-unions. If industry rests on the state's insuring the supply of all the necessary products to the workers, the trade-unions must be included in the system of the state's administration of industry and distribution of products.¹⁵

The trade-unions opposed this scheme with the utmost energy. In retrospect, it might be said that such a fusion of trade-unions into the state apparatus would have reduced the unions to a labor front of the State Party, but in Trotsky's concept it was meant, partially at least, to counterbalance the dominance of the Party in the state apparatus by strengthening his own apparatus. As leader of an army-labor combination, Trotsky would have had the key position in the Party and in the state. Despite the bitterness of the dispute at this time between Trotsky and the Workers' Opposition, all the oppositionist groups alike hoped to shift power from the Party to broader organizations. "The resemblance of the platform of the 'Workers' Opposition,' to Trotsky's platform was that, while Trotsky spoke of turning the trade-unions into organs of the state, the 'Workers' Opposition' spoke of trade-unionizing the state."¹⁶

Against both oppositions, Lenin defended the Party monopoly. He rejected the claims to trade-union management that Shlyapnikov and Tomsy put forward as an Anarcho-Syndicalist deviation, which meant that in his opinion they were incorrect in general and in particular unsuitable in the present disruption of Russian economy. Only much later did it become a basic tenet of Stalinism that Anarcho-Syndicalists had to be mercilessly liquidated as traitors to the working class. Lenin fought for the centralized power of the Party, but always with a full consciousness of the dangers to the original concept of Soviet democracy involved in the use of compulsory measures. This comes out most clearly in his opposition to Trotsky's plan of transforming the trade-unions into state labor organizations. For Lenin, the principal task of the unions was not to administer but to form a link between the governmental bodies and the broad masses, and to act as schools of Communism and economic manage-

¹⁵Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 464.

¹⁶N. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, II, 116.

ment. This very limited concept did not allow the unions to share in the state power, but, on the other hand, Lenin defended the independent rôle of unions in the Soviet state as representatives of their class interests, imperative in a state still far removed from even the first phase of realizing its goal of a classless workers' state. This argument followed from Lenin's life-long belief that trade-unionism is one of the three organic forms of proletarian struggle—the economic, the political, and the theoretical. But it was not an answer to the problem, which grew in the next months to unmanageable proportions. The State Party, isolated, splitting between its workers' and administrators' wings, estranged from the broad masses, suffered the growing hostility of the entire country and drifted toward catastrophe.

THE KRONSTADT UPRISING

On March 1, 1921, following a strike wave that was most severe in Petrograd, the general unrest came to a climax in the fortress of Kronstadt, before the gates of Petrograd. The sailors and the garrison called a citizens' meeting which was attended by 16,000 people. Kalinin spoke in vain against the platform this meeting adopted, which became the rallying point of the opposition in the country. The Kronstadt sailors formulated an alternate answer, imbued with the October spirit, to every major problem. They represented conflicting tendencies and groups—the multitude of dissatisfied peasants, the middle class, the intellectuals, the organized counter-revolutionary nuclei, but also the opposition of the workers to state regimentation.

The Kronstadt program, made up in substance of the following points, has become increasingly relevant after twenty-five years of Party dictatorship.

(1) New elections by secret ballot with full freedom of agitation in the pre-election campaign "among workers and peasants."

(2) Freedom of speech and press for workers and peasants, for Anarchists and Left Socialists.

(3) Freedom of assembly for labor unions and peasant organizations.

(4) Liberation of Socialist and Anarchist prisoners.

(5) Elimination of the practice by which the Party has representation in all Soviet institutions; no Party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas and state support for such purposes.

(6) Abolition, in particular, of the corresponding Party commissars in the army.

(7) Equality of rations for all who work, with the exception of those employed in trades detrimental to health.

(8) Abolition of Communist guards in mills and factories; where guards are necessary, the shop units should designate them from the ranks of the army and the factory workers, according to their judgment.

(9) Full freedom for peasants with regard to their land, on the condition that they manage it with their own means and without employing hired help.

(10) The right of craft production by one's own effort.¹⁷

The Bolshevik Party declared that the White Guardist General Kozlovsky was behind the Kronstadt uprising and, therefore, no compromise was possible. On March 7, at the order of the Politburo, Trotsky began the bombardment. Kronstadt was taken after ten days of battle, waged during the Tenth Party Congress. Between the 1st and the 17th of March, several regiments of the Petrograd garrison and of the sailors of the port were disarmed and sent to the Ukraine or the Caucasus. Arrests and executions throughout Russia followed. At the height of the mutiny, the fiftieth anniversary of the Paris Commune of 1871 was celebrated in Moscow.

Lenin had given Trotsky the order to take the Kronstadt fortress under artillery fire, but he realized that this first large-scale uprising against the state power, one so near the industrial and political center of Russia, Petrograd, marked the end of the old course. Lenin had held the Party together by a series of compromises, by continuous realignment of conflicting groups. He had compromised with Trotsky on the question of army structure. He had tempered the opposition of the Party organizers, led by Stalin, against Trotsky. He had tolerated the state planners, but had not permitted the fusion of the trade-unions into the state. He could not let the fortress Kronstadt fall into the hands of a group hostile to the Party, but he also could tolerate the dangerous experiments with the Russian peasantry no longer. At this hour, Lenin gained his full stature and retook the reins of the Party into his hands. A peasant economy cannot be industrialized by military and, therefore, terrorist measures. The dictatorship in Russia was based on two classes, and Lenin intended that this alliance be maintained. Following the Kronstadt uprising, Lenin

¹⁷Emma Goldman, *My Further Disillusionment in Russia* (New York, 1924), pp. 67-68.

returned to his original concept of the transformation of Russian economy, which was as different from the reality of war economy as from the program of the state planners.

On March 8, the Tenth Party Congress assembled in Moscow. Recognizing how close the Party was to a breakdown of its power, the delegates rallied around Lenin as the one man who might yet save them.

Under the slogan, "Give us back free trade," Lenin said, the country was in revolt against the Bolshevik dictatorship. The peasant masses and the urban middle class hoped that by overthrowing the rigid regimentation of the State economy they would be able to find a way out of their misery and poverty by the restoration of market relations between town and country. It was the protest of the small producer against an inefficient state industry. The rebellion reflected more, however, than the resistance of the petty bourgeoisie; it had deeply affected the proletariat and had spread to the factories of Moscow and the provinces. Lenin commented on "the ferment and discontent" lately manifest among non-party workers; at meetings recently held in Moscow, "it was evident that they were transforming the slogans of democracy and liberty into slogans which would mean the overthrow of Soviet power."

Lenin called on the working class not to abandon the State Party in the hour of its greatest peril. He advocated the strongest measures against dissidents; the Tenth Party Congress proscribed Party factions, a step that later gave Stalin a starting point for his own methods.

In the midst of the country's turmoil, however, in terms that today seem shockingly polite and moderate for Communist polemics, Lenin discussed as much as attacked Shlyapnikov's views on Communist society, drawing on Engels to substantiate his point. He rejected the program of the Workers' Opposition as unrealizable under the conditions of want, and in a land where the peasant population would predominate for many years. The shortest period, he declared, in which large-scale industry can be organized sufficiently to make the worker the central figure of Russian economy, is ten years, but he accepted this "Anarcho-Syndicalist" proposal as an opportunity for an interchange of opinion among Party members on this question.

But if a comprehensive discussion is necessary, let us have it, by all means; we shall find the people who will quote in detail the whole of our literature. And if it is necessary and appropriate, we shall raise this question internationally, for you have just heard the report of the representative of the Communist In-

ternational and you all know that a certain deviation towards the Left exists in the ranks of the revolutionary international working-class movement. The deviation about which I have just spoken is the same as the Anarchist deviation of the K. A. P. D. in Germany, the fight against which was clearly revealed at the last congress of the Communist International.

Lenin pleaded with Shlyapnikov for—

A year or two of relief from famine, a year or two of regular supplies of fuel, so that the factories may function, and we shall receive a hundred times more assistance from the working class, and far more talent will arise from its ranks than now. No one has any doubt about this, nor can there be any doubts.

Lenin summed up this statement by declaring that the propagation of Shlyapnikov's program was incompatible with membership in the Communist Party, but added that "scientific research" on it should not be abandoned.

If Comrade Shlyapnikov, for example, in addition to his recently published book on his experiences in the revolutionary struggle in the underground period, writes a second volume in his leisure time during the next few months in which he will analyze the concept "producer," we shall all be pleased.

Lenin analyzed the background of the crisis: The demobilization of the peasant army was releasing hundreds of thousands of "broken men" who could not find work, whose only trade had become war; the result was often banditry. "The demobilization created an incredible number of insurgent elements throughout the country." The proletariat is a small minority, while the peasants remain the overwhelming majority. "We could not demonstrate [to them] the superiority of large-scale production in practice, because this large-scale production has been destroyed." The area under cultivation, the means of production, and the yield have diminished; there is "absolute starvation" in the towns. The petty-bourgeois elements are arousing the peasantry against the workers, and that is more dangerous than Denikin, Yudenich, and Kolchak together.

Lenin ended his report with the lapidary words, "Owing to the economic situation, the Soviet power is shaking."

Lenin proposed to announce "that very evening over the radio to all parts of the world that the Congress of the Government Party has substituted a tax for the food quotas and has thus given a stimulus to the small farmer to enlarge his farm." He referred to a law dated October 3, 1918, introducing taxation in kind, which had remained a dead letter. The kernel of Lenin's New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) was not taxation in kind alone, nor even the security given the peasant

by ensuring him a fair return for his labor, but the return to a limited market system and the creation thereby of a changed political atmosphere in the country.

The utopian period was over. In Europe the trend was obviously towards regaining social equilibrium after the post-war crisis, and, despite all the emphasis on the world revolution, the Bolsheviks were not counting on rapid changes in Asia. "During the past three years we have learned to understand that banking on an international revolution does not mean calculating on a definite date. . . . That is why we must be able to coordinate our activities with the class relationships in our country and in other countries, in order that we may be able to maintain the Dictatorship of the Proletariat for a long period and remedy, if only gradually, all the misfortunes and crises which have befallen us."¹⁸

¹⁸Lenin, report to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), March 8, 1921, *Selected Works*, English edition (Moscow, 1937), IX, 83-106.

Dostoevsky:

Prophet and Psychologist

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

UNMISTAKABLY one of the Big Three of Russian novelists in the nineteenth century (the others being Tolstoy and Turgenev) Fyodor Dostoevsky is set apart by his peculiar qualities as prophet and psychologist. Tolstoy possessed a more even naturalism of style. Turgenev knew the Russian peasants better, although he philosophized about them less, than Dostoevsky.

But the latter is unique and unapproachable in Russian and, indeed, in world literature, by virtue of the prophetic fire which lights up the greater passages in his works and makes one forget the lapses into poor construction, even into banality, which reflect the intense strain under which most of his writing was done. And few writers in any language have shown a deeper intuitive insight into the heights and depths of human character, have produced such vivid contrasts in saintliness and bestiality.

From the experiences of a life that was, in the main, harassed, tormented and unhappy, Dostoevsky derived a philosophy of apocalyptic God-seeking, of impatience with lukewarmness either in good or in evil, of mystical exaltation of the Russian spirit. One of the most individualistic of authors, he is also one of the most typically Russian. His work is a constant proof of the truth of the observation of the modern Russian philosopher, Nicholas Berdyaev:

"The Russian spirit is not prone to scepticism, and a sceptical liberalism suits it less than anything."

Dostoevsky always prefers the sinner, especially the humble and repentant sinner, to the self-satisfied pharisee. His novels are shot through with the themes of redemption through suffering and of the obligation to forgive everything because everyone is unconsciously responsible for whatever happens.

As a young man he started out on the typical career of a Russian radical intellectual of the forties. Living in St. Petersburg, he joined a discussion circle headed by a Russian disciple of Fourier named Petrashevsky. The members of the circle were arrested and several, including Dostoevsky, were condemned to death. At the last moment, when they were awaiting execution, the sentences were

commuted to imprisonment at hard labor and subsequent exile in Siberia.

This experience permanently affected Dostoevsky and aggravated his tendency toward epileptic seizures. His life as a convict in Siberia gave him the material for *The House of the Dead*, a vivid picture of prison life and of the varying types of ordinary criminals who were mingled with the political exiles.

But imprisonment and exile did not make Dostoevsky an embittered, implacable revolutionary. On the contrary, he developed a much more conservative ideology, broke with the Russian radical and liberal circles, and lost few opportunities of satirizing their representatives. This was not the result of opportunism. Few distinguished men have shown less capacity for practical opportunism than Dostoevsky.

Until his second wife brought some order into his business affairs and finances, Dostoevsky lived in a morass of debt and poverty, unable to resist the importunities of grasping and needy relatives and plagued with the fatal illusion that he could make a fortune at the roulette table. Advance royalties were recklessly squandered on this addiction to gambling. The diary of his second wife, who was of a prosaic, methodical disposition, unable to resist the impulse to jot down the price of everything the couple purchased in Dresden and other European cities, is full of records of his successes and failures at the gaming table.

Dostoevsky's break with the main current of Russian revolutionary thought in the nineteenth century, which was socialistic and materialistic, is attributable not to intimidation, but to a profound conviction that materialistic Socialism offered no genuine or satisfactory solution for the problems of human existence. He also saw with clairvoyant perception the embryonic tyrant that often lurked in the extreme revolutionary.

If there is something peculiarly Russian in Dostoevsky (unlike the cosmopolitan Turgenev, he never felt at home in Germany or France) there is also a universal quality in his genius. Some of the supreme problems that have occupied the minds and hearts of the world's thinkers and mystics, the existence of God, the duality of good and evil in the human soul, the issues of guilt, punishment and redemption, are treated with burning intensity.

This is peculiarly true in what is probably Dostoevsky's greatest work, *The Brothers Karamazov*. Each of these brothers is more than an actor in a story that is vivid and absorbing in its own right. Each

is the symbol of a moral and intellectual attitude toward life. Ivan is the intellectual whose feverish, active, searching mind recognizes no bounds for its speculation. Alyosha is the gentle, humble saint, the ideal Russian Christian. And Dimitri is the sinner for whom there is hope, the man of lusts and passions and generous impulses who is finally redeemed as he accepts punishment for a crime he has not committed.

Many years ago, living in Moscow, I heard one of the greatest actors of the Moscow Art Theatre, Katchalov, declaim some of the soliloquies of Ivan Karamazov. It was an unforgettable intellectual and emotional experience, comparable with hearing one of the greatest British actors recite the most impressive passages in Shakespeare. One of the passages which Katchalov selected reflects the dualistic attitude toward Western Europe which Dostoevsky and other Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century felt. Ivan Karamazov says to his brother, Alyosha:

I want to travel in Europe. . . . And yet I know that I am only going to a graveyard, but it's a most precious graveyard, that's what it is. Precious are the dead that lie there, every stone over them speaks of such burning life in the past, of such passionate faith in their work, their truth, their struggle and their science that I know I shall fall on the ground and kiss those stones and weep over them; although I'm convinced in my heart that it has long been nothing but a graveyard.

Here one finds a combined expression of two strong trends in Russian intellectual life during the last century. Russian national culture, outside the sphere of religion, was late in flowering. There was no fourteenth century Russian Dante, no sixteenth century Russian Shakespeare, no seventeenth century Russian Newton, no eighteenth century Russian Mozart or Voltaire.

But in the nineteenth century there was a remarkable upsurge of Russian creative achievement, especially in literature and music. There was a growth in the numbers of the Russian educated class and a much wider appreciation of the glories of European literature and science, music, and art. Russians were passionate intellectual pilgrims to the centers of European learning.

At the same time there was a widespread mood of rejection of the West, of more or less clearly formulated consciousness of unique and superior elements in Russian life and thought. There was a feeling that the West had played out its rôle, that Russia was a young country with a boundless future.

Dostoevsky strongly shared this mood and this feeling. His

thinking is prophetic and intuitive rather than analytical and logical. But one finds in his fiction and in his less known journalistic writings a tendency to regard as equivalent and allied the conceptions of Russia, Orthodoxy, Brotherhood, and Christ. On the other side he marshals the ideas of Europe, Roman Catholicism, Egoism, and Anti-Christ.

Some of Dostoevsky's writings in the later years of his life, when he fell under the influence of the nationalist publicist, Danilevsky, are suffused with a rather commonplace jingo spirit. The novelist was not at his best in dealing with questions of internal and foreign policy. As the critic Rozanov observes:

In our whole literature there never was a writer whose ideals were so completely severed from current realities.

So it is not surprising to find Dostoevsky, at the time of the Russian war with Turkey and the subsequent European diplomatic crisis (1877-78) boldly predicting that there would be an all-European war, in which the eastern powers would be victorious and Roman Catholicism would be replaced by a revived eastern type of Christianity. It was at this time that he indulged in the following anti-western forecasts:

"Perhaps not we, but our children will see the end of England."

"The fate of Poland awaits France, and she will cease to exist politically."

But there was something deeper than mere preoccupation with Russian national interests and territorial claims in Dostoevsky's antipathy to the West. He saw in Western institutions elements of cold legalism, of justification by good works which were inconsistent with his own ardent creed of universal love, recognition of the responsibility of all for the sins and sufferings of all.

Dostoevsky knew Europe from visits and disliked it. He disliked America without ever having visited that country. When Dimitri Karamazov is contemplating flight from penal servitude in Siberia to America he says:

How shall I put up with the rabble out there, though they may be better than I, every one of them. I hate that America already. And, though they may be wonderful at machinery, everyone of them, damn them, they are not of my soul. I love Russia, Alyosha, I love the Russian God, though I am a scoundrel myself. I shall choke there.

And in another novel, *The Possessed*, Dostoevsky falls into a vein

of satire, not one of the most prominent characteristics of his work, when he describes the imaginary will of an American millionaire:

He left the whole of his vast fortune for building factories and teaching the applied sciences, his skeleton to the students of the local academy and his skin for a drum, on which should be played day and night the American national anthem.

One of the most grandiose and profound philosophical passages in all the novels of Dostoevsky is the legend of the Grand Inquisitor, recounted by Ivan Karamazov. It possesses special significance for our own age, which has seen the emergence of so many dictatorships. This phenomenon cannot be accounted for altogether by crude brute force. The totalitarian régimes of our time have exploited indifference to freedom, inability to use freedom constructively, even a fear of freedom on the part of some individuals.

This legend represents Christ as coming to earth again and being brought before the Grand Inquisitor in Seville. The latter recognizes him, and reproaches him for disturbing the minds of men, pacified by what the Church has offered them, miracle, mystery, and authority, with the vision of freedom of choice as between good and evil. Dostoevsky appreciated very keenly this viewpoint that freedom is a fatal gift to humanity, although he did not share it. There is power, as well as irony in the words which he places in the mouth of the Inquisitor:

I tell thee that man is tormented by no greater anxiety than to find someone quickly to whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the ill-fated creature is born. . . . Didst Thou forget that man prefers peace, and even death, to freedom of choice in the knowledge of good and evil? Nothing is more seductive for man than his freedom of conscience, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering. . . . Thou didst desire man's free love, that he should follow Thee freely, enticed and taken captive by Thee. . . . Thou didst crave for free love and not the base raptures of the slave before the might that has overawed him forever. But Thou didst think too highly of men therein, for they are slaves, of course, though rebellious by nature. . . . We have corrected Thy work and have founded it upon miracle, mystery, and authority. And men rejoiced that they were again led like sheep, and that the terrible gift that had brought them such suffering was at last lifted from their hearts.

In this same strangely beautiful, moving, and prophetic parable the Grand Inquisitor further reproaches Christ for not having taken advantage of his ability to establish a kingdom on earth, a universal state, which would have satisfied an eternal and universal craving of the human race. He argues that, by doing so, the Savior would

have given universal peace. "For who can rule men if not he who holds their conscience and their bread in his hands?"

When Dostoevsky went into Siberian imprisonment he received a Bible from the hands of some of the wives and widows of the Decembrists, as the men who organized a revolt against Tsar Nicholas I in 1825 and dreamed of a constitutional régime for Russia, were called. This was the only book which prisoners at that time could take with them. The impression which it left on the author's mind was profound. All his works are deeply influenced by religious and moral wrestlings and ponderings.

The eternal problem of whether a good end can justify evil means is put dramatically by Ivan to Alyosha in one of their endless dialogues, long as the Russian winter nights.

"Imagine," says Ivan, "that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me and tell the truth."

"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.

Dostoevsky entered the lists against western radicalism and liberalism combatively in his novel *Besy*, which is usually translated as *The Possessed*, although it literally means "Devils." The plot was suggested in part by a sensational contemporary event. A student who belonged to a revolutionary circle, but who had shown signs of rebelling against its discipline, had been murdered.

Dostoevsky introduced a crime of somewhat similar inspiration into this novel. Two of the principal characters are the Verkhovensky, father and son. Granovsky, a pioneer Russian westernized liberal, is the model for the father, Stepan Verkhovensky, while the fanatical young revolutionary, Nechaev, disciple of Bakunin and chief of the organization which murdered the student, is caricatured in the son. The idea of the superman, who recognizes no higher moral law, and the sense that revolutionary materialism can lead to extreme despotism are found in this work.

Kirilov, one of the characters in *The Possessed*, feels that the fear of death is the last obstacle to be conquered in his aspiration to become a superman. It is with this motive that he commits suicide. And another of the characters, Shigalov, makes the deeply prophetic remark:

"My starting point is unlimited freedom, my conclusion unlimited despotism."

Dostoevsky's contemporary, Turgenev, is satirized in *The Possessed* under the name of Karmazinov. He is represented as a timid, effeminate figure who lives in morbid fear of revolution and makes a habit of saying farewell to his readers without ever ceasing to turn out literary work. Dostoevsky even dug up a story to the effect that Turgenev had been in a storm at sea and pleaded with the sailors to make sure that his life was saved because he was an only son.

This malicious caricature, which does Turgenev much less than justice, was prompted both by professional jealousy and by personal incompatibility of temperament. Turgenev was a well-to-do established author when Dostoevsky was little known and struggling with a crushing burden of debts. And Dostoevsky could never forgive Turgenev for having lent him a sum of money during the period of his infatuation with the gaming tables, a debt which he was not able to repay for some years.

Like many individuals who have professed boundless love for humanity in the abstract, Dostoevsky was far from easy in personal relations. He was extremely irregular in business relations and often irritable and unreasonable. On the other hand he was probably more sinned against than sinning and did more than his share in maintaining a brood of parasitic relations from whose importunities he was gradually removed by the practical second wife who brought some order and security into the last decade of his life.

There has been an exaggerated tendency in foreign countries to identify Dostoevsky with "the Russian soul." He was an intensely subjective author and it is easy to find his own unusual life reflected in his novels. The long drawn out court scenes in *The Brothers Karamazov* and *Crime and Punishment* probably owe their inspiration to the prolonged judicial examination of Dostoevsky after the arrest of the Petrashevsky group. The author's own malady, epilepsy, is communicated to Prince Myshkin, hero of *The Idiot*. Biographical research establishes points of similarity between women who figured in Dostoevsky's life and some of the more passionate women characters in his novels.

His stature should grow in the twentieth century. For, along with his uncanny insight into some of the dark places of the human soul, he displays a truly prophetic vision in relation to certain issues which are more real and pressing in the broken and disordered twentieth century than they must have seemed in the relatively stable and orderly nineteenth.

Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries

By A. LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY

I

THE first relations between Russia and England were established four centuries ago, and the circumstances under which they occurred and matured were prophetic of those to follow. In 1553 the British, to offset the control of the sea lanes of the world acquired by the Portuguese and the Spaniards in the age of great discoveries, decided to seek for a road to fabulous Cathay and the Spice Islands by striking eastwards through the Northeast passage. Of the three ships, however, which set out on this expedition under the double command of Richard Chancellor and Sir Hugh Willoughby, only Chancellor's ship survived a great storm off the coast of Norway, entered the White Sea, and anchored at the estuary of the Northern Dvina. Tsar Ivan the Terrible welcomed the arrival of Chancellor, who assumed that he had discovered a new continent, with more than customary diplomatic courtesy and warmth. He might well be pleased. Faced with a virtual cordon sanitaire established by powerful Poland, Sweden, and the Livonian Order, who were endeavoring to keep Russia segregated from contacts with the West, he welcomed a new trade route around North Cape which completely outflanked his potential enemies on the Baltic Coast and gave him access to much needed war supplies in the coming great Thirty Years War. Also a friendly England might become a valuable ally in the year of the formidable coalition which formed itself to oppose Russia's ambitions to reach the Baltic Sea. So, Ivan not only gave a virtual trading monopoly to the British established Muscovy Company, but sent an ambassador, Nepeia, back with Chancellor, to inaugurate diplomatic relations, which pursued a rather stormy course throughout the reign of Queen Elizabeth.

This was caused by the disparity in aims revealed from the outset in the relations between the two countries. The British had come to Russia in search of trade with the Orient. Having abandoned their attempts to reach their goal by sea, they concentrated on securing an overland route through Russia into Central Asia and beyond.

Ivan soon decided that he had given enough to the British in the way of trade concessions, and strenuously opposed their endeavors to use Russia as a stepping stone on their way toward Asia. In addition, after the opening of hostilities in the Livonian War, he was anxious to secure a military alliance with England. Queen Elizabeth, anxious to obtain further trading concessions in Russia, adopted a waiting policy to the increasing exasperation of the irascible Tsar. Thus the lines of future policy were drawn from the outset with the British seeking economic advantages, shying away from political commitments, and revealing their interest in the Asiatic countries east of Russia, while the Russians, though seeking British support in Europe, were anxious to keep the British out of Asia. We may observe that at this early stage the Russians were just starting their drive eastward which was to bring them to the Pacific Coast, while the British Empire was still non-existent, but already one could ask with Bismarck how a whale and a bear could find common grounds to fight—or to be friendly? However, Ivan's political instinct showed itself more acute in one sense than Queen Elizabeth's, for by seeking a military alliance with England in a European war he was revealing the complementary need of the "whale" and the "bear" to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Later events revealed that this historical law dictated by geography would operate only when a power, endangering both England and Russia arose in Europe. At this particular time Queen Elizabeth's diplomacy was centering its attention on Spain, and the great struggle developing in the Baltic was deemed by the British to be of secondary import. They also appeared to have overlooked the importance of Russia's expansion west and east. After Ivan's capture of the Tartar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan on the Volga, Siberia was conquered between 1581 and 1643, when the Russians reached the Pacific.

The subsequent establishment of the British Empire in Asia foreshadowed the inevitability of the Anglo-Russian rivalry. But during the first century of Anglo-Russian relations the British concentrated exclusively on economic interests until they suddenly and dramatically lost out to their rivals, the Dutch. The execution of Charles I in 1649 produced such an impression in Moscow that Tsar Alexis ordered the British out of his country, declaring he would have nothing to do with a nation of regicides. Once more it was emphasized that Russian thought was running along political and not economic grooves. Alexis went even further and granted a loan of a ship load of costly furs to the exile Charles II, which was duly repaid upon

Charles' return to the throne. The Dutch seized this opportunity to secure the much coveted monopoly of Russian trade. As Holland and not England was the leading naval power of the seventeenth century, this development conformed to the logic of history. It also explains why Peter the Great turned to Holland and not to England in his endeavors to westernize Russia. It is an interesting fact that England did not appreciably influence the complex pattern of Peter's reforms. What cultural influences penetrated into Russia at the time came from Holland, France, and Germany, and only a few isolated Scotsmen like Patrick Gordon, made their mark on Russian life.

The statesmen of Queen Anne and of George I were hardly made aware of the tremendous changes taking place in Russia under Peter the Great. Absorbed in the War of the Spanish Succession, they scarcely realized the growing power of Russia, which still appeared to be safely held at bay in the Baltic by the might of Sweden. But when Sweden was defeated by Russia and relegated from the rank of a leading military power to a second-class position, British diplomacy, always empirical and practical, began to oscillate between friendliness and hostility toward the new great power, which had so dramatically appeared in Eastern Europe. These oscillations revealed Britain's concern with the naval balance of power in the Baltic, the only point where she saw any possibility of contact with Russia and any danger to her trading interest, since the Baltic area was important to England as a source of timber and hemp for her navy. But the steady growth of Russia's power during the eighteenth century, following the impetus created by Peter's reforms, changed the whole picture and the political and economic map of Anglo-Russian rivalry gradually began to be filled in.

II

By the acquisition of Gibraltar and Minorca in 1713 Britain entered the Mediterranean, and half a century later her hold over India was secured. Scarcely a decade later, as a result of Empress Catherine the Great's victory over the Turks, the once powerful Ottoman Empire was reduced to the status of the "ill man of Europe," and the dangerous Eastern question came into existence. By the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji (1774), Russia gained control of the Black Sea, the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles were opened to Russian traffic, and Russia established her claim of protectorate over the Balkan Orthodox population. During the war in 1770, the Russian

Baltic fleet had penetrated the Eastern Mediterranean by going around Europe, started a rebellion in Greece, and destroyed the Turkish fleet off the coast of Asia Minor. Thus the Russians preceded the British and all other nations into the Eastern Mediterranean. These world-shaking events had definitely drawn the future battle lines between the two great rival empires. During the reign of Catherine, who expressed pro-English sentiments, there was little for Britain to complain about, even though the weight of Russia's power had been felt not only in the Balkans and in Poland, but in the very heart of the Holy Roman Empire as well. Indeed, the Treaty of Teschen made Russia and France co-guarantors of the internal status quo of the German Empire. But a change of her attitude toward England occurred when, during the wars of the American Revolution, the privateering activities of the British Navy endangered the interests of Russian shipping. Catherine struck back vigorously by forming the League of Neutrals in an effort to restrain the arbitrary use of British naval power on the high seas. This was a potent lever to apply against England which Catherine had discovered, and it was to be used later by her son, Paul I.

In the meantime, the French Revolution, followed by Napoleon, began to reverse the trend of this budding hostility and to bring into play the law of complementary mutual support in great European crises. England and Russia were equally affected by the events in France, hence Catherine in the last years of her reign once again drew closer to England. Both countries realized the need of a fusion of British naval might and Russian military power. This principle was tersely stated in the farewell message of George III to the Russian Ambassador Count Vorontsov:

You know yourself, as I have frequently said during the twenty-one years that we have known each other, that a good Englishman must be a good Russian, and a good Russian a good Englishman. One would have to renounce all common sense . . . to imagine that there could exist an alliance more natural than the alliance between Great Britain and Russia, which countries are not neighbors, neither of them having the same kind of power . . . , the one being the most formidable military power on the continent, the other insular with the largest navy any country ever had.¹

But precisely because these two countries were on the periphery of Europe and offered such striking contrasts in the nature of their

¹A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825*, Duke University Press, 1947, pp. 121-22.

power, they attracted and repelled each other all over the map of Europe and Asia and only extreme emergencies were able to weld them together.

The checkered story of Anglo-Russian cooperation against France illustrates this clearly. A joint Anglo-Russian expedition against the French in Holland (1799) resulted in failure producing a quarrel. Admiral Nelson's squadrons appeared in the Baltic while Paul I, cooperating with Napoleon against England, ordered an expeditionary force of some 20,000 Cossacks to proceed to India via Khiva and Bokhara. At the same time, he revived Catherine's policy of the League of Neutrals and thus put pressure on England's two most sensitive points. The assassination of Paul (March 11, 1801) brought this aggressive policy to an end and once more, under his successor, Alexander I, the pendulum swung toward cooperation with England in the Third Coalition against Napoleon. During the campaign of 1805, British and Russian forces once again operated jointly, in the kingdom of Naples, while their fleets cooperated in the eastern Mediterranean. But two years later, after the Treaty of Tilsit, the two countries came to the parting of the ways and even to actual warfare. After the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia, as an ally of France, was forced to declare war on England because of her failure to mediate for peace between the two countries. This war officially lasted for five years but no real hostilities occurred. Both sides were too well aware of the artificial nature of the Franco-Russian alliance and of the complementary nature of their power to expend themselves in mutual destruction. Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, ended this period of Franco-Russian cooperation and reintroduced a period of Anglo-Russian joint military action which lasted until the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo.

It is interesting to notice that the cooperation between England and Russia was in each case genuine and potent while the intermediate periods of hostility never got beyond mutual diplomatic threats or shadow boxing. Thus the logic of history which brought Russia and England together in the face of the danger menacing Europe from Napoleonic ambitions proved to be stronger than all the temporary shifts and vagaries of diplomacy. But when the danger was over, the welding process came to an end and once again the two powers became more acutely conscious of their divergent interests. We can now see that the worst periods of Anglo-Russian rivalry coincide with periods of relative stability and tranquility in Europe.

III

The nineteenth century, which really opens with the fall of Napoleon, brought several new and important factors into the pattern of Anglo-Russian relations. The first of these was economic which in the main stabilized them. The industrial revolution made England dependent on her coal and on her manufactured goods, not only for survival, but for the splendid growth and prosperity of the Victorian Age. Russia, retaining her agricultural economy, became an important source of raw materials for England, and to the complementary nature of the military-naval balance there now was added an economic balance based on the exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials. This balance lasted throughout the nineteenth century until it was weakened by the growing competition of the United States and the later industrialization of Russia. However, only in the period of the Five Year Plans did the growing power of the Russian industries seriously disturb this balance.

The second factor, a by-product of the first, was the rise of liberal and democratic trends in England as a result of the increased power of the British middle class. This change in the social structure of England was not paralleled in Tsarist Russia, which, throughout the nineteenth century, retained its semi-feudal economy based on the dominance of the landed gentry. An ideological chasm now developed between liberalism and Tsarism, which became a potent propaganda weapon against Russia. An overtone of self-righteous moral indignation against the evils of absolutism colored in a crusading spirit a purely geographical and political rivalry. Lastly, this rivalry spread increasingly over the world. We had seen that up to the time of Peter the Great the sole point of contact between the two countries was in the Baltic; during the eighteenth century the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean entered as new fields of contact and friction, and a few timid thrusts carried this rivalry further east. In the nineteenth century this rivalry spread with the rapidity of brush fire all over the map of Asia and reached the Pacific Ocean.

The first phase of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia shows a definite pattern emerging which repeats itself cyclically in later crises during the century. In each case a focal point develops in Turkey and in the Balkans, and radiates eastward from there, the rivalry spreading to the eastern Mediterranean, then to Persia and Afghanistan, then to the Far East in a cycle of about thirty years, followed by a short period of quiescence and even good relations. However, Em-

peror Nicholas I made two distinct attempts to stave off the menace of the "cold war" with England turning into a military struggle, and he rightly turned his attention to the main point of friction, Turkey. When Mehemet Ali in 1839 once more went on the war path against Turkey, Russia did not evoke the clauses of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The Tsar agreed instead to settle the crisis through joint negotiations with England and the other powers, consenting to the re-establishment of the so-called "ancient rule" concerning the Straits, namely that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were to be closed to all warships alike while Turkey was not at war (1841). In 1844 Nicholas I by a dramatically sudden visit to England negotiated an agreement providing for joint consultations between Russia and Great Britain in the event that the "sick man of Europe," Turkey, showed further signs of disintegration. But the momentum gathered in England from the ill feeling toward Russia, produced by the rivalry in Asia, coupled with the bellicose policies of Napoleon III in search of "a cheap war every three years," were too powerful to permit the resumption of cordial relations between the two countries, and an insignificant quarrel of monks in Jerusalem was sufficient to plunge Europe into the Crimean War.

Basically, this war was an attempt on the part of a coalition of European powers to redress the balance of power which had tipped too strongly in favor of Russia, but it was also the only time in history when England and Russia faced each other in a major armed conflict. In accordance with the saying of Bismarck about the whale and the bear, it showed that the British Navy was helpless against Russia's land-locked power. The sanguine hopes which British strategists had put in a massed naval attack against St. Petersburg and the other Russian ports in the Baltic Sea, resulted in two futile summer campaigns. Thereafter, the British were forced to scale down their plans and concentrate their aims on the destruction of Russian naval power in the Black Sea. This was achieved, by the seige and capture of the Russian naval base of Sebastopol and the demilitarization of the Black Sea clause inserted in the Treaty of Paris which closed the war. However, this advantage was of a very temporary nature, because fifteen years later Britain was forced to accept its cancellation. Furthermore, the recoil produced by her defeat in Europe, started Russia, in the years following the war, on the last great wave of conquests in Asia. While Britain watched in dismay, the conquest of Turkestan brought Russian expansion to the border of Afghanistan, in direct line with the Khyber Pass leading into India.

At this time (1858 and 1860) Russia also secured her hold on the Far Eastern territories which, fused with a diplomatic conflict over the situation resulting from the Polish rebellion in 1863 in which Great Britain, France, and Austria accused Russia of violating the treaty of Vienna, kept the fire close to the powder keg.

However, there was not sufficient heat in these developments to produce a real explosion until once again, according to schedule, the Balkans set off the explosion. We need not here go into the causes or the events of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. It suffices to say that England openly supported Turkey in this war, and that the really dangerous possibility of a new war flaring up between England and Russia when the British fleet, anchored in the Sea of Marmora, faced the victorious Russian Army encamped at San Stefano. To avert the consequences of such a perilous international situation, the Congress of Berlin was called. If the Russians, as a result of their victory, were able to create a powerful and independent Bulgaria at the expense of British-supported Turkey, Lord Beaconsfield was able to avenge this setback by a resounding diplomatic victory at the Congress. Bulgaria was reduced by half, and the Russians were forced to accept the scaling down by about 50 percent of the treaty of San Stefano which they had dictated to Turkey. It was during the period of tension preceding the Congress of Berlin, with British and Russian guns simultaneously trained on each other, that the Russians made a thrust toward India for the second time in history. The Russian Army was halted on the march by the decisions reached at the Congress of Berlin.

While the second Afghan war was on, Persia once more came into the picture as a propitious field of both economic and military rivalry. In 1878 the Shah Nas Ed Din visited Russia and obtained from the Russian government a promise to train the Persian armed forces—thus came into existence the Persian Cossack Brigade, manned by Russian officers. Russia extended the Transcaucasian Railway which tapped the Persian trade. Not to be outdone, the British obtained a concession for the Imperial Bank of Persia (1889), while the following year Russian financial interests founded the Discount and Loan Bank of Persia. By a secret agreement the Russians also were promised all economic concessions in northern Persia, while the British were obtaining economic rights in southern Persia. However acute this rivalry might be, it remained strictly confined to the field of economics and trade. This, however, was not the case further to the East. The conquest of Turkestan by the Russians had given them a

common frontier with Afghanistan, and the capture of Merv, a city close to the Afghan border, produced such tenseness in England that according to a famous pun, the British government was suffering from "Mervousness." When the Russians actually reached the Afghan border, a clash occurred at Kuchka with Afghan troops officered by the British, and war with England was narrowly averted by the timely mediation of the king of Denmark (September 1885).

If in the 1880's the fire of Anglo-Russian hostility had been reduced to embers in the Balkans, it had flared up and was burning brightly in Central Asia. When in turn it had been brought under control in these remote areas a decade later, following the sequence noted, it leaped once more to the Far East. It is interesting to note how closely these various crises tally in dates. The Congress of Berlin put an end to the Balkan crisis in 1878, and the rivalry in Persia starts the same year, while the Anglo-Afghan War follows from 1878 to 1880. The tension in Central Asia subsides as a result of the Pamir settlement in 1895, and the same year the Far Eastern crisis opens with the defeat inflicted by Japan upon China.

IV

The result of the emergence of Japan as a power in Asia was the headlong clash of two imperialisms which led up to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Just as Japan, after her easy victory over the Chinese, was initiating her program of expansion on the mainland of Asia in pursuance of what she deemed to be her manifest destiny, Russia started her drive to the open sea through Manchuria. Following the policy of immediate expediency, and seeing that of the two imperialisms the Russian was less dangerous because of its more limited scope, Britain allied herself with Japan. She thereby launched Japan on her career as a great conquering power and sowed the seeds of retribution forty years later by the loss of Singapore, Malaya, and Burma. However, the victory of Japan over Russia in the war of 1904-5 seemed at the time to justify this policy, and a new chapter in Anglo-Russian relationships opened following this war.

Following her defeat, Russia decided to reduce her losses in Asia by coming to terms with both Japan and England on the realistic basis of limitive respective spheres of influence. Thus the Grey-Izwolsky and the Motono-Izwolsky agreements of 1907 came into existence, the first settling the Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Near

East, particularly in Persia and Afghanistan, and the second doing the same between Japan and Russia in Manchuria, and later in Mongolia. Anglo-Russian rivalry came to a temporary end, and the motivating impulse of this coming together of the former rivals was the rise of Germany, which from Bagdad to Kiaochow equally endangered the interests of both powers. Once more the counter law of the complementary nature of England and Russia in the face of a menace from a third power held good, and a period of cordiality marked by the visit of King Edward VII to Reval led to the comradeship-in-arms during the First World War, despite their deep innate mutual distrust.

V

The Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet régime does not appreciably change the fundamental lines of the Anglo-Russian policy pattern. Not only do the traditional areas of rivalry—Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Far East,—reassert themselves once more, but the economic and psychological factors, though at times inverted, tend to repeat themselves. The antagonism of British liberal thought against Tsarism, and the haughty sense of righteousness which colored anti-Russian propaganda in England, now finds the same scope in virulent attacks against Communism. Paradoxically, this hostility, particularly in the 1920's, does not seem to interfere with economic relations, reminding us of Lloyd George's cynical remark, "One can trade with cannibals." This profit motive led to the recognition of the Soviet régime by the Labor government in 1924, but the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries was to pursue a stormy career, affecting the very existence of Ramsay MacDonald's government in the famous Zinoviev letter incident, followed in 1927 by a breach of relations. During the nineteenth century we observe the paradoxical situation of the liberal governments getting along better with the Tsarist government because the Tories, by stressing British colonial imperialism, stimulated the rivalry with Russia. So do conservative governments in England seem to get along better than the Socialists with Soviet Russia. This seems to indicate that political ideologies merely screen the deep-rooted motives of mutual distrust based on the inter-play of balance of power between the two great nations.

As a result of the Russian Revolution some new factors emerged which cannot be overlooked. The most significant of these was the expansive and missionary nature of Communism, whereas Tsarism

by its very nature lacked political appeal beyond its borders. At first British imperialism profited mightily by this change owing to the collapse of Russia during the Civil War of 1918-1920, and the British gained full control in the Near East, in Persia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Even the Straits question was settled without Russia. The Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War further seemed to realize the hopes of extreme jingoists both in England and in France that, economically or strategically, Russian territory might come under direct control of the Allies. The British were especially mindful of the Baku oil fields and Russian Central Asia. At the Genoa Conference in 1922, a British French Financial Syndicate was created for the purpose of exploiting Russian oil fields. But the tide turned, and a counter wave of Communist influence spread over Asia, not only regaining the lost spheres of Russian influence, but penetrating into new fields, particularly South China, Afghanistan, and, to some extent, India. Now it was Britain's turn to be on the defensive. Around 1926-27 these violent swings of the pendulum came to an end, and it is significant that both Empires were then holding their own in Asia, approximately along previous lines of demarcation, showing that the logic of history was more powerful than the vagaries of political ideologies. At this time the industrialization of Russia under the Five Year Plans ruptured the economic balance of mutual and complementary exchange of British manufactured goods for Russian raw materials which had held out through the nineteenth century. This was not immediately apparent because the synchronous rise of Hitler in Germany and Japanese militarism and expansionism produced a further demand for British goods, and forced the countries to fight side by side again in World War II.

But seeds of distrust remained, as shown by the British exclusion of Russia from the deliberations at Munich, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, the inevitable corollary of the British action. That a new period of virulent distrust and bitterness should follow the enforced cooperation of war years was something which may have been expected, and it is too early to draw conclusions from the dangerous potentialities of the present West-East conflict. This much, however, can be surmised. Britain has come out of the struggle weaker, for a time at least, than ever before, and Russia is a stronger power in international affairs than ever before. If we observe the actual issues which led to Byrnes' and Bevin's estrangement with Molotov, we will find that they are in the main the same traditional issues which over and over again have made the history of the Anglo-

Russian rivalry so turbulent. The question of Poland brings us back to 1830 and 1863; Bulgaria to 1878; the navigation of the Danube to 1829 and 1856; the control of the Straits, to 1774; the Yugoslav (Serbian) questions to the 1830's and 40's; the presence of Russian forces in Northern Persia to 1908; and Manchuria to 1898-1905. While during the nineteenth century, and particularly during the Crimean War, England sought support of France against Russia, now this support comes from the United States.

The very fact that the framework of the relationships between Russia and England has shown elements of continuity and stability, however much the pattern of details may change, justifies the belief that the present crisis will once more be of a temporary nature. However, Anglo-Russian relations have to be integrated into the wider framework of a rapidly changing world, and such factors as the relinquishing by Great Britain of her Empire in Asia and the possible split of Europe into two federations, not to mention the rising tide of Communism, are the real issues upon which the question of war and peace will depend in the future.

Gapon and Zubatov:

An Experiment in "Police Socialism"*

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

I

AT the turn of the century four simultaneous efforts were started to inject some organization into inchoate Russian public life. The same years, 1901 to 1903, that witnessed Lenin's attempt to constitute an All-Russian Social Democratic Party for the proletariat, witnessed the formation of a Social Revolutionary Party to give leadership to the peasantry, a Constitutional Democratic Party to organize the liberal and democratic intelligentsia, and an amazing series of experiments in police unionism and police "socialism." All these were so many minor eddies in a swiftly rising freshet—signs that the whole, long-frozen political structure of Russia was about to thaw. But none of the new organizations was to prove equal to the task it had set itself: to channelize the rapidly rising flood.

In the bureaucracy there were striking differences of opinion on the attitude to be taken towards the nascent labor movement and the various embryonic political parties. To Plehve,¹ who, as Minister of the Interior, had charge of the secret police and public order, it seemed that the Zemstvo liberals and Constitutional Democrats were the most dangerous, the Social Revolutionaries next, and the Social Democrats he put only in third place. His chief bugbear was the Zemstvos, with their urge for local autonomy, their remonstrances and petitions reminiscent of the French Revolution's *cahiers de doléances*, their demand for a national council of Zemstvo delegates or *Zemski sobor*, or national council, that might easily become the germ of a parliament, another *Etats Généraux*. He feared and detested them most because they represented socially

*The present article forms part of a history of the Russian Revolution, to be published by Dial Press in 1948 [Ed.].

¹Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve, Minister of the Interior and one of the spiritual authors of "police socialism," assassinated on July 15, 1904, in a plot organized by Yevno Azev, one of his own spies whom he had planted in the Social Revolutionary Party.

the most exalted demand for constitutionalism, a species of treason to the autocracy amongst the landowners themselves.

Next in order came the manufacturers and financiers with their demands for subsidies, new tariff and taxation structures, a state budget, the transformation of the feudal-bureaucratic state in the image of modern capitalism and parliamentarism. These, and the moderate Zemstvo elements were the more dangerous because they had their agent, Count Witte,² in the very Council of Ministers.

If the Social Revolutionaries came second in the order of Minister Plehve's attention, it was not by reason of their socialism nor their peasant committees, but because of their use of terror. Socialism never worried Plehve. With an inverted *narodnichestvo* common to many reactionaries in Russia, he looked on rural socialism as a kind of peasant communal village arrangement, not at all incompatible with the tasks of tax collecting, military levies, and absolutist dictatorship. The peasants he regarded as an unshakeable rock of loyalty to the throne. Urban socialism he dismissed as a remote and impossible utopian dream, while Witte's projects for State ownership of railways and banks and the vodka traffic naturally troubled him not at all. The real problem was the owners of private industry whom Witte represented so ably at court.

Plehve pondered much over a report made by the conservative Governor of Moscow, General Trepov, in 1898:

In order to disarm the agitators—General Trepov had written—it is necessary to open and point out to the worker a legal solution of his difficulty, for we must bear in mind that the agitator will be followed by the youngest and boldest part of the crowd, while the average worker will prefer the less spectacular and quiet legal way. Thus split up, the crowd will lose its power.

The suggestion intrigued the Minister of the Interior. What were these restless workingmen, he asked himself, if not the same loyal peasants of yesterday, bewildered by the new industrialism, angered by the greed of the industrialists, led astray by revolutionary agitators from the intelligentsia. Why might the state not shepherd them and watch over them a bit more, weed out the hotheads, give the mass a chance to organize under the most dependable auspices, protect them by social legislation against the greedy and doubtfully loyal bourgeoisie, act as benevolent and impartial arbitrator in in-

²Count Sergei Yulyevich Witte, Minister of Finance, Commerce, and Industry from 1892 to 1903 whose régime was accompanied by 114% increase of state revenues and the construction of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad. He became Premier in 1905, but was dismissed from political life in 1906.

dustrial disputes, avert strikes and disorders by friendly arbitration, bind them more closely to the paternal state and Tsar? Would it not be a master stroke of statesmanship to set the workingmen against the factory owners instead of against the Government? And as a by-product, might not even a little carefully directed labor disorder be a useful weapon on occasion to show whither Finance Minister Witte's industrialization and liberal flirtations were leading?

II

The real architect of police-regimented unions in a police-controlled paternal state was Sergei Vasilievich Zubatov, who now became chief lieutenant of General Trepov in Moscow. It was Zubatov and not Plehve or Trepov to whose name would be attached the honor of the great experiment in police unionism destined to go down in history as the *zubatovshchina*. As a *gymnazia* student he had entered the *Narodnaya Volya*,³ enlisting with the police almost simultaneously as a secret agent. Thereafter he had risen rapidly in the service, being the sponsor of many progressive innovations: photography, finger-printing, and a superior system of secret espionage on a scale hitherto unknown in Russia or in the world. "You must look upon your colleague, the secret agent," he once told the police, "as you would upon a woman with whom you are conducting a secret love intrigue: one rash step and you have dishonored her in the eyes of the world." Clearly a man of sentiment and imagination!

His biggest achievement so far had been the nationwide simultaneous raids that smashed the beginnings of the Social Democratic Party in 1897, rendering nugatory the efforts of their First Congress at Minsk.⁴ Now he had risen to the headship of the Moscow *Okhrana* or secret Security Police, his only superiors being General Trepov, in charge of all the police services of the Moscow Province, and Minister of the Interior Plehve. This, his most ambitious plan, was really the police counterpart of the urge for organization that was beginning to take possession of all classes in Russia. Against the

³The nineteenth century conspirative terrorist Party of the People's Will or People's Freedom which managed the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and then was crushed by the police with the aid of agents who penetrated and then betrayed the movement.

⁴In 1897 the local social democratic organizations attempted to form a nationwide organization at a Congress held in Minsk. All but one of the delegates were caught by the police.

Zemstvo intellectuals, the students, the Social Democrats, and Social Revolutionaries, he would offer his experiment in police unionism and police "socialism." In May 1901, he founded in Moscow the *Society for Mutual Aid for Workingmen in the Mechanical Industries*. As an experienced secret agent, he tried to keep his guiding hand as unobtrusive as possible, but his less subtle superiors, Trepov and Plehve, insisted on tying up the Society with all sorts of rigid and too obvious safeguards. The by-laws and financial expenditures had to be approved by General Trepov. The secret agents who were leaders of the union, were supplemented by uniformed police openly present at each meeting.

But the Moscow workingmen, heirs to the ancient patriarchal tradition and hungering now for organization, were more trustful of the Tsar and his officials than either Zubatov or the revolutionaries had believed possible. Assured that a paternal government was with them, they rushed into the strange union. Five days after it was formed, it was able to lead a procession of 50,000 workers into the Kremlin for solemn prayer before the tomb of the Emancipator Tsar, Alexander II.

"Intellectuals" were barred from the organization, "hotheads" and "trouble-makers" among the workingmen were arrested and silently deported. Hence purists among the Social Democrats wanted to limit their activity to denunciation and exposure. The workers were too class-conscious, they contended, to continue to have anything to do with such a monstrosity once it was exposed to them. But the more realistic leaders knew that denunciation was not enough.

We must understand—Lenin wrote in *Iskra*—how to develop the struggle of the workers against every shameful intrigue and spy's trick. . . . This struggle will develop the political consciousness of all who take part in the police-gendarme-and-spy "labor organization". . . . In the long run the legalization of the working class movement will be to our advantage and not to that of the Zubatovs. . . .

This freedom from sectarian aversion to working wherever work was needful, was not limited to Lenin. At the Second Congress,⁵ one of the resolutions passed unanimously during the exhausted closing hours of the last session was a decision that Social Democratic workingmen should join these unions where possible, and try

⁵The first real congress of the Social Democratic Party, held in London in 1903, was officially known as the Second Congress, in recognition of the abortive "First" Congress held in Minsk in 1897.

to defend and enlighten their members against the police. The startling successes even then being achieved by police-unionism made any other attitude impossible.

The Moscow Society for Mutual Aid had begun, with Zubatov's encouragement, by discussing economic and cultural questions and formulating wage proposals. They chose as the first object of their attentions a "foreign exploiter"—a French factory owner. But he went crying to his ambassador, who in turn protested to Plehve concerning this quasi-governmental action against one of his nationals. The first demands had to be dropped.

Zubatov's next idea was to help the union draw up proposals for wages and working conditions, impartially for the whole of Moscow industry. As head of the *Okhrana* he even went so far as to convoke a meeting of the manufacturers, berate them not a little, and insist upon concessions. With the first successes, the movement began to spread rapidly, from industry to industry, and then, on the wings of rumor and report, from town to town until particularly the newly industrialized factory centers of Southern Russia were honeycombed with police unions and programs for police socialism.

While Zubatov supported labor legislation and repeatedly took the part of the workers against the employers, he simultaneously dispatched provocators into the revolutionary movement with an idea of "provoking you to acts of terror and then crushing you" as he once said to a labor prisoner in a moment of frankness. Chief of these agents was Yevno Azev, son of a poor Jewish tailor, who became a student spy, then, with Zubatov's aid, a Moscow engineer and one of the founders and the eventual leader of the Terror Section of the Social Revolutionary Party. In that rôle, he was to take part in a plot which would cost his chief Minister Plehve his life! But his story is only tangential to the one we are following.⁶

In Odessa a Doctor Shaeovich appeared as Zubatov's agent to start things moving. Colonel of Gendarmes Vasiliev, assisted by two Jewish woman agents, even formed a "Jewish Independent Labor Party" in Kiev! A police-sponsored priest, George Gapon, offered himself as a leader of the working-class movement in St. Petersburg. Police socialism was booming all over Russia.

III

In the Spring of 1903, the new industrial regions exploded in a series of little strikes, that set each other off, merged with each

⁶The full story can be found in Boris Nicolaevsky: *Azeff, the Spy*, Doubleday, Doran, 1934.

other, began to grow into something too big for a police official to manipulate in comfort. In July, 1903, at the very moment when the Social Democrats in their London Congress were adopting a resolution to send socialist workingmen into the police unions, Doctor Shaevich lost control of the Odessa movement. A general strike started there and spread all over southern Russia and into the Caucasus, a dress rehearsal for the greater upheavals of 1905. Zubatov, Shaevich, and Vasilyev fell from grace, and were banished to administrative exile in far northern Russia. Thus ended the first phase of the experiment in police unionism. But in the capital, Priest Gapon had not yet started his work, nor was he under the Moscow jurisdiction of the disgraced Zubatov. Minister Plehve did not interfere with the priest's plans.

Father George Gapon is one of the most interesting figures thrown up by the revolution, and one of the most peculiarly Russian. Son of a peasant of Ukrainian origin, at the time we meet him he was only 32. He is described as intelligent, serious, meditative, energetic; he was undoubtedly handsome and an impressive orator. In his youth he had been given a clandestinely circulated manuscript tract of Tolstoy by one of his teachers, who was a Tolstoyan. The other main source of his inspiration seems to have been Zubatov and his police unions. As prison chaplain he showed his ability to handle men and won the confidence of his superiors for a project to substitute "spiritual supervision" for policing to guide the Petersburg workers, since they had proved more suspicious of the police than the workers of Moscow. His project for a *Union of Russian Factory Workers* with himself as leader received Plehve's approval shortly before the latter's death. The new union's aims included "the sober and rational passing of leisure time," religious and patriotic training, exclusion of drunkenness and gambling, the development of a "prudent view of the duties and rights of workers," and "self-activity for the legal improvement of the conditions of labor and life of the workers."

During the first half of 1904 the workers kept away from the new priest-led union. Gapon, torn between his Tolstoyan views, his moral and social ambitions and his police instructions, sought to increase the confidence of the masses in his organization by getting advice and support from more advanced workers. After a few secret confidences with such people, the society began to grow rapidly. Before the year was out it included practically all eligible workers engaged in the mechanical trades in St. Petersburg, together with a

sizeable sprinkling of police spies and a few men under the influence of Socialist ideas. More successfully than Zubatov he seemed to be deflecting the hostility of the members from the régime to the employers. Its great meetings sang *God Save the Tsar* with deep and undoubted fervor, for they thought of him as having overruled his wicked officials and sanctioned their legitimate hopes for organization.

In gauging the patriarchal backwardness of the Russian masses in the dawn years of the twentieth century, we must keep this picture clear in our minds. Nor was it only the unskilled workers, yesterday's peasants, who followed a priest and sang thus fervently, *God Save the Tsar*. Actually, the main scene of our drama is the huge Putilov locomotive works and machine shops, the oldest and largest heavy industry factory in Moscow, containing the largest number of skilled metal workers. Here Father Gapon had his greatest organization. Under his guidance, they formulated their moderate demands upon the enterprise. In December, the latter answered by firing the leading members of Gapon's committee. Thereupon, the entire force of the Putilov Locomotive Works walked out and urged Father Gapon to take them directly to the "Dear Father Tsar" that they might lay their troubles at his feet.

Priest Gapon was scarcely less naive than the men he had brought together, and was influenced by the mass spirit quite as much as he influenced it. The movement was getting too big for its founder to control; its illusions were assuming independent life and taking control of him. At first he was hesitant at the audacious idea of going directly to the "Father of the Russian People." Then he sanctioned it, finally was carried away by it. He began to avoid his superiors, the officials of the police department and the Ministry of the Interior. Like his followers, he too now sought to go over their heads and seek direct contact with Tsar Nicholas. On January 21 (January 8, Old Style), the evening of the projected procession to the palace, he wrote the following confidential message to the Tsar:

Sire!

Do not believe the Ministers. They are cheating Thee in regard to the real state of affairs. The people believe in Thee. They have made up their minds to gather at the Winter Palace tomorrow, at 2 p.m., to lay their needs before Thee. If Thou wilt not stand before them, Thou wilt break that spiritual connection which unites Thee with them. . . .

Do not fear anything. Stand tomorrow before the people and accept our humblest petition. I, the representative of the workmen, and my comrades, guarantee the inviolability of Thy person.

(signed) Gapon

Next morning, according to the common estimate, more than 200,000 men, women, and children, workers and their families, gathered at many concentration points to converge in procession upon the Winter Palace. They were unarmed. In keeping with Gapon's guarantee, the few terrorists, hot-heads, or police-agents who had brought arms were searched by his ushers and their weapons taken from them. Their intention was pacific, even reverential. Their women and children were there. It was Sunday. They marched with interlocked arms, some bore ikons and pictures of the Tsar. (This carrying of images of the ruler in procession is an ancient Russian custom that flourishes still today.) As they marched, they sang as only Russian multitudes can sing, and over and over again their song was *God Save the Tsar*.

At their head marched Priest Gapon with a scroll. Its petition was a reflection of the medley in his mind and the variegated nature of his following:

Sire—We workingmen and inhabitants of Saint Petersburg . . . our wives and our children and our helpless old parents come to Thee, Sire, to seek for truth and protection. We have become beggars; we have been oppressed; we are burdened by toil beyond our powers. . . . We are choked by despotism and irresponsibility, and we are breathless. . . . There has arrived for us that great moment when death is better than the continuation of intolerable tortures. We have left off working, and we have declared to our masters that we shall not begin to work until they comply with our demands. We ask but little . . . to diminish the working day to eight hours . . . minimum daily wage should be one ruble per day, to abolish overtime. . . .

The officials have brought the country to complete destruction, have involved it in a detestable war. . . . We workingmen have no voice in the expenditure of the enormous amounts raised from us in taxes. . . .

These things are before us, Sire, and they have brought us to the walls of Thy Palace. We are seeking here the last salvation. Do not refuse assistance to Thy people. Give their destiny into their own hands. Cast away from them the intolerable oppression of the officials. Destroy the wall between Thyself and Thy people, and let them rule the country together with Thyself. . . . Order immediately the convocation of a *zemski sobor* . . . order that the elections to the Constituent Assembly be carried on under the condition of universal, equal, secret voting. This is the most capital of our requests . . . the principal and only plaster for our painful wounds. . . .

Order and take an oath to comply with these requests and Thou wilt make Russia happy and famous and Thou wilt impress Thy name in our hearts and the hearts of our posterity forever.

If Thou wilt not order and wilt not answer our prayer, we shall die here on this Square before Thy Palace. . . .

So the people, finding their voice through a priest who had picked

up scraps of demands and slogans that were in the air, marched to the palace of their Tsar to lay their troubles at his feet. But the Tsar was not in his palace. He had left the city hastily, taking with him wife and daughters. In his stead he had left the officials: generals, police chiefs, and his uncle, the Grand Duke Vladimir.

Troops fully armed, guns loaded and not with blanks, descended upon the marchers, surrounded their separate detachments, fired at close range. Men, women, children fell. The crowds melted away. Crimson stains appeared on the white snow. How many fell, no one knows, for the wounded were treated in secret and the dead were withdrawn by their kin. The common labor estimate is 500 killed and 3000 wounded. A public commission of the Bar Association set the figures at 150 and 200 respectively. In any case, enough blood was shed to baptize the day "Bloody Sunday" as it was called thenceforward.

An epoch had come to an end. It had been sufficient for the masses to get the fearful idea of acting on a cherished fairy tale for it to be exploded forever. That day millions of primitive minds took the leap from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century. In love and reverence their best had come to lay their troubles at the feet of the Dear Father Tsar. The bullets and the shed blood swept away all vestiges of love and credulity. Now they knew themselves fatherless and knew that they would have to solve their problems themselves. Now their minds were opened at last to the teachings of the Republican and Socialist intellectuals. Constituent Assembly and Democratic Republic, General Strike and Armed Uprising, ceased to be phrases comprehensible only to the educated and the specialists in revolution. They took possession of millions and thereby became a material force for the transformation of Russia.

Father Gapon fled. With the aid of Social Revolutionaries he escaped abroad. From hiding, he dispatched one more note to his Tsar, this time without salutation or respectful capitals:

The innocent blood of workers, their wives and children, lies forever between thee, oh soul destroyer, and the Russian people. Moral connection between thee and them may never more be. . . . Let all the blood which has to be shed, hangman, fall upon thee and thy kindred!

So ended the first experiments in "police-socialism" and a police-guided labor movement in Russia.

Russian Studies in American Colleges

By J. A. POSIN

To avoid confusion or misunderstanding, let us state at the outset that the term "Russian studies," as defined in this article, includes the language itself, literature in the native tongue or in English translation, survey courses in civilization or culture, and closely allied subjects. It does not include studies in history, economics, or political science, each of which is usually taken care of in its respective department. This differentiation is made *not* because the writer believes in artificial departmentalization of studies but because, owing to a series of circumstances, Russian studies in Social Sciences and Russian studies in the Humanities have received different treatment in the United States.

For the last fifty years the study of the Russian language and its closely-allied literary subjects in American colleges and universities has been quite haphazard and accidental. One of the earliest experiments occurred at Harvard toward the end of the last century. A generation later, the Department of Slavic Languages consisting of one member was established at the University of California. At different times at a small number of colleges in various parts of the United States similar developments took place. Until the entrance of the United States into World War I these early pioneers led a precarious existence. The teaching staff in Russian rarely, if ever, was more than one person. Moreover, this one individual was generally expected to provide instruction in other Slavic languages in addition to Russian. The number of students in these early Russian courses was few.

The Russian Revolution of March 1917, and our entrance into World War I a few weeks later, stimulated interest in the study of Russian. Establishment of new departments and additions to staffs previously existing necessarily followed. For example, another full-time member was added to the Slavic Department at California in 1917, and a new department was established at Stanford in 1918.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent period of non-recognition of the Soviet régime, were responsible for the myopic policy of ignoring the importance of Russian studies. A notable

exception to this was the addition of a third full-time teacher at the University of California in 1921. The isolationist influence continued until the recognition of the Soviet Union in 1934, at which time there were not more than six or seven universities having Russian or Slavic departments.

Between 1934 and 1941, there was heightened interest in colleges in the study of Russian. In 1939 Cornell University introduced Russian studies. When, in 1941, the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. became allies, new perspectives were forced on Americans.

During the war, interest in Russian civilization and the language skyrocketed in the colleges. Aided by government subsidies, chiefly from the War and Navy Departments, and also from private foundations, various colleges and universities either increased their staffs to meet the new demand for instruction, or, like most schools, began for the first time to offer instruction in Russian. The Army's chief contribution to the development of Russian studies was the A.S.T. program in Russian, spread throughout many colleges. Emphasis was placed on the spoken language. The program, though short-lived, gave impetus to the study of the language by training many hundreds of young men, thus furthering the interest of many in more serious study of the language. Though hindered by the limited time and the specialized nature of the work, A.S.T.P. did train a corps of teachers with no previous classroom experience.

The Navy's contribution was the establishment of the Russian Department in the Navy Officers' Language School at the University of Colorado in 1944. As far as instruction in the language is concerned, the program was better rounded and more ambitious than that of the A.S.T. All branches of study of the language were emphasized: oral, reading, and writing. During its existence of slightly more than two years, the Department at the University of Colorado graduated about 250 students qualified for their various tasks. At one time as many as fifty teachers were needed. This meant a semi-tutorial program with classes seldom of more than four people and frequently less.

The Rockefeller Foundation, through such organizations as the American Council of Learned Societies, undertook to subsidize the study of Russian in a number of colleges, chiefly for the purpose of training a corps of specialists in the language for civilian government employment. Examples of this type of instruction were the intensive courses at Cornell University and at the University of Iowa in 1942 and 1943.

Under the heightened stimulus of the common military cause,

some institutions, like Dartmouth, adopted permanent programs of Russian studies; others established permanent departments, as was the case at Smith.

At present, despite the cooling of war-time ardor for everything Russian, a great number of institutions still strive to maintain some sort of instruction in Russian language and allied subjects. According to the *Bulletin of the American Association of Teachers of Slavonic and East-European Languages* of December 15, 1947, 140 colleges and universities offered some instruction in Russian in the academic year 1947-48. According to the same source, 240 persons, either full or part-time, are engaged in teaching Russian language or literature, or both. In many instances, this worthwhile attitude is due to the far-sightedness of college administrators; in others, it is forced upon the administrations by the pressure of student interest. There are still far too few permanent departments of Russian or Slavic; even permanent programs with a long-range view are lacking.

The greater part of what has been accomplished can be put on the credit side, but, in many instances, it bears an accidental, impermanent character. The question before those who are directly concerned with the systematic and orderly development of Russian studies in this country is: "What is the future of Russian studies in the U. S.?" It is clear that most of what has been accomplished, either spontaneously or under the stimulus of war, can be utilized. Even the errors have obvious value. The best-qualified and the most willing of the relatively large number of students of all types can be further developed in the direction of Russian studies. Some of the teachers, trained and developed in the emergency war jobs (those employed in the Army and Navy programs, for instance), can be integrated into a permanent educational setup. Certain new ideas and methods evolved or widely tested during the war can be successfully applied in college teaching. Notably, the method of intensive study for graduate and other qualified students can be, and is, successfully used in a number of universities. Contrary to widespread belief, this method did not originate during the war. It has been successfully used with Russian language since 1934 (Harvard, Columbia, California, and others). The war merely popularized this method and gave it wider application.

Instruction in the language is the foundation of a "language" department. The department is built by giving this instruction first consideration. However, instructing the student in the mechanics of the language, while fundamental, is not sufficient. So-called

"cultural" studies, either in the language or in English, must complement the language instruction in order to give the serious student an opportunity to round out his knowledge of Russian culture and civilization. Moreover, while the study of Russian history, politics, economics, and law usually does not constitute the administrative concern of Russian departments, since these subjects are treated in their respective departments, the study of them should be urged, and proper schedules provided to avoid conflicts in time.

Another important development under the stimulus of the war was the area studies. A definite attempt was made to integrate the study of Russian language, history, and culture into one coherent whole. We can, perhaps, look to the time when a great portion of the area study will be done in the original Russian. Elaborate programs of Russian area studies have already been inaugurated—so far predominantly in English—in various centers, among them at Harvard, Yale, and Stanford (in the latter, through the so-called Pacific-Asiatic-Russian program which operates under a Rockefeller grant).

In general, there is need for a systematic and well-planned approach, *on the basis of scholarship*. Political expediency should never be permitted to inhibit development of the study. The study of Russian language and literature, as well as other Russian subjects, is worthy of the attention of aspiring scholars for its own sake, without regard for the direction of temporary political winds.

As suggested above, there is need for establishing more departments of Russian, and, wherever conditions warrant, Slavic. In this connection, it should be noted that the practice of calling the department "Slavic" when almost all of its facilities lie in the realm of Russian, and only fig-leaf instruction in other Slavic languages is maintained for the sake of appearances, does not make much sense. Why not designate the department frankly as "Russian?" There is no greater virtue in having an unbalanced "Slavic" department than in having a strong Russian department.

Let us now consider perhaps the most difficult problem of all—that of teaching personnel. Because of the haphazard manner in which Russian studies have been dealt with in the past there has never been any sustained effort to develop new young teachers of professorial standing. In the first place, one could offer no encouragement to aspiring scholars in the Russian field. The future was too uncertain. Those few who did pursue their studies to the Ph.D. degree did it out of devotion to the subject rather than for any

promise of definite future application of their training. In forty-odd years of existence, the Slavic Department at the University of California granted only five Ph.D.'s. Of these, four were received by natives of Russia who had perfect command of the language before they started, and one by a native of Yugoslavia, with the corresponding knowledge of Serbian. During those years, several very promising young people of American birth drifted into other occupations before they completed their training for the doctorate in Russian.

Beginning at the freshman level, it requires approximately ten years of study to receive a doctorate in the Russian field. At no point has there been an effort, on anything approaching a national scale, to plan ahead in the matter of training new cadres. As a matter of fact, because of retirement and death, the ranks of trained and experienced scholars in the field have been narrowing rather than growing. Within the past three or four years, two professors died and one retired at California, one died at Harvard, one at Vassar, and one at Stanford. In the past, most of the professorships were held by persons of Russian birth and, sometimes, of Russian training. This situation still prevails today. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with it, and indeed it may have some advantages, but how long will this situation last? Most of the persons concerned have either passed or are approaching fifty. During the past quarter-century or more there has been no wave of immigration of young educated Russians. We are rapidly approaching a crisis when there may be a catastrophic shortage of trained and experienced professors. The teachers whose training was acquired wholly or mainly in the emergency war programs offer no solution to the long-range problem of the future, although they may serve as a stop-gap for the present. In the first place, they lack, for the most part, the necessary training and experience required for an academic career. In the second place, they are too old as material for the future, since their average age is well over fifty.

There is still time to avoid the crisis or greatly to mitigate it if we begin at once to lay foundations for the training of young scholars. These must come from the ranks of young American-born men and women. Russian ancestry *per se* qualifies a person for training for a professorship in Russian no more than does English or American ancestry alone qualify one for a similar career in English. There is a nucleus, however, with which we can start. It is provided by the best and most eager of our war-time students. The Navy Language School alone has prepared some extremely gifted young men who

have repeatedly expressed their interest in and enthusiasm for making the teaching of Russian subjects a lifetime occupation. Many of them are now out of uniform, and would be available for further study in the pursuance of that aim. In their case, it would take considerably less than ten years to prepare them for the doctorate. In the first place, almost all of them were graduates of colleges before they joined the Navy, and therefore would not be starting at freshman level. In the second place, they have already made an excellent start by completing the highly-intensive courses in Russian. True, most of them are married and have family responsibilities, but here the foundations can be of great help by offering the most promising of them suitable scholarships and fellowships. It would be highly desirable to provide facilities for these young men to study and live in Russia for a year or two prior to granting them their doctorates or before they begin their active academic careers. The foundations could help here also, and, of course, the cooperation of the Russian government would be necessary in granting them permission to live and pursue their work in Russia. Our own government may take a more active part, too. Those universities and colleges, which are equipped at present, must make long-time provisions for this work and undertake new programs or expand old ones with great care and a sense of responsibility. In general, the project is too big and too important to depend on one agency alone, whether government, foundations, or universities; all must cooperate. Incidentally, some of the projects sponsored by the foundations are of outstanding importance and should be continued beyond the original term of grant. One such project is the Hoover Library grant for visiting scholars, on the Stanford campus, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. Another is the Russian Institute at Columbia University, also sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. Although neither of these projects has direct connection with the problem outlined in this article, in the long-range view they play an important rôle with regard to it.

Many state universities have another important source of funds. It is no longer as difficult as it once was to convince state legislatures, even in the isolationist Middle-West, that the development of Russian studies is essential. Particularly, in this era of money-prosperity, with most States showing a surplus, it should not be too difficult to establish Russian studies at state-supported institutions on a more solid and extensive basis.

The picture is brighter also in the privately-endowed institutions.

The relatively few high-endowment universities present no problem beyond that of convincing their administrations and boards of trustees. But even the low-endowment institutions have large enrollments because of the G.I. bill and are in a much more secure financial position. In the isolated cases where this may not be true, additional revenue could be obtained by an intensive campaign for funds among regular and prospective donors. Appeals for such donations are facilitated by pointing out that gifts to universities are exempt from income tax to a large proportion. Russian studies have to date benefited very little from private gifts to universities. The fact is that in the entire country there is not one endowed chair of Russian studies.

Before concluding this discussion of college-level Russian instruction, let us touch upon a very serious problem, the satisfactory solution of which can greatly facilitate long-range success of the whole undertaking. This problem concerns secondary-school instruction in the Russian language. In spite of extremely gratifying results in numerous cases, people in the field have felt that starting Russian-language studies in college (sometimes as late as the sophomore or junior year) does not give the student sufficient time to assimilate the knowledge and make it part of his mental make-up. The same opportunity should be given a student to begin his Russian studies in high school as now exists for the student of Spanish or French. The student who decides in high school that he wants to dedicate his life to Russian studies should not be made to wait until college to begin his work. Others should be given an opportunity to develop an interest in Russian studies in high school. Many desirable students, who might otherwise remain unaware of it, may be attracted to the field. Conversely, those less capable may be weeded out early, before they reach the university.

Of course, teaching Russian in high school presents many real difficulties. Among them are: lack of enthusiasm on the part of school boards; lack of finances; shortage of teachers even on secondary-school level, and the virtual absence of a method of instruction suitable for the high-school curriculum. A few high schools, most of them in the Eastern United States, have introduced some instruction on an experimental basis. This is a step in the right direction, but vastly more is needed. High-school curricula must eventually include Russian on a footing of equality with French, German, Spanish, and Latin. With proper application and concentration, it is reasonable to expect that it will not be impossible to find a solution for this problem.

A Page from the Past

By PIERRE ROUTSKY

THE abdication of Nicholas II, Tsar of All the Russias, was a shattering blow to Russian officials and institutions abroad. Various disquieting rumors had been in the air during the days preceding this event, and the Consulate General in New York was awaiting with bated breath official communications from Russia. The fateful news reached us from Washington toward the evening of March 12, and the next day all our official family was assembled at the Consulate from the early morning.

Somehow, there was no inclination to weigh the consequences of this historical event; everybody was anxious for additional news covering the outward particulars and details. Numerous telephone calls were exchanged between the Embassy and the Consulate, but neither one had received any official news.

Toward the evening of that same day the first cablegram was brought to us by a Western Union messenger. Dimitry Florinsky, one of our Vice-Consuls, and I rushed to decode the message. It was short and the code one of the simplest, but in our excitement and thirst for news we struggled with our work for some time.

Strange as it may seem, this first message from the Provisional government was an order to remove the portraits of the Emperor and of his family from the official quarters of the Consulate.

This cablegram of rather secondary importance was sufficient, however, to bring to us all the sense of the great political change which had taken place in our Motherland. Old symbols were gone; new life, as yet untried in Russia, was making its entrance. I am sure that neither the foreign service officer who had written the cablegram, nor the executive who had signed it, had thought of the psychological impact their message would have on the people assembled at the Consulate.

The next cablegram followed the first one shortly and announced to us "the glorious and bloodless revolution," which had put the Provisional Government at the helm of Russia. Evidently, this delayed second cablegram had been meant to reach us first and to impress on our minds the importance of the political change in Russia. But, as it so often happens in human affairs, the first "proce-

dural"—in the United Nations' parlance—cablegram had taken care of the "substantive" matter.

I cannot continue my narrative without mentioning our old Russian porter Vassily, an ex-soldier, a man of simple faith and loyalty. After having received the order to remove the portraits of the Emperor, he was dumbfounded; it seemed to him almost a sacrilege merely to take the portraits down and not to move them to another wall. Seeing his deep consternation, Michel Oustinoff, the Consul General, advised him to wrap the pictures carefully, and to put them away in the attic, "temporarily." At these words Vassily's face lighted up and he murmured, "That way, Your Excellency, they will not be covered with dust when we put them again in their usual places."

Afterwards there were other happenings that seemed considerably puzzling to our poor Vassily, and none more so than the arrival one day, a few months later, at the Consulate of General Maria Bochkarova, who had commanded the Women's Battalion at the beginning of Kerensky's régime. She was accompanied by a male aide in captain's uniform. The latter approached Vassily and asked him to announce General Bochkarova to the Consul General. Vassily—all confusion—reported to Oustinoff that a captain outside told him that a general wished to see the Consul General, but that he, Vassily, had not noticed any general out there.

When later someone tried to explain the situation to Vassily, the old fellow muttered, "I have seen enough to know that our Mother-Russia cannot be saved by generals in skirts."

Vassily died that same year and so did not see the fruitage of subsequent political events in Russia.

The following days passed mostly in decoding numerous cablegrams, sending them over to the Embassy, receiving instructions from the latter, and girding ourselves for new activities. Among the many messages received, there was one concerning the amnesty granted to political refugees. These refugees were to occupy our minds and our time for months to come.

We were aware, of course, that there were Russian political refugees in the United States and, particularly, in New York City. The Imperial government, however, had never bothered us on that score, and thus the names and the doings of the political refugees in this country were almost *terra incognita* to the majority of us.

Consequently, when we received instructions and funds for the repatriation of all the political refugees who wished to return to

Russia, we had to create a sort of intelligence service, in order to be able to differentiate between the *bona fide* political refugees and the Russians who simply wanted to get a free passage to Russia.

In this task we received unexpected help from the political refugees themselves. Quickly they learned about the manna that fell from the government and, like Nibelungs crawling out of Nibelheim, they left their "underground" homes and immediately started their pilgrimage toward the Consulate. Thus we had the opportunity to see for the first time a few of those refugees who later became leaders in the Communist upheaval. The very first who appeared on our horizon was Leo Bronstein, known as Trotsky; subsequently he was followed by Bukharin, Shatoff, and a score of other refugees of local prominence, whose names I cannot recollect at the moment. In a shrill, slightly hysterical voice, Trotsky demanded to see someone in authority. Out of curiosity, Oustinoff himself decided to talk to him. On seeing our chief, Trotsky started at once his harangue, claiming that, as head of the local Bolshevik party, he was entitled to travel to Russia as a passenger of note, and not as one of the herd of political refugees (he was referring to our decision to repatriate the refugees in groups). His speech implied that all that should have been clear to the Consul General. In this connection there occurred an interesting dialogue between the Consul General and Trotsky. Trying to stem his oratory, Oustinoff told him that rules were rules and added, quoting here a Russian proverb, "The eggs do not teach the hen." To this Trotsky retorted immediately, "Mr. Consul, evidently you have not grasped as yet that the time has already come for the eggs to teach the hen."

In the meantime, our Intelligence Service was gathering information on the political refugees in New York City in order to proceed with their repatriation. This special task had been entrusted to me and, in cooperation with my co-workers, I evolved the following procedure. Each political party was to elect a presidium, and the latter was to determine the number of people in each group to be repatriated and the order of precedence, and to send us at required intervals a report on the number and the names of the persons to be repatriated in a given group, as well as a statement that they were *bona fide* members of that particular political party. It was also to issue a personal party card to each member. Prior to sailing, these cards were to be collected by the agent of the company responsible for the transportation of the refugees, compared with our list, and returned to the Consulate. The latter, on the other hand, was

to take charge of chartering trains and steamers, and of other measures for the evacuation and the transportation of the refugees. All financial matters were to be handled by the Consulate exclusively. The refugees were to proceed to Siberia, via Pacific Ocean.

In connection with this work, I had to make frequent trips to Washington. I remember one such trip when my deep absorption in our new problems had caused me some embarrassment. The chancery of the Embassy was located in a spacious wing, affording ample accommodations for the offices and the archives. Opening into the chancery was a safe of room proportions, with a regular size door leading into it. Having completed my report and obtained instructions as well as a sizeable check for expenses, I glanced at the clock and calculated that I had just time to catch the Congressional to New York. Putting my documents into a briefcase and saying a hurried, "So long, see you soon!" to the secretaries in general, I stepped briskly out of the room. Hilarious shouts, "Hey, Routsky, where do you think you're going? This is not exactly the way to New York!" followed me, and with a sheeplike expression on my face, I retraced my steps . . . from the safe.

During that period we held bi-monthly conferences at the Consulate with specially appointed delegates from each party. There were representatives of the Bolshevik party, the Social-Revolutionary and the Social-Democratic parties, and of the Anarchist group. The Bolshevik party was represented by Trotsky and Bukharin; the Anarchists were represented by Shatoff, while the other parties by members of their presidiums, in rotation. After having greeted them, in my capacity of host and chairman, I used to proceed at once to the consideration of various complaints, lodged with the Consulate, and covering mostly matters of accommodations and food on trains and steamers. Trotsky, endowed with a lot of self-importance and aggressiveness, would interrupt with his criticisms of our actions and his admonitions to me, as an official of the old régime, to change my antiquated views and to develop a correct appraisal of the political evolution going on in the world, and especially in Russia. At subsequent conferences, he also took opportunity to mention that the Provisional government was only a stop gap, and that the final word rested with the people of Russia who would say it pretty soon. Other delegates, with the exception of Bukharin, would try to facilitate my task of chairman by asking Trotsky to attend to the business in hand. Shatoff, the Anarchist, especially tried to please everybody by his smooth talk and friendly

manners. The only man who, literally, never said a word was Bukharin, who later on became the official interpreter of Marxian wisdom but finally was executed for unorthodoxy of his views. We called him "the silent one," and silent he remained until his departure for Russia. Another topic for Trotsky's tirades was provided by his assertion that all the other members of the conference, except Bukharin, did not really represent any political party; that the so-called party memberships consisted of persons who had simply paid gratuities for their listing as members, and who made a mockery of *bona fide* political parties.

No doubt there was a grain of truth in his assertions, but he refused to put his accusations in writing, and the Consulate had no possibility nor opportunity to start a general investigation. Moreover, such an investigation, even had it been approved by the Embassy, would not have had any marked influence on the policy of the government. It was understood that the amnesty and the repatriation of the political refugees were required of the Government, and it had no choice in the matter.

Trotsky was of medium stature, with very thick glasses and unkempt black hair. Most unprepossessing in appearance, he was the most vociferous of them all. As I saw him at these meetings, he impressed one as a definitely maladjusted personality; his speech and his gestures were those of a neurotic person. He spoke in a shrill, high pitched voice, and tried to hypnotize his listener with his myopic but intense eyes. At that time he was on the editorial staff of the *Novyi Mir* (New World), the Russian Bolshevik daily published in New York City. Trotsky was a salesman, *par excellence*, of the Bolshevik propaganda. His articles in the *Novyi Mir* and even his later activities as Commissar of Foreign Affairs and War Commissar testify to the fact that his *forte* was not the knowledge of foreign or military affairs, but rather his oratorical ability to move the masses in the direction needed at that particular moment. In this respect he could be likened to Kerensky, who had succeeded in reviving the fighting spirit of the Russian Army—although for a short period only—when it was already in a state of disintegration. I have not read Trotsky's *History of Revolution*, but from what I saw and heard of him I have not detected any other talents in his general make up.

His colleague, the taciturn Bukharin, was a short, emaciated blond man of around forty, with a pointed beard. He looked like a typical teacher and impressed one as a thinker. His head bent, he

seemed to listen carefully to everything that was being said, but he never broke his silence. The friends of Bukharin were wont to explain his manner by the fact that he was a true Yogi follower, who delighted in concentration and meditation. He was, as I have learned from various sources, a man of education and a writer; he followed that line of work in Russia until his death.

Shatoff also did not run true to form. He was short, round, and stocky, but very light on his feet and possessed of an unbounded energy. Of a sunny disposition, he was always trying to enliven the meetings by introducing some lighter topics. His efforts, however, were thwarted by the garrulity of Trotsky and the stony silence of Bukharin. Later, Shatoff became Chief of Police in Leningrad and still later he achieved fame as builder of the Turkestan railways. Lacking, as he was, in culture and education, he owed his achievements solely to his energy, which he knew how to impart to others working under him.

The remaining delegates were of the common garden variety with no distinguishable traits of character or mind.

As I have mentioned before, one of the perpetual themes of Trotsky's was his insistence on special favors due him as far as his travel to Russia was concerned. Nevertheless, his claim to exception was not heeded, and he was treated in the same manner as his comrades, but with different and wholly unexpected consequences.

The consecutive groups of the political refugees were routed either via San Francisco, or via Seattle and Vancouver. Those bound for Seattle and points north usually covered their last leg of journey by the Canadian-Pacific Railroad. Without any malice aforethought on my part, Trotsky happened to be in a group traveling via the Canadian-Pacific, and was arrested by the local authorities as soon as he had crossed the Canadian border. Upon his arrest, he was sent to Montreal, and placed in a concentration camp. As we learned later, this had been done at the advice of the British government. Trotsky, naturally, raised a howl that was heard both in Russia and in England. Special orders were cabled from Russia to our Consul General in Canada, instructing him to lodge an immediate and vigorous protest with the Canadian government against such an unwarranted procedure, and to visit Trotsky in the detention camp. Similar protest, evidently, had been sent to the British government, and Trotsky was released after having spent almost two weeks in a concentration camp.

A short time afterwards, during his visit to New York, Serge

Likhatcheff, our Consul General in Canada, told me that Trotsky, for some reason, blamed me personally for his Canadian misadventure, and that he had assured Likhatcheff very solemnly that he, Trotsky, would not take lying down this affront to his pride and dignity, brought about by my Machiavellian machinations.

This *sui generis* exodus continued almost until the arrival in the United States of the Special Embassy of the Provisional government headed by Boris A. Bakhmeteff.

The Russian Translation Project

Three Years Later

By W. CHAPIN HUNTINGTON

THREE years ago the editor of *The Russian Review* gave the writer an opportunity to explain the new Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies. The Project was then less than a year old and the account was essentially an interim report of principles and plans rather than a statement of accomplishments. Now the first cycle is almost completed: five translations are in the hands of the publishers and the first book is scheduled to appear in May. Thus we are nearly ready to place the initial volumes on our "five-foot shelf" of outstanding Russian works in American translation.

The harvest of manuscripts has poured in during the past year and the editing of this material, particularly the final editing of translations scheduled for early publication, has interrupted the undertaking of new work. The delay is only temporary, however, and a second subvention from the Rockefeller Foundation makes it possible to start another cycle of translations and thus extend the series.

At the present moment, there are twenty-seven titles on our list in various stages of completion as follows:

A. In the publisher's hands	5 titles
B. Received from translators	14 "
C. Expected early in 1948	4 "
D. In process of translation	3 "
E. Authorized but not assigned	1 "
	<hr/>
	27 titles

Details are given in the table appended. It is evident that the majority of the translations contracted for in the first group have been completed or will be delivered in the near future. There is thus a wide choice of translations available to ourselves and our publishers, the Macmillan Company, in laying out a program of publication.

When the Russian Translation Project was launched, the writer

had the good fortune to be chosen editor of the new enterprise whose eventual magnitude and complexities he hardly foresaw. Happily, he was not alone, since the Council, with the wisdom of long experience in managing projects of this character, set up an Administrative Committee to guide and assist him.

The members of this Committee were: Dr. John A. Morrison, geographer (chairman); Dr. Harold Spivacke, musicologist; Dr. Sergius Yakobson, historian and bibliographer; Mr. Mortimer Graves, gifted administrative secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies. All of these scholars were deeply interested in and possessed special knowledge of Russia. The Project is indeed fortunate that after four years of existence the membership of its Administrative Committee is still unchanged. This Committee, whose members combine a rich and varied experience, have put all this at the disposal of the Project with unselfish devotion and its success will be largely due to their efforts.

Starting with a list of titles assembled as the product of an enquiry of some two hundred scholars throughout the United States, the Administrative Committee has kept adding others, either as a result of research or at the suggestion of interested friends. From this backlog the titles authorized for translation have been chosen, after careful discussion and appraisal, either because they met special needs in the field or on account of their value to the basic aim of the Project—the promotion of an understanding of Russian life and thought.

It will come as a surprise to many that one of the difficult problems of the Project has been the acquisition of Russian texts. Books published under the Imperial régime are, in most cases, so long out of print that they have become collectors' items, unobtainable or only to be had at exorbitant prices. In the case of Soviet books, the supply has been very uncertain. Worldwide difficulties in publishing, characteristic of the war and postwar periods, have not spared the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the books sent over by the Soviet export agency have not always been suited to our program, or the few copies of books we might have used in a shipment have been snatched up on arrival by libraries in or about New York.

In order to meet this situation, we have resorted to photostats of the single copies of wanted books held in the Library of Congress, or elsewhere, which could not be borrowed for the long period necessary to make a translation. This procedure was expensive but less so than time wasted in fruitless search. It also had the advantage

that the loose sheets of the photostats or photographic prints, "blown-up" from microfilm, could be made large enough to magnify type which was originally too small, and were often more convenient for the translator to handle than a heavy book would be.

For the future, relief is in sight, thanks to a subvention made to the American Council of Learned Societies by the Rockefeller Foundation for the lithoprinting (photo-offset) of Russian books to be produced in facsimile. This new enterprise which is under the direction of Mr. Mortimer Graves, will enable college libraries and projects like our own to obtain many of the Russian works that they need.

Recruiting Translators

"Ruler of many tongues, the Russian language is great before all the tongues of Europe, not only by reason of the vastness of the regions which it dominates, but by virtue of its own greatness and richness."

Thus, two hundred years ago, wrote Lomonosov, the scientist and father of modern Russian literature. And, a century later, Turgenev, master of Russian prose, wrote in exile: "—O great, mighty, just, and free Russian language! Were it not for thee, how could one help falling into despair at the sight of all that goes on at home? But it is impossible to believe that such a language was not bestowed upon a great people!"

It is true, these men were speaking of Russian in its highest use, in belles-lettres and creative literature, while the books our Project deals with are generally works of description, exposition, and criticism, somewhat more utilitarian, perhaps. Nevertheless, we knew that our translators would face a rich, inflected language, with a way of thinking different from ours.

Could enough competent translators be found in the United States? Some scholars doubted this but most of our advisers were more confident.

To our initial list of recommended translators, names have been added throughout the last three years, so that we have now built up a valuable roster of one hundred and fifty names. It is an exceptional list, nevertheless, in the light of our experience not more than a fourth of the translators registered can be rated "excellent," that is absolutely dependable for such work as that of the Russian Translation Project. We have not actively sought to enlarge this roster but have rather let it grow as the Project has become better known.

Each time our work has received any publicity, new names have been sent in to us, some of them of persons of exceptional background and education.

Of these translators, about each of whom we have a biographical sketch, those whose native language is English still comprise only a third of the total, but, with the growth of Russian studies in the United States, the proportion shows a rising tendency. In the initial article on the Project in *The Russian Review* of three years ago, the qualifications of a good translator were listed as: (1) ability to write sustained idiomatic English; (2) thorough knowledge of Russian; (3) background of Russian history and civilization; (4) special training in the field covered—these in the order named. Experience has only confirmed this opinion and, while we cannot at this stage demand with Sir John Denham: "Nor ought a genius less than his that writ attempt translation," we have learned by trial and error that it is wiser to insist on high standards at the outset than to spend days of editorial time revising a faulty manuscript.

Rewriting is a disagreeable job and seldom satisfactory, and in several cases revisions have cost us almost as much as the original translation. Another lesson from the hard school of experience is that no personal recommendation or formal statement of qualifications is sufficient to assure in advance that a translator will do satisfactory work. Even reprints of translations submitted in good faith by an applicant as evidence of ability, are sometimes deceptive since they may have been extensively revised after leaving the translator's hands. Therefore, the Russian Translation Project now requires an unrehearsed test translation of two or three thousand words of every candidate, without fear or favor, and, in order to be absolutely fair, pays him a fee of twenty-five dollars to make it. In the past four years a dozen promising applicants have failed, three in the case of one book, at a total cost of three hundred dollars, but this was much cheaper and certainly more satisfactory than tedious revision or, as has occurred, discarding an entire translation and contracting for a brand-new one.

Why do they fail? Here are some typical cases:

An American, is a bluffer, trying to cover his ignorance of Russian by glibness about his subject, desperately reading all manner of reference books in the hope that he can then guess what the Russian means.

An American, is self-deceived. Has been with Russians for years and once lived in Russia, but friends have flattered him and he has never acquired a solid foundation. He writes "stood" for *put*, and "imposes on me" instead of *impresses me*.

A Russian, teaches modern languages but he learned English last and in tight places cannot extricate himself from the network of Russian idioms. His translation reminds one of the quotation from James Howell:

"Some hold translations not unlike to be
The wrong side of a Turkey tapestry."

A Russian, not quite well enough educated. Spoiled, undisciplined, and careless, trying to "get by" with social charm.

A young artist who lacks adequate training in writing both Russian and English, is slovenly. Spoiled by an adoring family who worship his genius and regard this translation as hardly worth the great man's time.

A Russian musician, lacking a sound general education, erratic and slovenly. Writes that "The Tartars by no means appear to have had predominantly ethical regard for nationality" instead of *The Tartars were by no means the predominant nationality from the ethnic point of view.*

A wartime government translator. Russian. His English was all right in spots but did not stand the strain, and he was ignorant of the subject. Translates "fur traders" as *industrialists*, "Far East" as *Near East*, "fur trade" as *lumber trade*, calls a "cape" a *sound*.

A Russian graduate of an American college but too immature for the work in hand. His command of English is inadequate to save him from bogging down in Russian syntax. Helpless away from clichés.

An American scientist lived for years in the U.S.S.R. apparently enjoying his laboratory work, but never mastered Russian because he could read and converse sufficiently without it. Probably self-deceived. He wrote that we should "look for the Middle Ages in the past," instead of *look beyond the Middle Ages into the past.*

An American, rather smug specialist in his field, working for a Ph. D. Had a smattering of Russian and was a victim of self-deception. Aided by a Russian friend who knew less English than the American did Russian. These partners made many errors, such as translating "carnal bond" as *cardinal tie*.

In sum, the tests showed that the type-fault of those whose native language was English was a lack of solid grounding in Russian grammar and syntax. With the native Russians who failed, the prevailing weakness was the inability to extricate themselves from the net of Russian sentence structure. Of all the unsatisfactory candidates it could be said that they did not appreciate that good translation is simply good English writing. In dealing with many of them one had the impression that they naively regarded Russian as a language apart, and felt that translation from it was a sort of feat not to be judged by the objective standards applied to translations from French or German.

Using the test translation and with growing caution as the months have passed, we have made contracts with thirty translators, six of them a cooperative group of Cornell students under the direction of Professor E. J. Simmons. As it turned out, thirteen of these were native Americans, two were English, and fifteen had Russian as

their native language. Fourteen were men, sixteen were women. As might have been expected, nearly half were professors. Two were professors' wives. A fifth were government experts, and the rest writers or private scholars.

It soon became apparent that an editor's work is never done, that simply engaging a translator and awaiting the prospect of editing his final product upon its prompt delivery, did not end the matter. Instead, in the case of most of the translators, relations were continuous throughout the term of their work, which was generally delivered in installments. Thus, a steady correspondence has been carried on. Actually, in such an untried enterprise, this was valuable since new problems were continually arising, demanding solution, and incipient errors could be nipped in the bud. For this reason, we wrote into the contracts with our translators in England the provision that the Project would pay air mail postage on all their communications.

In four years many things can happen with thirty translators, including marriage, sickness, and death. Some grow weary of well doing. One lady when she tired, lapsed into Russian syntax and had to be reminded. Another knew the subject of her book so well that when she grew bored with the author's style, she had a way of re-writing his text. An eminent professor kept no copy of the translation he sent us, insisting plaintively that he was not expert enough on the typewriter to do the corrections or erasures where carbon paper was involved. Fortunately we have a microfilm of his work in reserve!

An American, highly recommended by a leading Slavist, whom we had accepted in the beginning before the rule of test translations was adopted, knew Russian grammar but lacked background. This translator did not know the difference between an "orangery" and an orange grove, and thus ruined the author's metaphor of a palm tree suffocated in a conservatory.

An American scholar well versed in the classics but ignorant of science, made the mistake of attempting a book filled with references to chemistry and physics. Strange reactions occurred in a St. Petersburg laboratory under this treatment before they were corrected by a thorough-going revision!

The Art of Translation

One of the first questions to arise was that of transliteration. Which was more important in our case—to approximate the Russian

sounds or to render the Russian words into conventional combinations of Roman letters, unpronounceable to the uninitiated but reversible, that is, capable of being turned back into Cyrillic, letter for letter?

After hearing all the arguments and studying a dozen systems, we cut the Gordian knot and discarded reversibility. Our translations were directed at intelligent readers who would not know Russian, therefore, we sought deliberately to produce words as "American-looking" as possible, in order to reduce "reader-resistance" to a minimum. No diacritical marks, no apostrophes. The aim was to approximate the sounds of the Russian words, so that if spoken by an educated American, they would generally be identified by an educated Russian. Each of our books will carry an explanation of this simple scheme and will contain an index of names with the elusive Russian accent indicated by marks on the syllables stressed.

Another fundamental question was whether the translation should be literal or free. New translators almost always inquire about this. A cynic, who obviously did not dare to give his name, since the quotation is always anonymous, once said: "Translation is like a woman: if she is beautiful she is unfaithful; if she is faithful, she is not beautiful."

As for us, we were not cynics and we refused to accept these stern alternatives. In principle we agreed with the dictum of Dryden and of Horace that a faithful interpreter should translate not just the words but the force and the spirit of the original. But the practice was more difficult. At first, we were none too sure of these new translators, nor of their discretion. Moreover, many of the Soviet works, useful though they were as technical information and as specimens of Soviet thinking, were poorly or monotonously written with bombast and vain repetitions. This was particularly true up to a decade or more ago; the Revolution had not yet got round to elegance, and striving for literary quality was regarded in the first years as unnecessary and effeminate.

We saw no point in trying to embellish such a style by translation. If translators could render it clearly, that was enough. If anything, we wanted our readers to know what a Soviet-Russian book sounded like. Again, in the case of well written books, it would be unfortunate to lose the flavor of the Russian in translation. As time has gone on, however, and we have grown in experience, we have become more and more particular about the style of our translators.

A challenging question was that of ideology. Marxism is a *Weltanschauung* pervading every phase of life in the Soviet Union. Therefore, most Soviet books, and especially works dealing with history, economics, or sociology are inspired by and reflect this peculiar view of life. Of course, treatments vary. One book will be by a convinced scholar, a carry-over from the old régime, whose Marxism is thoroughly assimilated into the body of his work. Another, and possibly less sincere author, is taking out insurance against the censor or striving to proclaim his orthodoxy by frequent quotations from Lenin or Stalin, arbitrarily inserted at intervals throughout the text and having no organic connection with it.

It will be a new experience to many educated Americans to read a Soviet book, especially one dealing with a familiar subject and to see how different the world looks through Marxist spectacles. Thus, we have often been asked whether we will not omit certain passages and paragraphs in our translations. This we have steadfastly refused to do, believing that it is highly dangerous to embark upon a policy of tampering with the Russian text and thereby sacrificing its authenticity and our own scholarly integrity. Moreover, the value of a Soviet work to American readers may lie as much in its revelation of the Soviet mind as in the factual material it presents. This has been a fundamental tenet of the Russian Translation Project from the beginning.

The final editing of manuscripts for publication has taught us still another lesson in the exacting art of translation. It is that, even after the utmost care has been exercised in choosing the best available translators and in fitting the translator to the job, there is much left for the editor to do. Manuscripts differ in such a large-scale undertaking as this, but even the best of them cannot be turned over to the publisher sight unseen.

Here we are not concerned with mechanical errors of punctuation and spelling, of which a certain number are expected in a long manuscript. The faults we mean are subtler and more fundamental. Thus there is the translator who gets in a hurry and is sometimes actually inaccurate in his renderings of words. Or the lazy translator who fails to find an English equivalent and retains the Russian word—with or without quotes—confident that the editor will know and insert the correct meaning.

Many translators seem to use one (small) Russian-English dictionary and to be unaware of the riches of the classic Dal' or the excellent Soviet Ushakov, not to mention the Russian-German

Dictionary of Pavlovsky. Nor does it seem to occur to them that they could build vocabulary and understanding by reading Russian and English works in the fields they are treating: history, government, the Russian Church. Some have no apparent intellectual curiosity: they make a translation of a phrase which is obviously meaningless or absurd and let it stand without further investigation. This throws the burden of research back on the editors.

There occur also occasionally slips into colloquialisms, vulgarisms, and slang where such expressions are quite out of place and serve no useful purpose. All these faults in translators who have been recommended and tested.

On the whole, however, the editor's experience has been immensely rewarding. If this account has seemed overly critical of the faults of translators, the criticism is offered in no captious or pedantic spirit. Those in charge of the Project are quite conscious of their own shortcomings and of their inexperience in the beginning.

So many of our translators have been diligent "beyond the call of duty," and generous with their services. One was so conscientious about her translations of flora and fauna that she came to Washington on her own initiative, carrying a box full of filing cards, in order to check botanical and zoological names with the Smithsonian Institution and the Bureau of Fisheries. Another, a distinguished scholar in the field of Near Eastern studies, wrote us: "On the title page, I have put my wife's name as translator because her work has been many times more considerable than mine." Here was a case of what we have come to term the stereoscopic view, where two congenial and complementary people cooperate on a translation, making it more profound as well as more accurate. To the lively interest and thoughtfulness of one of our devoted and efficient translators, working in the field of art, we owe the discovery and acquisition by The Library of Congress of a unique collection of photographs of the Old Russia, some of which it is expected may help to illustrate the book she has translated.

Periodicals

In the field of translations from periodicals, the arrangement with the quarterly *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* which was mentioned in our previous article in *The Russian Review* has continued with satisfactory results and has resulted in the publication of translations of nine striking articles as follows:

- Dec. 1944—"Soviet Psychology in Wartime," by S. Rubenstein.
"The Theory of the Concept, the Judgment, and the Inference in Formal and Dialectic Logic," by E. Shur.
- June 1945—"Physiological Experiments and the Psychology of the Sub-conscious," by E. Airapetyantz and K. Bykov.
- Dec. 1945—"Basic Traits of the Classical Russian Esthetics," by V. Asmus.
"William of Occam and the Prehistory of English Materialism," by O. V. Trachtenberg.
- Mar. 1946—"The Philosophical Opinions of the Petrashevsky Circle," by N. Troyan.
- Sept. 1946—"Johann Joachim Winckelmann and the Three Epochs of the Bourgeois Weltanschauung," by Mikhail Lifshitz.
- Mar. 1947—"Recent Views on the Mass and Extension of the Electron," by F. Galperin.
- Sept. 1947—"The Logic of Aristotle and Formal Logic," by P. S. Popov.

The editor of *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* wrote us at the beginning of the year:

Evidence of the good-will of the Russians, as a result of our cooperation with the Russian Translation Project, continues to come in, especially in the tangible form of subscriptions from Russian institutions. That helps!

This is most encouraging and makes one wish that the philosophers had more control of international relations. It has thus far not been feasible to make similar arrangements with any other American periodicals.

Translation of Russian Newspapers

It has long been known to students of Soviet Russia that newspapers and current periodicals are an indispensable source of information about Soviet life and folkways, in the words of Professor P. E. Corbett, "a vivid reflection of living and changing reality."

Convinced of the importance to American scholars and institutions of English texts of the best known Soviet newspapers and periodicals, the Department of State early this year asked the Russian Translation Project whether it would undertake to provide such a service on a non-profit basis. Those in charge of the Project, while expressing our sympathy and interest, explained that the service envisaged would be too large an enterprise to be grafted onto the present small organization, that it would rather form a new project by itself. We offered, however, to conduct a limited experiment or pilot test which would throw light on the problems of translation, printing, and costs.

The first experiment involved the carefully timed translation, and varityped printing of an entire issue of the Moscow *Izvestiya*, an exact replica of the original, in English, page by page, in size and arrangement. Cost data were then obtained on the reproduction of editions of various sizes; by printing press, mats made by a linotype machine, or by the offset method.

The whole matter is still under study and further information is being awaited, as to whether the eight daily newspapers and twenty-five periodicals required as source material can be regularly and promptly received from Russia. Meanwhile the reaction to the project from universities, scholars, journalists, and radio commentators has been most encouraging.

* * * *

Up to the present we have undertaken the translation of twenty-seven books, containing thirteen thousand pages, or about five million words. I trust it will not be thought presumptuous or irreverent to point out that this is over five times the length of the Authorized Version of the Bible. We have no such unified collection of books to translate, nor such a golden age of the English language to work in, as Bishop Lancelot Andrewes and his fifty-four collaborators, "learned men . . . having special skill in the Greek and Hebrew tongues." Nevertheless, we have had on the whole a corps of competent and earnest translators, aware of the importance of the work they were doing.

The Russian Translation Project has been a cooperative enterprise from the start. It would never have been possible to conduct it with such a small staff if it had not had the constant generous help of many interested friends. Scholars like Professors Kenneth J. Conant of Harvard, John N. Hazard and Ernest J. Simmons of Columbia, and Chauncy D. Harris of Chicago, have given hundreds of hours without any compensation whatever.

The list of scholars throughout the country and abroad who have generously served as consultants, written prefaces, and read manuscripts is practically a "Who's Who" of Russian scholarship in the English-speaking world. I regret that it is not possible to mention them all.

The plan is to continue the Project until a total of fifty useful works have been translated and distributed. When this has been accomplished we hope that it will form a solid contribution to a clearer understanding of Russian life and the Russian mind.

STATUS OF TRANSLATIONS

As of December 31, 1947

Titles	Remarks—Editorial Work Remaining
A. In Publisher's Hands. (5)*	
Kuzminskaya: <i>Tolstoy as I Knew Him</i>	To be published in 1948
Vyshinsky: <i>The Law of the Soviet State</i>	To be published in 1948
Gudzy: <i>History of Early Russian Literature</i>	To be published in 1948
Lyashchenko: <i>History of the National Economy of Russia</i>	To be published in 1948
Balzak: <i>Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.</i>	To be published in 1948
B. Translations Received. (14)	
Zenkovsky: <i>Russian Thinkers and Europe</i>	Text ready for publication.
Berg: <i>Natural Regions of the U.S.S.R.</i>	Reproduction of maps under study.
Kaidanova-Bervy: <i>History of Public Education in Russia</i>	Editing of Vol. I going forward.
Okun: <i>Russian-American Company</i>	Vol. II requires further revision.
Andreyev: <i>Russian Discoveries in the Pacific</i>	
Findeisen: <i>History of Russian Music</i>	Being indexed. Reproduction of illustrations and musical examples under study.
Glebov: <i>Russian Music</i>	Needs final editing.
Pekelis: <i>History of Russian Music</i>	Editing and index. Reproduction of musical examples.
Varneke: <i>History of the Russian Theatre</i>	Editing and index.
Krachkovsky: <i>On Arabic Manuscripts</i>	Editing and index.
Sokolov: <i>Russian Folklore</i>	Editing and index.
Grabar: <i>History of Russian Art</i>	Final editing, index. Problem of reproducing illustrations.
Efimenko: <i>Primitive Society</i>	Final editing, index. Illustrations.
Menshutkin: <i>Life of Lomonosov</i>	Editing. Illustrations. Index.
C. Expected Early in 1948. (4)	
Nechkina: <i>History of Russia</i>	Delivery in April, 1948.
Anthology: <i>Russian Writers on Literature</i>	Delivery in February, 1948.
Romanov: <i>Russia in Manchuria (1892-1906)</i>	Delivery in March, 1948.
Barthold: <i>Turkestan</i> (4 monographs)	Three-quarters delivered.
D. In Process. (3)	
Anthologies: <i>Russian National Character</i>	Contents Settled. Prefaces assigned to specialists.
<i>Nineteenth Century Criticism</i>	Outline Expected February 1.
<i>Soviet Legal Philosophy</i>	Translation over half completed.
E. Authorized by Committee. (1)	
Anthology of <i>Soviet Literary Criticism</i>	Translators being tested.

*Balzak's *Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.* was sent to the publishers on January 21, after this report was written.

Book Reviews

DEAN, VERA MICHELES. *The United States and Russia*. (The American Foreign Policy Library, edited by Sumner Welles and Donald C. McKay.) Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947. 321 pp. \$3.00.

There is much that is admirable in Mrs. Dean's volume. In a condensed and lucid form, it provides the reader with interesting and useful information on the territory and population of the Soviet Union, its natural resources, its political and economic structure. The main purpose of the book, however, is to *interpret* present-day Russia to American readers, with the solution of the problem of American-Soviet relations in view. And here I find myself compelled to express some doubts as to the soundness and efficacy of the author's general approach and method.

Properly enough, Mrs. Dean tries first of all to put Soviet Russia into a historical perspective. Certainly, historical continuity must be stressed with regard to the Russian Revolution as in the case of any other historical phenomenon. But this continuity should not be presented in an oversimplified fashion, and the element of *change* must be emphasized along with that of continuity. As I see it, neither of these requirements has been observed by the author.

Thus, in speaking of the tradition of "a highly centralized autocracy or dictatorship" in Russian history, she fails to make clear the fundamental difference between the old-type royal absolutism and the modern totalitarian dictatorship. Even at the height of its power, Russian autocracy was not an "ideocracy," in the

sense in which the Soviet government is; neither did it possess that technical apparatus of persuasion and coercion which the present Russian régime has developed to such a degree of perfection. As a result, on the eve of the Revolution, the Russians were by no means "nurtured in the tradition of absolutism" or "taking the view that the state was paramount." This certainly was not true of the intellectuals, and anti-*étatiste* tendencies were very strong among the popular masses as well. In any case, there was in the country neither a widespread love for autocracy nor even a willingness to submit to it. The revolutionary movement of modern times strove for political freedom and civil liberties, and the revolutionaries went to the masses with the slogan, "Down with autocracy." The elections to the first two Dumas aroused a great interest among the workers and peasants, as did the elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1917—an event which is not mentioned in Mrs. Dean's historical account. Moreover, the author, in my opinion, greatly minimizes the degree of political change that took place in Russia since the establishment of the constitutional régime, just as she minimizes the extent of cultural and economic progress in the country during the last pre-revolutionary decades.

All this leads to a wrong historical perspective, endowing the ultimate triumph of Lenin with a character of inevitability which it actually did not possess. According to Mrs. Dean, Russia simply "passed from one autocracy to another," and she adds that "this should have been

anticipated by anyone familiar with Russian history." Strangely enough, it was not anticipated by the foremost Russian historian of the time, the late Paul Miliukov, who spent the greater part of his life in a struggle for constitutional democracy in Russia.

Equally oversimplified is Mrs. Dean's picture of the economic background of the Russian Revolution. Capitalism, she asserts, "did not exist in Russia except in fetal form." "Such native capital as existed . . . was in the hands of large landowners." As a matter of fact, the growth of capitalist tendencies in Russia can be traced back at least to the beginning of the nineteenth century; before the Revolution, Russia went through two phases of intense industrialization, and the largest native capitalists were either of merchant or of peasant origin. The author's general conclusion that "Russia had by-passed the period of individual enterprise" sounds as an echo of the old Slavophile-Populist illusions, long abandoned by Russian economic historians, Marxian and non-Marxian alike.

Mrs. Dean's assertion that before the Revolution the majority of the Russian people had had "no experience with either the concept or practice of private property" is based on a factual error. It is not true that at the time of the Emancipation "most of the peasants were unable to purchase land" and that there were "millions of landless peasants" in Russia half a century later. Except for the relatively small group of the so-called household serfs (one and a half million out of twenty million), all liberated serfs received land allotments, and in the course of the subsequent decades peasant landownership was increasing, with the result

that on the eve of the revolution the peasants had in their hands about 75 per cent of the arable land in the country. No doubt, the peasants wanted more land, but this certainly does not argue in favor of the theory that they were devoid of the sense of property. In fact, the whole history of the relations between the peasants and the Communist régime proves the contrary. Both Lenin and Stalin repeatedly stated that, if left alone, the peasants would develop in a capitalist rather than a socialist direction, and it is a matter of record that collectivization had to be brought about by tremendous political pressure, in the face of a strong and widespread peasant opposition. Even after its victory, the Soviet government was forced to make concessions to the peasant's property instinct by allowing him to have his own homestead on the collective farm.

With regard to national psychology, I would hesitate to subscribe to the familiar generalization according to which "the sense of Messianic destiny is a notable characteristic of the Russians." I do not possess the evidence that would permit me to assert that the "masses of the Russian people" were subscribing to the tenets of Panslavism, in the nineteenth century, or to those of international Communism, after the Revolution. I am sure, however, that "intense suspicion of all foreigners" is not "a Russian trait." Neither is it true that the Russians "adopted an outward facade of Westernization while inwardly rejecting Western culture as alien to the Russian spirit." In the case of the intelligentsia, the whole intellectual history of modern Russia is a proof to the contrary. As to the masses, they do not seem to have rejected the

fruits of Western culture, once these have been made available to them. And the whole anti-Western propaganda campaign in present-day Russia, with its emphasis on the "rotteness" of Western culture, is another testimony to the strength of the attraction which the West has for the Russian people.

In the field of foreign policy, Mrs. Dean again oversimplifies the historical continuity, while neglecting to register the elements of change. Like so many other writers on the subject, she tends to make Russian aims in the Near East much more traditional and "secular" than they really are. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the problem of the Straits had no meaning for Russia, and as to the "medieval Russian princes dreaming of nailing their shields to the gates of Constantinople," this belongs to the realm of poetry rather than that of diplomatic history. According to Mrs. Dean, "Russia had fought eleven wars with Turkey between 1676 and 1918, primarily about the Straits." Actually, I do not know of a single Russo-Turkish war fought primarily for the Straits—except perhaps the First World War, in the beginning of which, however, Russian diplomacy was willing to forego all claims to the Straits for the sake of keeping Turkey neutral. More important is the failure of Mrs. Dean to indicate the radical difference between the spirit and the technique of the imperial Russian policy, on the one hand, and of Soviet foreign policy, on the other,—a difference that is one of primary importance even if the specific objectives of the two policies often coincide. On occasions, she notes the revolutionary character of Soviet foreign policy, as when she says that "the Russians

have carried their intolerance of political opposition at home over into their relations with the neighboring countries," or when she describes the Soviet concept of "friendly" governments (p.159). But she does not stress this point as it should be stressed, and on the whole her tendency is to discuss Soviet foreign policy in terms of traditional power-politics which, I submit, obscures rather than clarifies its real nature.

Throughout the book, the author obviously tries to maintain an attitude of objectivity, and this in itself is, of course, a laudable effort. But I wonder whether I can share Mrs. Dean's concept of objectivity. She seems to proceed on the basis of the assumption that our understanding of the other side's point of view will make mutual conciliation possible. To this my reply would be that it all depends on what the nature of the other side is, and what kind of a point of view it holds. Thus, Mrs. Dean's explanation that "from Tito's point of view, Mikhailovich deserved to be punished" (p. 160) does not sound to me too reassuring.

At times, Mrs. Dean's desire to see all sides of the question leads her to unresolved contradictions. In the case of her discussion of Soviet "democracy," for instance, I do not see how she can apply the term, in any sense whatsoever, to the régime which she herself describes as follows: "Only after opposing elements have been removed by death or neutralized by imprisonment or exile is it possible to permit a measure of public discussion within the framework set by the government." There is a similar ambiguity in her treatment of Russia's relations with the satellite countries. In one place she ascribes Soviet influence in Eastern Europe "primarily to the interest

aroused by the actual operation of the Soviet system," in other words, to Communism's popular appeal, while in another place she speaks of the increasing use of force by Russia and the "friendly" Communist governments necessitated by the growing opposition among the Eastern European peoples. The second statement, which cancels the first, is, of course, amply supported by ever growing evidence. And yet, so great is Mrs. Dean's desire to give the other side the benefit of the doubt, that she still cannot "answer with assurance" the question "whether Communists . . . will honestly co-operate with non-Communist political groups . . . or will merely prove to be Trojan horses in the governments they have entered," as she still considers it necessary to ascertain whether the Communists "do or do not menace democratic institutions."

The concluding part of the book deals with American-Soviet relations. Here the reader will find some excellent general advice as to the necessity of clarifying the objectives of American foreign policy and of making it consistent and constructive. But when it comes to more specific observations and recommendations, the author's treatment begins to suffer from ambiguity and occasional contradictions. Mrs. Dean apparently finds fault with American policy past and present, but she does not make her dissent sufficiently clear. When one reads her argument against a "blind automatic refusal to accept any proposal made by Russia," one wonders at what time, during the whole period from Teheran to the last London

conference, was American diplomacy guilty of this particular sin? More specific is another criticism: America is in danger of becoming identified as a supporter of the *status quo* all over the world. "Had the Americans supported the liberals much of the post-war friction with Russia could have been avoided." I am all in favor of supporting the liberals (who, in Mrs. Dean's terminology, include the democratic Socialists) but I fail to see how such a policy would make the Soviet government any happier. Does not Mrs. Dean herself tell us that the Soviet spokesmen describe as Fascist "all groups opposed to Russia or to native Communists" and that "the most bitter ideological struggle in the post-war world promises to be the struggle between Communists and Socialists?"

There is one piece of advice in this part of the book which I find particularly unrealistic. Among the set of "pertinent questions" which Mrs. Dean wants the American policy-makers to ask themselves is the following: ". . . is it possible for us to find a common ground for cooperation with the government bloc of Communists, Socialists, and dissident Peasant party members which has been ruling Poland, *irrespective of its attitude toward Russia?*" [the italics are mine]. If this is not a rhetorical question, and apparently it is not, one is entitled to ask Mrs. Dean this question: how does she envisage the realization of such a program in the light of the Soviet Union's attitude toward both Poland and America?

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

Harvard University

WALSH, WARREN AND PRICE, ROY. *Russia: A Handbook*. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1947. 140 pp. \$1.00.

This little handbook is a useful and much needed guide to the Soviet Union for high school teachers, students, and adult study groups. It is comparable to a more elaborate study outline brought out at intervals by the American-Russian Institute. Based on official Soviet data, the latter, however, is uncritical and one-sided.

Russia: A Handbook was written under the supervision of Professor Warren Walsh, Chairman of Russian Studies at Syracuse University, in collaboration with Roy Price, Professor of Social Studies and Education at the same university. The authors have done a good job of editing, the materials are judiciously selected and arranged. One aim of the booklet, according to the authors, is "to help students to overcome the habit of judging all nations, and the Soviet Union in particular, solely by American standards. In a real sense, they must understand that differences in geography, historical traditions and experiences make for differences in attitudes and beliefs, and differences even in such concepts as the meaning of 'democracy' or 'security'."

Part I of the book contains chapters on the people and their land, the government, economic life, Soviet culture, and foreign relations. Part II consists of suggested activities for students, some multiple choice exercises, a glossary of terms, and a very useful selected bibliography.

Although strictly factual and neither pro nor anti-Soviet in tone, this booklet is marred occasionally by sweeping generalizations: "There is

little doubt that the majority of the Soviet people are materially better off now than they were under the old régime" (p. 53); "if the Russian peasant is collectively minded today it is because he has long been so" (p. 51); "Some authors [one wonders whom the author has in mind] describe pre-revolutionary Russia as an economic colony of the great powers of the West" (p. 45). Such statements, debatable to say the least, certainly require further elaboration and qualifications.

There are some outright errors:

(1) The slogan "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" does not describe the period of War Communism, but the ultimate stage in the withering away of the state (p. 46).

(2) Gorky died in 1936, not in 1931 (p. 71).

(3) Sholokov should be Sholokhov (p. 71); Prokovyev should be Prokofiev (p. 73); Mendeliev should be Mendeleev (p. 75). In general, the phonetic transcriptions of Russian names throughout the book add nothing but confusion.

In spite of these blemishes, this little handbook is an honest attempt at an impartial exposition of the Soviet Union and should fulfill adequately the purposes for which it is intended.

DIMITRI S. VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

KUNITZ, JOSHUA. *Russia: The Giant that Came Last*. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947. 413 pp. \$5.00

Mr. Kunitz states in the preface to his book that he has attempted to

tell "the dramatic story of Russia's emergence, growth, and consolidation on the European plain." He adds that his interest is in the influences which have initiated or accelerated Russia's "progress." The preface thus gives the reader the impression that this is a history of Russia written from the point of view indicated above. Actually, however, this book is not a history but an historical-literary essay centering around a number of key personalities. The book is divided into two parts. Part I deals with the period from the origins of the Russian Kievan state to the end of the reign of Alexander I. Part II, comprising well over half of the work, begins with Nicholas I's reign and ends with Lenin's announcement at the October 27 (old style) session of the Second Congress of Soviets in 1917 that "Now we shall proceed to construct the Socialist order." In Part I, the heroes of the drama are Tsars, particularly Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great; in Part II, they are revolutionists, especially Herzen and Lenin. On page 238, Mr. Kunitz, referring to the beginning of Alexander III's reign (its dates are incorrectly given as 1881-1896) states that "The age of Lenin was at hand." Almost the last half of the book is devoted to a highly laudatory account of Lenin's revolutionary career, set against the background of Russian history in this period.

Mr. Kunitz views Russian history as a successful struggle, against great odds, toward the goals of national greatness, cultural development, and moral progress. The "impulse had come from the top" until the nineteenth century; thenceforth, it was to come from the revolutionary intelligentsia. Mr. Kunitz is

enthusiastic in praise of Ivan the Terrible. His reign, he writes, "represented a colossal stride forward in Russia's development." He maintains that Ivan strengthened Russian national consciousness, transformed Russia into a multi-national state, and "laid emphasis on the necessity of breaking through the *cordon sanitaire* . . ." As for Peter the Great, Mr. Kunitz is eloquent in approval of his policies and achievements. He devotes special attention to defending Peter's conduct toward his son, Alexis, referring to the latter as a "traitor" and a "counter-revolutionary" and to Peter as "in some ways a revolutionary." Catherine the Great's reign saw "Russia's old economic and social institutions, together with the corresponding political forms and cultural instruments attain that state of ripeness which is inevitably followed by decay."

The above approach is similar to that which has been followed by Soviet historians since the purge of Pokrovski's followers in the early 1930's. In his treatment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mr. Kunitz adopts a point of view borrowed from Lenin. The history of Russia in this period he regards as that of a decaying feudalism, eroded by the forces of capitalism and menaced by the rising proletariat led by the Bolsheviks. As he approaches the revolutionary dénouement of 1917, he seems to hew more and more closely to the line set forth in such Soviet works as the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*. He is, however, less critical of Trotsky than is the official *History*. He recognizes Trotsky's important services to the Bolsheviks in connection with the seizure of power in 1917, and states that "for the moment at

least" his loyalty to Lenin's program was beyond question.

The chief merit of Mr. Kunitz's book is its wealth of interesting factual material particularly on the development of revolutionary thought in the nineteenth century. The parts of the volume describing the reflection of social trends in creative literature are often rather good. A readable and interesting style, reflecting the author's sympathetic approach to his subject, is also to be applauded.

Despite these merits, *Russia* is not an outstanding contribution to the literature on its subject. It falls between several stools. As general Russian history it is vastly inferior to the standard works of Pares, Vernadsky, or B. H. Sumner. Most of its material on Russian literature is available in the writings of Prince Mirsky, Professor Simmons, etc. As intellectual history it is certainly not comparable to Sir John Maynard's splendid *Russia in Flux*. It fails as a popular work because of its obvious, but fuzzily expounded, Marxist presuppositions. The last half, in particular, frequently refers to the abstractions "capitalism," "feudalism," and so on, without making these terms intelligible to the reader.

Specialists in history, literature, or political science will find many faults in this book. It abounds in sweeping generalizations and contains many careless statements. Despite the claims on the jacket regarding its "unconventional" approach, it contains no original interpretation of any major problem of Russian history. This lack of originality is on the whole probably a merit. Thus Mr. Kunitz has not followed recent Soviet scholarship in its dubious revision of the Normanist theory of the origin of the Russian state. Less

meritorious however, is the author's failure to indicate acquaintance with such works as Ivanov-Razumnik's *History of Russian Social Thought* or L. Plotkin's recent monograph on Pisarev.

The reviewer was especially disappointed by the sections of the work dealing with the radicals of the 1860's. The statement that Chernyshevsky was "shabby and half-starved" at St. Petersburg University, unaccompanied by any indication that he came of a moderately prosperous family, is misleading (p. 201). Pisarev was not "editing his own magazine." The editor of the *Russian Word* was Blagosvetlov (p. 211). The proclamation (referred to as an article) for which Pisarev was arrested was not written for "a secret publication," but was an individual item attacking the Tsarist official Schédo-Ferroti, and calling for the overthrow of the ruling dynasty (p. 212). No mention is made of the host of important radicals such as Zaitsev, Antonovich, Shelgunov, Sokolov, and others who carried on the nihilist-materialist trend after the arrest of Chernyshevsky and Pisarev.

A book as burdened with errors and inaccuracies as this could not be a good one, whatever its point of view. However, in conclusion, it must be emphasized that its main weakness springs from the biased, uncritical point of view from which it is written. Mr. Kunitz is obviously indignant regarding what he considers the inhumanity and backwardness of the Russian imperial régime. He falls into the familiar inconsistency of the uncritical Marxist who condemns the representatives of a "dying class" for the immorality of their actions and at the same time regards these actions as the inevit-

able
refer
age
the
point
again
could
the
poli
Mr.
help
Sovi
was
ance

Yala

LOB
R
D
P

In

Eur
nov
time
littl
fore
cent
thei
cour
dom
Rus
the
fess
nec

In
ities
mer
Pro
his
tary
and
peri
and
only
Nei

able outcome of class interests. He refers often to the unfortunate heritage of Russia's past ("Byzantinism," the Tartar yoke, etc.) but fails to point out that even idealistic rebels against this heritage, such as Lenin, could not be expected to throw off the incubus of centuries of despotic political habits. It is too bad that Mr. Kunitz's praiseworthy effort to help Americans understand how the Soviet régime came into existence was not carried out with more balance and realism.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, ANDREI A.
Russia and Europe, 1789-1825.
Durham, N. C., Duke University
Press, 1947. 448 pp. \$5.00.

In his foreword to *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825*, Professor Lobanov states that "up to very recent times Russian historians have shown little interest in the field of Russian foreign relations, preferring to concentrate on the internal problems of their country." In western European countries, this lack of research in domestic as well as foreign affairs of Russia is even more obvious, and the volume now published by Professor Lobanov thus offers a most necessary and valuable contribution.

In view of the scope and complexities of the subject, whose full treatment would demand many volumes, Professor Lobanov wisely confines his study to the diplomatic and military events that connected Russia and Europe during the Napoleonic period, leaving out the intellectual and social links, which bore fruit only during subsequent decades. Neither does he discuss the manifold

internal issues and cross currents which influenced the course of Russian diplomacy, nor does he try to enlarge upon the motivations for Russia's political course. He straightforwardly narrates, "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.*"

Far from following general tendencies among recent historians who minimize the place of military action as a factor in the course of history, Professor Lobanov assigns almost one half of his book to discussions of military operations—reflecting the fact that, in the sense of Clausewitz, war was for Russia during fifteen out of the thirty-six years under discussion the means of prosecuting diplomatic aims. While it is disappointing that no maps of the campaigns or battles have been inserted to explain the often very complex manoeuvres which produced sudden changes in the diplomatic climate, the reader yet gains a clear and comprehensive picture. He is at the same time impressed, notwithstanding Professor Lobanov's emphasis on the rôle of the individual, with the comparative weakness of human planning and human "genius" in the face of the great forces resulting from geography, climate, tradition, spirit, morale. An interesting example of this impotence is offered not only by Napoleon's military failure but by the respective rôles in history of Alexander I of Russia and Frederick William III of Prussia. The author at no time misses an opportunity to point out the weakness and vacillation of the Prussian king; yet, territorially, politically, and socially, Prussia benefited considerably more by the reign of this irresolute, unreliable, and self-effacing ruler than Russia profited by the intense, driving activity of the brilliant Alexander.

In the course of his story, Professor Lobanov comes upon many of the issues which are troubling the world today; and though he carefully refrains from comparisons and conclusions, the reader is bound to recognize the persistence of these problems. The fundamental fact of the intrinsic "instability of friendly relations between Russia and England" (p. 88) is carefully exposed as well as the duality of their "interests . . . [which] both attracted and repelled each other" (p. 122). Polish relations are described with lucidity, and if the author points out that Russian policy under Alexander paralleled the complexity of the Tsar's personality (p. 192), a duality of purpose—because of inherent contradictions—is equally evidenced in the twentieth century. Problems such as Russian Mediterranean intrigues, the question of Malta and that of Dalmatia as well as the Greek dilemma, are taken up; and interesting side issues, such as Alexander's instructions to Novossiltsov, are not neglected.

The author makes refreshingly sparing use of footnotes; his bibliography, however, might have been expanded. It is obvious that many additional sources have been studied, although Professor Lobanov's essential reliance on French and Russian works and a certain underestimation of the great German contributions, both in primary material and in the works of a Pertz, Oncken, Meinecke, Droysen, and Prokesch, is definitely noticeable.

The conscientious work of the author is not matched by equal care on the part of the publisher. From the dust cover, where the name of Professor Lobanov is misspelled, throughout the book, errors in names abound, such as Urnerloch (p. 53),

Brunnen (p. 55), Mitau (p. 66), Zelle (p. 112), Heilsberg (p. 151), Schoen (p. 248), Tugendbund (p. 254), Varnhagen (p. 371), and numerous others; in chapter VII, the fifth subdivision is lacking. But these annoying details cannot detract from the value of a book which combines scholarship with judgment and perspective and which will prove a most needed standard reference work in the vast and scantily explored field of Russian history.

WALTHER KIRCHNER

University of Delaware

SOLOVEYITCHIK, GEORGE. *Potemkin; Soldier, Statesman, Lover and Consort of Catherine of Russia*. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1947. 346 pp. \$3.50.

In this earnest yet popularly written book the author has endeavored to present a deeper and more rounded portrait of Prince Grigory Potemkin than is the usual fate of this illustrious figure in historical literature. Without omitting or soft-peddalling the erotic element of Potemkin's association with Catherine II (as well as with other women), Mr. Soloveytchik describes Potemkin in the rôle of Catherine's co-ruler of the Russian state, the main builder of her Empire as it spread to the south. He has also probed into the Prince's proverbial eccentricities, attempting to find their psychological bases. On the whole, the author has succeeded most eminently.

He has proved that, though a brilliant showman, Potemkin was not a faker: he pins the fault for the legend of the "Potemkin villages" on the malicious imagination of the Saxon

diple
darin
buil
Russ
this

T
plau
trar
kin
of th
and
sian
he h
such
Cat
at
Cat
to w

L
chik
tem
yon
tial
proc
tha
do h
situ
Pot
bed
frier
out
Rus

I
ties
eme
Sol
thei
aut
and
of I
nied
the
reg
The
tha
ters
tha
two
also

diplomat Helbig. Potemkin was a daring builder but most of what he built in the newly won South of Russia was solid and has lasted into this day.

The author has further and quite plausibly demonstrated that, contrary to the general opinion, Potemkin did not fail in his grand scheme of throwing the Turks out of Europe and making Constantinople a Russian city—for the simple reason that he had no such scheme. There were such ambitions, yes, but they were Catherine's and Bezborodko's; and, at that, Bezborodko's more than Catherine's. What Potemkin set out to win from Turkey he did win.

Less convincingly Mr. Soloveytschik relates that Catherine and Potemkin were secretly married. Beyond some hearsay and circumstantial evidence, he presents hardly any proof of that. It is true, however, that if we accept this postulate we do have the key to the extraordinary situation where both Catherine and Potemkin took a series of younger bed-companions without losing their friendship for each other and without breaking their partnership as Russia's rulers.

In this connection, as personalities, both Catherine and Potemkin emerge sharply and clearly from Mr. Soloveytschik's narrative. The use of their intimate correspondence by the author has been especially skillful and fruitful. The amazing episode of Potemkin's relations with his five nieces borders on the revolting but the author rescues the reader's warm regard for the Prince, at least in part. The author does this by showing that no less than two of the five sisters genuinely loved Potemkin and that he was truly in love with these two, if not with all five. The author also helps by depicting richly not

Potemkin's personality alone but the general scene and morals of the time as well. We are made to realize, sometimes gradually as in the very first chapter, "The Russian Scene," sometimes abruptly as in certain paragraphs elsewhere, that people of one era cannot rightfully judge people of another by their own yardsticks of morality.

The main impression left with the reader is that, despite their revolting (to us) morality or rather lack of it, Catherine and Potemkin did succeed as Russia's co-rulers. Not on the domestic arena, to be sure. There, outside a few purely administrative reforms, they did nothing but aggravate serfdom and all the other running sores of Russian feudalism. But in their foreign policy the pair were remarkably progressive even if aggressive. Their aggression was aimed at feudals worse than themselves; hence, relative progress. The power of the outdated Ottoman Empire was diminished. The position of the fresher Russian Empire in the South and the East was strengthened. This is not to say that in its absolute values the foreign policy of Catherine and Potemkin was so wonderful.

The only weighty discord between Catherine and Potemkin was with respect to the British. Potemkin was all for an alliance offered by Britain. Catherine was very much against it. She won. The author hints his belief that the Empress, more nearly than Potemkin, understood and represented Russia's interests when she turned down the British proposal. Perhaps the author is right. But whatever were Russia's longterm interests, from the viewpoint of America, the Russian Empress certainly did the right thing. For in the process, the American colonies had

an easier time winning their independence from George III, when his pleas for Catherine's alliance and troops were declined by the Empress despite Potemkin's pro-British arguments.

Wisely Mr. Soloveytschik devotes much space and attention to this important phase of Potemkin's preoccupation with Russia's foreign policy. Because of this the reader may forgive the too sketchy treatment given to other high points of the Prince's statesmanship—as for example the author's hurried coverage of the annexation of the Crimea in 1783.

There are a few other lacunae in the book. Scholars may sorely miss footnotes and a bibliography which the author dispensed with in his obvious bid for the layman's attention. And laymen (also some scholars) may find quite a few paragraphs too long and some sentences unnecessarily involved. And it is quite puzzling to see that the author, who surely should know all the acceptable usages of transliteration, writes "Dershavin" for "Derzhavin," "Zaporoshsckaya" for "Zaporozhskaya," "Nadeshda" for "Nadezhda," "Charitonov" for "Kharitonov," "Von-Visin" for "Fonvisin," and "Elaghin" for "Yelaghin."

But these are minor matters. The chief thing is that Mr. Soloveytschik has made a most worthwhile contribution to our knowledge not only of Potemkin but of the entire era to boot.

ALBERT PARRY

Colgate University

REAVEY, GEORGE. *Soviet Literature Today*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947. 187 pp. \$3.50.

Mr. Reavey, who in 1933 edited

with Mr. Marc Slonim a not very satisfactory *Anthology of Soviet Literature*, spent the years 1942-1945 in the Soviet Union as a Press Attaché of the British Embassy. This brought him in contact with Soviet writers and gave him a first-hand knowledge of the Soviet literary scene. In his new book he has attempted to depict that scene, with the main stress on the last decade.

The arrangement of the book, divided into ten chapters, is rather confused and confusing. The author begins with a brief outline of Soviet literature before the War of 1941-45 and a general picture of its background. He then passes on to "The Life and Organization of Soviet Writers," discusses the Soviet "rediscovery" of history and the historical novel, and devotes a whole chapter to the problem of "the hero" in Soviet fiction. Then follow the two chapters entitled: "The Writer and Actuality: the Short Story and the Diary" and "Soviet Fiction in the War and After." Chapter VII deals with the rôle and function of literary criticism in the Soviet Union. Recent Soviet poetry is discussed rather superficially in a chapter entitled "War, Poetry and Optimism." This is followed by a short chapter on "The Literature of the Nationalities." The final chapter, entitled "The New Demiurge and the Window of Europe," contains some generalizations and an attempted forecast of future developments. At the end the reader finds a diagram showing the structure of the Soviet Writers' Union.

The chapters on Soviet fiction and Soviet poetry contain little true literary criticism and little that is really new and valuable. For the most part the author is singularly shy of definite literary judgments.

M
pure
with
Sovi
ing
the
som
Sovi
his
viet
case
atio
whil
leav
fied
wou
worl
the
Mr.
criti
M
awa
tion
criti
the
nour
valu
in t
deve
Idea
and
from
Perf
ficia
"in
phil
com
imp
com
if it
broa
hum
the
ter.
quo
is n
futu
tion
pers

More interest attaches to the purely informative chapters dealing with the organizational aspect of Soviet literary life and the functioning of Soviet literary criticism. In the latter chapter Mr. Reavey cites some interesting examples of the way Soviet criticism works, yet, with all his first-hand knowledge of the Soviet literary scene, he fails in most cases to provide an adequate explanation of the facts cited by him and, while raising a number of problems, leaves the reader's curiosity unsatisfied. One of the points on which one would like to have more light is the workings of Soviet censorship and the relation between it and what Mr. Reavey describes as "pontifical criticism."

Mr. Reavey is by no means unaware of the restrictions and limitations under which Soviet writers and critics have to work, but he commits the error of taking some Soviet pronouncements too much at their face value, and of failing to situate them in their true perspective. Thus he devotes a whole chapter to "The Idea of the Hero in Soviet Fiction" and quotes with obvious sympathy from the writings of the Soviet critic Pertsov who protests against "superficial characters" in Soviet fiction "in whom there is no image, no philosophy of the age." Mr. Reavey comments: "This emphasis on the importance of the personality is of comparatively recent origin and, if it makes headway, it can only broaden the writer's conception of human nature that is so essential to the complete portrayal of character." A little further, Pertsov is quoted again as saying that "There is no path for our literature in the future except through the affirmation of the complete and precious personality of the hero," and Mr.

Reavey comments rather naively upon this platitude: "This is no doubt an important re-discovery, which . . . is already broadening and modifying the theoretical basis and the actual accomplishment of Soviet literature." Mr. Reavey is apparently unaware of the fact that as far back as the late twenties and throughout the thirties Soviet critics were harping on this theme of "the hero" (there was even a book by a leading Soviet critic entitled *In Search of a Hero*) and that if, with all the changes in outlook and shifts of "emphasis," Soviet writers have still to be reminded of their failure to find a hero (what nineteenth century Russian critic would have dreamt of doing so!), the roots of the evil must probably be sought in the general abnormal conditions of literature in a totalitarian State. Mr. Reavey himself makes no attempt to go below the surface, to discuss the relation between literature and life in the Soviet Union, or to explain why Soviet literature before 1932 was in so many ways superior. His own attempt at explaining "the failure to find a hero" is very lame: "It may be due to war conditions or the still incomplete synthesis in the writer's mind between the inner world and the objective one, or simply the absence of a really great novelist at this stage of Soviet literature." And he adds again rather naively: "There is every evidence that the critics are preoccupied with this very problem, and they wish to stimulate a post-war renaissance."

Mr. Reavey's book is a very good illustration of how difficult it is to assess Soviet literature unless one either approaches it with purely aesthetic criteria or as one of the facets of what is essential and unchanging in the Soviet State. The result of

Mr. Reavey's failure to use either of these two approaches is that while he began his book on a distinctly optimistic note (he speaks of "the sowing time of a 'renaissance' of its kind"), as he was putting the finishing touches to his picture after the literary "purge" of August-September 1946, he had to sound a note of warning. Since then numerous fresh facts have more than justified this note of warning: to-day we see a recrudescence of the narrow party spirit and a frenzy of extreme anti-Westernist "isolationism."

The book abounds in mistranslations of Russian titles: in part they are obviously due to carelessness, but at times they make us suspect Mr. Reavey's knowledge of Russian and compel us to approach warily his quotations, too. Thus the title of Gabrilovich's wartime book should be *Before* (or *At*) *Moscow* (*Pod Moskvoy*), not *Under Moscow*. Leonov's novel is called *The Road to the Ocean*, not *The Road Beyond the Ocean*. The title of Dobroliubov's famous article is "What Is Oblomovism?", not "What Does Oblomov Represent?". Sergeev-Tsensky's novel about World War I is called *The Guns Are Being Brought Forward* (or *Into Position*) (*Pushki vydvigayut*), not *The Guns Promote*, which is just meaningless. The title of Prishvin's book of miniature nature sketches is *Lesnaiya kapel'*, not *kaplia*, so it is wrong to translate it as *Forest Drop*. The mysterious "Polon" in Kuleshov's *Letter from Polon* is obviously *polon*, a variant of *Plen*, which means "captivity." Schipachev's *House in Shushenko* should read *House in Shushenskoie* (a place in Siberia where Lenin lived in exile). Other examples of Mr. Reavey's carelessness: Shestakov, author of *A Short History of the*

U. S. S. R., becomes Shestakovich; Babichev (one of the characters in Olesha's *Envy*) becomes Babich; and Joseph de Maistre becomes Joseph Le Maistre. There are also other inaccuracies, and on one or two occasions Mr. Reavey shows insufficient knowledge and understanding of pre-revolutionary Russian literature. Throughout the book there is a sad lack of uniformity in the transliteration of Russian names.

GLEB STRUVE

*University of California,
Berkeley*

MARTYNOV, IVAN. *Dimitri Shostakovich: The Man and His Work*. Translated from the Russian by T. Guralsky. New York, Philosophical Library, 1947. 197 pp. \$3.75.

The Musorgsky Reader: A Life of Modeste Petrovich Musorgsky in Letters and Documents. Edited and Translated by Jay Leyda and Sergei Bertensson. New York, W. W. Norton, 1947. 474 pp. \$6.00.

The first of these, the most complete and up-to-date treatise devoted to the works of Shostakovich, presents an interpretation of the composer's development along what may be termed the official Soviet line. This course, which smacks more of a school reader than of the underlying tenets proper to an independent aesthetic evaluation, inevitably narrows the scope of the author's discourse considerably. There are entirely too many eulogies for the officially approved works and too many slaps at the Western modernists who are reminded again and again that they have not succeeded

in writing music of the vitality and greatness of the Russian. To the credit of the author it must be said that within the framework of reference established by the party line, he tries to be as fair as possible and frequently makes generous qualifications about those works of Shostakovich that have been condemned officially. The volume contains a five-page appendix that lists the composer's works from 1919 to 1945.

The writing is, on the whole, clear and only occasionally does the translator employ technical musical terms unfamiliar to American readers, as the substitution of "elaboration" for "development." The most tiresome aspect of the lengthy descriptions, particularly of the symphonies, is that without musical examples they appear as rhetoric rather than musical analyses which they are intended to be.

By contrast, Musorgsky's letters abound in musical illustrations and quotations that serve not only to make his verbal references meaningful but also place a stamp of authenticity on the entire book. The editors have done a splendid job in assembling between two covers almost all the information relevant to Musorgsky's life. The correspondence is interspersed with wisely selected documents from contemporaries and copious footnotes which are conveniently printed at the bottom of the page to which they refer. Few composers have been so widely misrepresented and mistranslated to Western readers as Chaikovsky and Musorgsky, and the publishing house of Norton must be congratulated for following its authentic translation of the Chaikovsky diaries with this *Musorgsky Reader*. Unfortunately, the editors have seen fit to exclude some of the violently

chauvinistic utterances of the composer, which reveal the other side of Musorgsky's touching patriotism—a trait in his personality that should not be overlooked. Hence, it would have seemed wiser to include this material and have the benefit of a complete work. But this is a minor blemish and can perhaps be corrected in later editions.

The volume makes fascinating reading; too often collections of this sort are merely valuable source material, but Musorgsky the man and the musician does not need to be paraphrased in order to absorb. His wide reading, which ranged from the German philosophers and Darwin to Homer and Shakespeare, and his insight into the history of the folk art of the Russian people, that he was able to transform by the magic of his music into such lasting achievements as *Boris Godunov*, *Khovanshchina* and *Fair at Sorochintzy*, make his letters not merely shop-talk, but documents that reveal the wide panorama of nineteenth century Romanticism in a Russian perspective. Far ahead of his contemporaries, and even of his co-nationals, the reflections of his unruly originality in his own letters as well as in those of his fellow composers and, above all, of the historian Vladimir Stasov, shed an illuminating light upon the productions of a man who summed up his creed: "The artistic depiction of beauty alone, in its material sense, is sheer childishness—art in its infancy. The finest traits in man's nature and in the mass of humanity, tirelessly digging through these little known regions and conquering them—that is the true mission of the artist." And how touching the autobiographical note prepared for a German music dictionary, wherein he offers his "artis-

tic *profession de foi*: . . ." "art is a means of communicating with people, not an aim in itself. . . . Human speech is strictly controlled by musical laws . . . only artist-reformers such as Palestrina, Bach, Gluck, Beethoven, Berlioz and Liszt have created laws of art. . . ." And Musorgsky considers these laws as not immutable but liable to change and progress like the entire spiritual

world of man. Professionals may scorn the composer's admitted technical shortcomings (as do Chaikovsky and Rimsky-Korsakov in some of the documents contained in the *Reader*), but the man and composer who emerges from these pages cannot fail to elicit our genuine admiration.

FREDERICK W. STERNFELD
Dartmouth College

Ada
Lo
Alda
T
R
56
Atk
7
Y
\$
Bac
st
P
Bel
S
N
P
Ber
b
2
Ber
c
Y
Blo
7
N
7
Bro
C
2
*
and
exc

Bibliography

Books and Articles on Russia

Published in 1947

By EMILY JANE CARTER and MARY FRANCES THOMPSON

I BOOKS*

- Adams, D. Guy. *Russian Symphony*. London, Hutchinson. 192 pp.
- Aldanov, Mark. *Before the Deluge*. Tr. from the Russian by Catherine Routsky. New York, Scribner. 561 pp. \$3.50.
- Atkinson, Oriana. *Over at Uncle Joe's: Moscow and Me*. New York, Bobbs-Merrill. 325 pp. \$3.00.
- Baczkowski, W. *Towards an Understanding of Russia*. Jerusalem, Palestine. 216 pp.
- Beloff, Max. *Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia*. v. 1, 1929-1936. New York, Oxford University Press. 261 pp. \$4.25.
- Berdyaev, N. A. *Russian Idea*. Tr. by R. M. French. London, Bles. 264 pp. 18s.
- Bergman, Marion. *Russian-American Song and Dance Book*. New York, Barnes. 95 pp. \$3.00.
- Blok, Aleksandr. *Spirit of Music*. Tr. by I. Freiman; Il. by Dania Nachsen. London, Drummond. 70 pp. 5s.
- Brook, Donald. *Six Great Russian Composers*. London, Macdonald. 207 pp. 15s.
- Browder, Earl. *War or Peace With Russia?* New York, Wyn. 190 pp. \$2.50.
- Burnham, James. *Struggle For The World*. New York, Day. 248 pp. \$3.00.
- Callahan, Ludmilla. *Russian-English Technical and Chemical Dictionary*. New York, Wiley. 794 pp. \$10.00.
- Ciliberti, Charles. *Backstairs Mission in Moscow, 1936-1938*. New York, Booktab Press. 127 pp. \$1.00.
- Crankshaw, Edward. *Russia and the Russians*. London, Macmillan. 256 pp. 9s. 6d.
- Dallin, David and Nicolaevsky, B. *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*. New Haven, Yale University Press. 331 pp. \$3.75.
- Dean, Vera M. *United States and Russia*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 321 pp. \$3.00.
- Deane, John Russell. *Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at War-Time Co-Operation with Russia*. New York, Viking. 344 pp. \$3.75.
- DePalencia, Isabel. *Aleksandra Kolontay*. New York, Longmans, Green. 309 pp. \$3.50.
- Dukes, Sir Paul. *Come Hammer, Come Sickle*. London, Cassell. 208 pp. 10s. 6d.

*Due to limitation of space, reprints and revised editions have generally been excluded.

- Ettlinger, Amrei and Gladstone, J. *Russian Literature, Theatre and Art: A Bibliography of Works in English Published 1900-1945*. London, Hutchinson. 96 pp. 7s. 6d.
- Fischer, John. *Why They Behave Like Russians*. New York, Harper. 262 pp. \$2.75.
- Gorky, Maxim. *History of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R. v. 2: "The Great Proletarian Revolution, October-November, 1917."* Tr. by J. Fineberg. London, Lawrence. 651 pp. 15s.
- Gray, G. D. B. *Soviet Land: The Country, Its People and Their Work*. London, A. & C. Black. 324 pp. 12s. 6d.
- Guerney, Bernard. (Ed.) *Portable Russian Reader*. New York, Viking. 658 pp. \$2.00.
- Harben, Henry. *Russian Quiz*. New York, Universal Distributors. 55 pp. \$40.
- Hare, Richard. *Russian Literature from Pushkin to the Present Day*. London, Methuen. 258 pp. 4s. 6d.
- Hecht, David. *Russian Radicals Look to America*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 242 pp. \$4.00.
- Heisler, J. B. and Mellon, J. E. *Under the Carpathians: Home of a Forgotten People*. London, Drummond. 124 pp. 12s. 6d.
- Hill, Christopher. *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*. Ed. by A. L. Rowse. London, English Universities Press. 245 pp. 5s.
- Hirsch, Richard. *Soviet Spies: The Story of Russian Espionage in North America*. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pierce. 92 pp. \$1.00.
- Isakov, I. S. *Red Fleet in the Second World War*. London, Hutchinson. 125 pp. 10s. 6d.
- Jenkins, A. C. *Dear Olga*. London, Lane. 143 pp. 7s. 6d.
- Johnson, Hewlett. *Soviet Russia Since the War*. New York, Boni and Gaer. 270 pp. \$3.00.
- Kareda, Endel. *Technique of Economic Sovietization: A Baltic Experience*. W. Byfleet (Surrey), Boreas. 127 pp. 4s.
- Kerstein, Edward. *Red Star Over Poland: A Report from Behind the Iron Curtain*. New York, Appleton. 174 pp. \$2.50.
- King, Fay. *Footloose in the Soviet Union*. London, Valiant. 144 pp. 10s. 6d.
- Kisch, Sir Cecil. (Tr.) *Wagon of Life, and Other Lyrics by Russian Poets of the Nineteenth Century; with a Foreword by C. M. Bowra*. New York, Oxford University Press. 60 pp. \$4.00.
- Konovalov, Serge. *Oxford and Russia*. New York, Oxford University Press. 24 pp. \$75.
- Kunitz, Joshua. *Russia, the Giant That Came Last*. New York, Dodd, Mead. 413 pp. \$5.00.
- Lauterbach, R. E. *Through Russia's Back Door*. New York, Harper. 239 pp. \$2.75.
- Lavrin, Janko. *Dostoevsky*. New York, Macmillan. 161 pp. \$2.00.
- *Pushkin and Russian Literature*. London, English Universities Press. 240 pp. 5s.
- Lawrence, John. *Life in Russia*. London, Allen. 245 pp. 12s. 6d.
- Lehrmann, Hal. *Russia's Europe*. New York, Appleton-Century. 341 pp. \$3.75.
- Lenin, V. I. *Essentials of Lenin*. London, Lawrence & Wishart. 2 v. 758 and 885 pp. 12s. 6d.
- Lloyd, J. A. T. *Fyodor Dostoevsky*. New York, Scribner. 324 pp. \$3.50.
- Lobanov-Rostovsky, Andrei. *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825*. Durham, Duke University Press. 448 pp. \$5.00.

- Manning, Clarence A. *Story of the Ukraine*. New York, Philosophical Library. 326 pp. \$3.75.
- Martel, Sir Gifford. *Russian Outlook*. London, Joseph. 187 pp. 10s. 6d.
- Martynov, Ivan. *Dmitri Shostakovich*. New York, Philosophical Library. 197 pp. \$3.75.
- Middleton, K. W. B. *Britain and Russia*. London, Hutchinson. 238 pp. 21s.
- Molotov, V. M. *Speeches and Statements Made at the Moscow Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mar. 10-Apr. 24, 1947*. New York, Universal Distributors. 123 pp. \$.75.
- Muchnic, Helen. *Introduction to Russian Literature*. New York, Doubleday. 272 pp. \$3.00.
- Musorgsky Reader. Tr. and Ed. by Jay Leyda and S. Bertensson. New York, Norton. 474 pp. \$6.00.
- Nabokov, Vladimir. *Nine Stories*. Norfolk, Conn., New Directions. 126 pp. \$1.50.
- Norborg, Christopher. *Operation Moscow*. New York, Dutton. 319 pp. \$3.50.
- Parker, Ralph. *How Do You Do, Tovarish?* Toronto, Oxford University Press. 64 pp. \$2.25.
- Pasternak, Boris. *Selected Poems*. Tr. from the Russian by J. M. Cohen; il. by Donia Nachshen. London, Drummond. 58 pp. 5s.
- Patkin, A. L. *Origins of the Russian-Jewish Labour Movement*. New York, Bloch. 277 pp. \$3.50.
- Pratt, H. G. and Moore, H. L. *Russia, a Short History*. New York, Day. 282 pp. \$4.00.
- Reavey, George. *Soviet Literature To-day*. New Haven, Yale University Press. 187 pp. \$3.50.
- Remizov, Aleksei M. *On a Field Azure*. Tr. by Beatrice Scott; il. by Donia Nachshen. London, Drummond. 125 pp. 5s.
- Schlesinger, Rudolf. *Spirit of Post-war Russia: Soviet Ideology, 1917-1946*. New York, Universal Distributors. 187 pp. \$3.40.
- Schwartz, Harry. *Russia's Post-war Economy*. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press. 119 pp. \$1.00.
- Semeonoff, Anna H. (Ed.). *Gems of Russian Literature*. London, Dent. 133 pp. 8s. 6d.
- Shore, Maurice. *Soviet Education; Its Psychology and Philosophy*. New York, Philosophical Library. 346 pp. \$4.75.
- Shostakovich, Dmitri and others. *Russian Symphony: Thoughts About Tchaikovsky*. New York, Philosophical Library. 271 pp. \$3.75.
- Slonimsky, Juri and others. *Soviet Ballet*. New York, Philosophical Library. 285 pp. \$4.75.
- Snow, Edgar. *Stalin Must Have Peace*. New York, Random House. 184 pp. \$2.50.
- Soloveyitchik, George. *Potemkin*. New York, Norton. 346 pp. \$3.50.
- Soviet Union: Glimpses of Family Life*. London, Macmillan. 64 pp. 1s. 4d.
- Stern, Bernhard and Smith, Samuel. (Eds.) *Understanding the Russians; a Study of Soviet Life and Culture*. New York, Barnes and Noble. 246 pp. \$2.75.
- Strakhovsky, Leonid. *Alexander I of Russia*. New York, Norton. 302 pp. \$3.50.
- Strohm, John L. *Just Tell the Truth: The Uncensored Story of How the Common People Live Behind the Russian Iron Curtain*. New York, Scribner. 250 pp. \$3.50.

- Thomson, Gladys. *Catherine the Great and the Expansion of Russia*. London, English Universities Press. 294 pp. 5s.
- U.S.S.R.: *A Concise Handbook*. Ed. by Ernest J. Simmons. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 494 pp. \$4.50.
- Vernadsky, George. (Tr.) *Medieval Russian Laws*. New York, Columbia University Press. 106 pp. \$2.00.
- Voyce, Arthur. *Russian Architecture*. New York, Philosophical Library. \$5.75.
- Walsh, Warren and Price, R. A. *Russia: A Handbook*. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press. 140 pp. \$1.00.
- Whitting, P. D. *Russia: Notes on a Course for Modern Schools*. London, Historical Association. 20 pp. 1s.
- Yesipov, B. and Goncharov, N. "I Want to be Like Stalin": *From the Russian Text on Pedagogy*. Tr. by George S. Counts and Nucia P. Lodge. New York, Day. 150 pp. \$2.00.
- Zander, Walter. *Soviet Jewry, Palestine and the West*. London, Gollancz. 109 pp. 6s.

II. ARTICLES*

- Alexeiev, Nina. "I Didn't Want My Children to Grow Up in Soviet Russia." *Readers Digest*, L: 11-16, June.
- Alsop, J. W., and Alsop, S.J.O. "Last Chance." *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXIX: 37-8, January.
- "An Analysis of Soviet Theaters and Their Repertories as of 1941." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 82-85, October.
- Anderson, Paul. "Church in the Slav World." *International Review of Missions*, XXXVI: 191-205, April.
- Barnes, Joseph. "Books About Russia." *American Scholar*, XVI: 367-8ff., July.
- Barnes, Russell. "Russia's Spreading Power: What I Saw in Europe and the Near East." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, XIV: 75-80, November 15.
- Bergson, Abram. "Fourth Five Year Plan; Heavy Versus Consumers' Goods Industries." *Political Science Quarterly*, LXII: 195-227, June.
- Berman, Harold J. "Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law." *California Law Review*, XXXV: 191-234, June.
- . "Principles of Soviet Criminal Law." *Yale Law Journal*, LVI: 803-36, May.
- Bernard, Jules. "Notes on Alexei Tolstoy's *Harald Svenholm*." *American Slavic and East European Review*, VI: 79-91, May.
- Bertensson, Sergei. "The Première of *The Inspector General*." *Russian Review*, VII: 88-95, Autumn.
- Boelza, Igor. "Musical Criticism in the Soviet Union." *Musician*, LII: 53-4, July.
- Bonn, Moritz. "Soviets' Dilemma." *Contemporary Review*, CLXXII: 138-41, September.

*All articles in weeklies have had to be excluded.

- Borgese, G. S. "Russia and One World." *Common Cause*, I: 5: 173-81.
- Borozdin, Ilya. "Turkmenia at the Dawn of History." *Asiatic Review*, XLIII: 91-3, January.
- Brodney, Kenneth. "Rumania: a Communist Conquest." *Current History*, XIII: 335-40, December.
- Buligin, Dimitri (pseud). "I Was a Free Russian." *American Mercury*, LXV: 163-71, August.
- Bullitt, William. "Can Truman Avoid World War III?" *American Mercury*, LXIV: 645-56, June.
- Burgunker, Mark. "Technological Research Under the Fourth Five-Year Plan." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 20-26, October.
- Burnham, James. "Goal of Soviet Policy." *American Mercury*, LXIV: 389-406, April.
- Butler, Harold. "Two Giants." *Fortnightly*, CLXVIII (ns CLXII): 401-7, December.
- Cardwell, A. S. "The Vivisection of Poland." *Plain Talk*, I: 25-9, March.
- Carleton, William. "Ideology or Balance of Power?" *Yale Review*, XXXVI: 590-602, June.
- Casey, Robert. "Cultural Mission of Russian Orthodoxy." *Harvard Theological Review*, XL: 257-75, October.
- Chamberlin, William H. "Permanent Crisis; Necessity to Check and if Possible, Roll Back Soviet Expansion." *Readers Digest*, LI: 39-43, September.
- "Stirrings of Ukrainian Unrest." *Ukrainian Quarterly*, III: 109-15, Winter.
- "U.S.S.R. and U.N." *Russian Review*, VI: 37-43, Spring.
- Coleman, Marion. "Eugene Schuyler: Diplomat Extraordinary From the United States to Russia." *Russian Review*, VII: 33-48, Autumn.
- Crankshaw, Edward. "U.S.S.R. Revisited." *International Affairs*, XXIII: 492-9, October.
- "What Does Russia Want?" *National Review*, CXXVIII: 437-46, June.
- Cronia, Arturo. "Slavonic Studies in Italy." *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXVI: 197-208, November.
- Cross, Samuel. "The Mosaic Eucharist of St. Michael's (Kiev)." *American Slavic and East European Review*, VI: 56-61, May.
- Czubatyj, N. D. "Ukraine and the Western World." *Ukrainian Quarterly*, III: 145-58, Winter.
- Dallin, Alexander. "Public Opinion Inside the USSR; America Through Soviet Eyes." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XI: 1: 26-39.
- Darlington, Cyril. "Revolution in Soviet Science; the Genetics Controversy of Vavilov and Lyсенko." *Discovery*, VIII: 40-3, February.
- Davidson-Houston, James. "Russian Geography and Policy." *National Review*, CXXIX: 393-401, November.
- Davis, Arthur. "Some Sources of American Hostility to Russia." *American Journal of Sociology*, LIII, 174-83, November.
- Davison, Walter. "Analysis of the Soviet-Controlled Berlin Press." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XI: 1: 40-57.
- Dean, Vera. "Russia's Foreign Economic Policy." *Foreign Policy Reports*, XXII: 266-79, February 1.

- . "Russia's Internal Economic Problems." *Foreign Policy Reports*, XXIII: 98-107, July 1.
- Deane, John R. "Getting Along With Russia." (Reprint.) *Infantry Journal*, LX: 38-44, April.
- Denicke, George. "Challenge of Soviet Conquest." *Modern Review*, I: 63-70, March.
- Dobb, Maurice. "The Financial Plan in Soviet Economy." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 3-10, October.
- Doroshenko, Vasili. "Development of Written Languages Among the Peoples of the North." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 43-51, March.
- Dow, Roger. "Seichas: A Comparison of Pre-Reform Russia and the Ante-Bellum South." *Russian Review*, VII: 3-15, Autumn.
- Doyle, T. F. "Catholic Church in Russia." *Catholic World*, CLXV: 354-8, July.
- Duggan, Stephen. "Contrasting Educations: Russian and American." *Institute of International Education News Bulletin*, XXIII: 4-12, December.
- Dynnik, U. "Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy in the U. S." *Modern Review*, I: 653-660, November.
- "Economy of the U.S.S.R." *American Economic Review*, XXXVII: 595-648, May.
- Edelman, Maurice. "Russia: War or Peace?" *World Affairs* (London), I: 4-10, January.
- England, Albert. "Recent Advances in Soviet Neurology." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 354-361, April.
- Falk, Leslie. "Health in Byelorussia—a Devastated Area of the Soviet Union." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 306-313, April.
- Farago, Ladislas. "Amtorg: Its Business is Business With Russia." *United Nations World*, I: 29-31, July.
- Fay, Sidney. "Trade Policies Behind the Iron Curtain." *Current History*, XIII: 321-4, December.
- Fisher, Hilda. "Labor and the Communists; The Divided Opinion of Labor Unions on the Recognition of Soviet Russia." *Current History*, XII: 199-204, March.
- . "Labor Union Looks at Russia." *Current History*, XII: 558-64, June.
- Florinsky, Michael. "Russian Social and Political Thought, 1825-1855." *Russian Review*, VI: 77-85, Spring.
- Forrest, W. P. "Nutrition in the Ukrainian S.S.R." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXV: 319-33, October.
- . "Skoraya Pomoshch, the Moscow Emergency Medical Aid System." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, V: 9-14, December 1947-January 1948.
- "Fortune Survey; Russia and U. S. Communism." *Fortune*, XXXVI: 5-6, October.
- Frank, John. "Pushkin and Goethe." *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXVI: 146-151, November.
- Garbuny, Siegfried. "Russia's Claim to East Prussia." *Current History*, XII: 339-44, April.
- "Geopolitics of the Soviet Union." *Armed Forces Talk*, no. 197, pp. 1-9.
- Germain, Ernest. "Second Year of the Crisis in the Soviet Union: Soviet Economy in the Year 1946." *Fourth International*, IX: 146-57, May.

- "Stalinism: How to Understand It and How to Fight It." *Fourth International*, IX: 136-44, May.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. "Russia and the International Trade Organization." *American Economic Review*, XXXVII: 624-42, May.
- Gifford, Henry. "Shakespearean Elements in Boris Godunov." *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXVI: 152-60, November.
- Goodman, W. L. "Makarenko's Sense of the Mean." *New Era*, XXVIII: 11-16, January.
- Grimm, Peter. "Russia Seen From Within; Account of a Relief Mission Visit." *International Conciliation*, CCCCXXIX: 119-42, March.
- Grulio, Leo. "It's Strange to be Home." *Antioch Review*, VII: 163-82, June.
- Gsovski, Vladimir. "Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law." *Russian Review*, VII: 71-87, Autumn.
- "Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law." *Georgetown Law Journal*, XXXV: 209-23, January.
- "Soviet Law of Inheritance." *Michigan Law Review*, XLV: 291-320, 445-68, January-February.
- Guins, George. "Soviet Culture: Old Trends and New." *Russian Review*, VII: 24-32, Autumn.
- Hannington, Wal. "Democratic Planning in the Soviet Union." *Labour Monthly*, XXIX: 333-6, November.
- Harvey, W. R. "The Communist Creed as Practiced in the U.S.S.R." *Quarterly Review of Commerce*, XIII: 1: 11-22.
- Hazard, John. "Trend of Law in the U.S.S.R." *Wisconsin Law Review*, MCMXLVII: 223-43, March.
- Hecht, John. "Rending the Russian Veil." *National Review*, CXXIX: 228-33, September.
- Hirsch, Richard. "Soviet Spies; the Story of Russian Espionage in North America." *Readers Digest*, L: 127-52, May.
- Hook, Sidney. "The USSR Views American Philosophy." *Modern Review*, I: 649-53, November.
- Hoover, Calvin. "Basic Elements in Soviet-American Relations." *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXIII: 1-17, January.
- "Soviet Economic Policies at Home and Abroad." *Academy of Political Science. Proceedings*, XXII: 218-27, January.
- Hughes, Francis. "Incentives and the Soviet Inventor." *Discovery*, VIII: 10-12ff., January.
- Iswolsky, Helene. "Vladimir Soloviev and the Western World." *Russian Review*, VII: 16-23, Autumn.
- Jasny, Naum. "Intricacies of Russian National-Income Indexes." *Journal of Political Economy*, LV: 299-322, August.
- Johnson, Thomas. "Red Spy Net." *Readers Digest*, LI: 59-63, July.
- Kavetski, R. E. "Experimental Cancer Research in the USSR." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 322-327, April.
- Kennedy, Aubrey. "Expansion of Russia." *Quarterly Review*, CCL-XXXV: 1-17, January.
- Kerensky, Alexander. "In Defense of My Country." *Plain Talk*, I: 23-30, April.
- Kirkconnell, Watson. "Social and Economic Security in the USSR." *American Economic Security*, pp. 24-8, January.
- Kolarz, Walter. "Russia and the Middle East." *Fortnightly*, CLXVII (ns CLXI): 412-19, June.

- . "Russian Colonization." *Modern Review*, I: 214-26, May.
- Kournakoff, Sergei. "Tsarist Moscow's Southern Outpost; Estate of Kolomenskoye." *Travel*: LXXXIX: 28-30ff., July.
- Kravis, Irving and Mintzes, Joseph. "Soviet Union: Trends in Prices, Rations, and Wages." *Monthly Labor Review*, LXV: 28-35, July.
- Kulski, Wladyslaw. "Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship." *Foreign Affairs*, XXV: 667-84, July.
- Laserson, Max. "Democracy as a Regulative Idea and as an Established Régime: The Democratic Tradition in Russia and Germany." *Journal of the History of Ideas*, VIII: 342-62, June.
- . "Russia and the World: a Soviet Review of Diplomacy." *International Conciliation*, CCCCXXIX: 143-58, March.
- Lattimore, Owen. "Inner Asian Frontiers: Chinese and Russian Margins of Expansion." *Journal of Economic History*, VII: 24-52, May.
- Lawren, Joseph. "Can You Speak Russian? 400 Russians in St. Petersburg, Fla." *Common Ground*, VIII: 1: 88-92.
- Lehrman, Hal and Burck, G. H. "In Russia's Europe." *Fortune*, XXXV: 78-83ff., February.
- Levshin, A. "Wartime Changes in the Soviet School." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 76-81, October.
- Lippmann, Walter. "Peace and Another War!" *Ladies Home Journal*, LXIV: 36-7ff., June.
- Lukacs, J. A. "Communist Tactics in Balkan Government." *Thought*, XXII: 219-44, June.
- Lyons, Eugene. "On Misunderstanding Russia." *American Mercury*, LXIV: 729-36, June.
- . "Russia's Postwar Purge." *Plain Talk*, II: 17-21, November.
- . "What Does a Russian Promise Mean?" *Nation's Business*, XXXV: 60-7, December.
- Manning, C. A. "Democratic Diplomacy and Ukraine." *Ukrainian Quarterly*, III: 126-33, Winter.
- Mansvetov, Fedor. "Tannu-Tuva—the Soviet 'Atom City'?" *Russian Review*, VI: 9-19, Spring.
- Marshall, George. "European Recovery and Peace Treaties." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, XIV: 98-101, December 1.
- Masterson, James and Brower, Helen. "Bering's Successors, 1745-1780; Contributions of Peter Simon Pallas to the History of Russian Exploration Toward Alaska." *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, XXXVIII: 35-83, 109-55, January-April.
- Meshchaninov, Ivan I. "Soviet Achievements in the Sphere of Linguistics and Literature." *Modern Language Review*, XLII: 251-3, April.
- Meyer, Cord. "What Price Preparedness?" *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXIX: 27-33, June.
- Mikhailov, Alexander. "Organization of Scientific Work in the U.S.S.R." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 26-35, March.
- Mills, Clarence. "Climate Key to Russia's Rise." *Science Digest*, XXI: 43-5, May.
- Mohrenschildt, D. von. "American Intelligentsia and Russia of the N.E.P." *Russian Review*, VI: 59-66, Spring.
- Moorad, George. "Rape of Manchuria." *American Mercury*, LXIV: 278-86, March.

- Moore, Barrington. "Influence of Ideas on Policies as Shown in the Collectivization of Agriculture in Russia." *American Political Science Review*, XLI: 733-43, August.
- "Present Purge in the USSR." *Review of Politics*, IX: 65-76, January.
- Morley, Felix. "Twilight of an Empire." *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, XXXIII: 304-8, May.
- Morozov, Mikhail. "The Study of Shakespeare in the Soviet Union." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 3-15, March.
- "Moscow and After." *Readers Digest*, LI: 69-71, July.
- Mosely, Philip. "Soviet Policy in the United Nations." *Academy of Political Science. Proceedings*, XXII: 136-45, January.
- Mudd, Stuart. "Recent Observations On Programs for Medicine and National Health in the USSR." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 464-71, June; V: 71-81, December 1947-January 1948.
- Naimark, Mary. "The State Labor Reserves Schools." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 73-78, March.
- Nikolaevskii, Boris. "Stalin's Eldorado; with Biographical Sketch." *Fortune*, XXXVI: 98-101ff., August.
- Nikolaieff, A. M. "The Red Army in the Second World War." *Russian Review*, VII: 49-60, Autumn.
- Nylander, L. "Russia and Sweden Today." *American Scandinavian Review*, XXXV: 110-15, June.
- "An Outline Survey on Soviet Social Services." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 27-75, October.
- Parin, Vasili. "Ilya I. Metchnikoff." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 451-463, June.
- "Medical Research in the USSR." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 292-99, June.
- Parker, Ralph. "The Red Army Man Goes Home." *Geographical Magazine*, XX: 1-10, May.
- Parry, Albert. "Charles R. Crane, Friend of Russia." *Russian Review*, VI: 20-36, Spring.
- "Russia's First Encounters With the Japanese." *Travel*, LXXXVIII: 4-9ff., March.
- Paton, G. W. "Soviet Legal Theory." *Res Judicatae*, III: 58-68, May.
- Perry, Ralph B. "Logic of Peace." *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXXX: 76-82, December.
- Pertzoff, Peter. "Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1946." *Russian Review*, VI: 101-115, Spring.
- Plischke, Elmer. "Soviet-American Cooperation." *Forum*, CVII: 204-11, March.
- Podolsky, Edward. "Soviet Medical Research." *Contemporary Review*, CLXXI: 357-61, June.
- Potemkina, Antonina. "Nursing in Russia." *Trained Nurse*, CXVIII: 445-9ff., June.
- Price, Morgan. "Russia and the Powers." *Contemporary Review*, CLXXI: 5-10, January.
- "Russian Enigma." *Contemporary Review*, CLXXII: 1-7, July.
- Przudzik, Joseph. "Peace in Our Times, Soviet Style." *Catholic World*, CLXV: 141-6, May.
- "Public Opinion Inside the U.S.S.R." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XI: 1: 5-25.

- Raitch, Eugene. "Pushkin's Epistle to Prince Yusupov" (Translation) *Russian Review*, VI: 55-58, Spring.
- Raymond, Ellsworth. "Nameless Cities of Russia." *United Nations World*, I: 15-18, October.
- "Report on the USSR: Introduction and Bibliographical Note." *Quarterly Research Survey*, pp. 1-13, April.
- Reston, James. "Negotiating With the Russians." *Harper's Magazine*, CXCV: 97-106, August.
- "The Return to Political Orthodoxy in Russia." *World Today*, III: 73-81, February.
- Riazanovsky, Nicholas. "The Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State." *Russian Review*, VII: 96-110, Autumn.
- Riegel, Oscar. "Hungary—Proving Ground for Soviet-American Relations." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XI: 1: 58-82.
- Ropes, E. C. "Russian-American Cultural Relations." *Russian Review*, VI: 3-8, Spring.
- Russell, William F. "USA and USSR." *Teachers College Record*, XLVIII: 295-303, February.
- "Russian Sphere in Europe, The." *World Today*, III: 432-45, October.
- Rydal, William. "World Mirage." *Fortnightly*, CLXVII (ns CLXI): 11-18, January.
- Salvin, Marina. "Soviet Policy Toward Disarmament." *International Conciliation*, CCCCXX-VIII: 43-111, February.
- Sanders, Donald (pseud). "Stalin Plotted a Separate Peace." *American Mercury*, LXV: 519-27, November.
- Sandomirsky, Vera. "Leonid Leonov and the Party Line." *Russian Review*, VI: 67-76, Spring.
- Sax, Karl. "Soviet Science and Political Philosophy." *Scientific Monthly*, LXV: 43-7, July.
- Schüller, Richard. "Foreign Trade Policies of the United States and Soviet Russia." *Social Research*, XIV: 135-47, June.
- Schwartz, Harry. "Soviet Economic Reconversion, 1945-46." *American Economic Review*, XXXVII: 611-23, May.
- Schwarz, S. M. "Trade Unions in Postwar Russia." *Modern Review*, I: 350-9, July.
- Serebrov, A. I. "Cancer Prevention and Control in the USSR." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 343-47, April.
- Shimkin, M. B. "The Academy of Medical Sciences, USSR." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, V: 82-89, December 1947-January 1948.
- . "The New Soviet Curriculum in Medicine." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 271-74, February.
- Sigerist, H. E. "On American-Soviet Medical Relations." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, V: 4-8, December 1947-January 1948.
- Skerpan, Alfred. "Views and Reviews of the Soviet Problem; Discussion of Recent Books." *Antioch Review*, VII: 205-20, June.
- Sobieski, Zygmunt. "Reminiscences from Lwow, 1939-1946." *Journal of Central European Affairs*, VI: 351-374, January.
- Sobolev, S. S. "Protecting Soils in the USSR." *Soil Conservation*, XIII: 17-19, August.
- "Social Insurance in the Soviet Union." *International Labour Review*, LV: 261-73, March.

- Soloveitchik, Samson. "Family Law and Inheritance Law in USSR." *University of Kansas City Law Review*, XV: 83-94, April-June.
- Spigelman, Joseph. "What Are We Afraid Of?" *Harper's Magazine*, CXCIV: 124-31, August.
- Spinks, G. Stephens. "Christianity Returns to the East." *Hibbert Journal*, XLV: 223-6, April.
- Stanford, Neal. "Report on Russian Imperialism." *American Mercury*, LXV: 684-90, December.
- . "Secret Stalin-Hitler Plans." *American Mercury*, LXV: 261-8, September.
- Steed, Henry. "Between East and West." *Contemporary Review*, CLXXI: 257-62, May.
- Strakhovsky, Leonid. "Anna Akhmatova—Poetess of Tragic Love." *American Slavic and East European Review*, VI: 1-18, May.
- . "On Understanding Russia; a Review Article of Five Recent Publications." *American Slavic and East European Review*, VI: 181-99, May.
- . "Osip Mandelstam: The Architect of Words." *Russian Review*, VII: 61-70, Autumn.
- Strausz-Hupe, Robert. "The Western Frontiers of Russia." *Review of Politics*, IX: 322-30, July.
- Strohm, John. "Down on the Collective Farm." *Readers Digest*, L: 73-7, March.
- Struve, Gleb. "Mickiewicz in Russia." *Slavonic and East European Review*, XXVI: 126-145, November.
- Sykes, Christopher. "Russia and Azerbaijan." *Soundings*, pp. 47-52, February.
- Teitelbaum, Salomon. "Progressive Education in the USSR." *Journal of Educational Sociology*, XX: 356-65, February.
- Thompson, Dorothy. "Poland Two Years After Yalta." *American Mercury*, LXIV: 534-41, May.
- . "Transcript of Conference Between Generalissimo Stalin and H. E. Stassen, at the Kremlin in Moscow, April 9, 1947." *International Conciliation*, CCCCXXXII: 460-9, June.
- Uhler, J. E. "Russia's Advance in the United States." *Catholic World*, CLXVI: 11-18, October.
- . "Russo-American Impasse." *Catholic World*, CLXV: 395-401, August.
- . "Ukraine in the Economy of the USSR." *Ukrainian Quarterly*, III: 215-30, Spring.
- Van Dyke, Vernon. "Communism in Eastern and Southeastern Europe." *Journal of Politics*, IX: 355-91, August.
- Vernadsky, George. "Reforms Under Czar Alexander I; French and American Influences." *Review of Politics*, IX: 47-64, January.
- . "Voice Out of Russia." *Modern Review*, I: 572-80, October.
- Voigt, Fritz A. "Rule of Law." *Nineteenth Century and After*, CXLII: 1-11, July.
- . "Russia and the German State." *Nineteenth Century and After*, CXLI: 115-24, March.
- Vollmer, Clement. "The Teuton Once Swept Eastward." *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XLVI: 312-35, July.
- Waksman, Selman. "Microbiology in the Soviet Union." *American Review of Soviet Medicine*, IV: 314-321, April.
- Walsh, Warren. "American Attitudes Toward Russia." *Antioch Review*, VII: 183-90, June.

- "Documents: Petrograd, March-July 1917: The Letters of Edward T. Heald." *American Slavic and East European Review*, VI: 116-157, May.
- Washburn, John. "Russia Looks at Northern Korea." *Pacific Affairs*, XX: 152-60, June.
- Wiener, Thomas. "Kazakh Literature and Oral Art of the 19th Century; Reflections on Russian Rule." *American Review on the Soviet Union*, VIII: 52-72, March.
- Wilson, Leonard. "Present Status of The Great Soviet World Atlas in the U. S." *Association of American Geographers. Annals*, XXXVII, 67-72, March.
- Wolfe, Bertram D. "Lenin as Philosopher: History of a Text." *Partisan Review*, XIV: 396-413, July-August.
- "Lenin, Stolypin, and the Russian Village." *Russian Review*, VI: 44-54, Spring.
- "The Rise and Fall of the Comintern." *American Mercury*, LXIV: 365-73, March.
- Wood, Junius B. "Trained to Raise Hell In America: International Lenin School in Moscow." *Nation's Business*, XXXV: 33-5ff., April.
- "What Russia Says About Us." *Nation's Business*, XXXV: 37-8ff., March.
- X (pseud.). "Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs*, XXV: 566-82, July.
- Yugow, Aron. "Reconversion and Reconstruction in the USSR." *International Labour Review*, LV: 62-76, January.

7

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

(November 1945–April 1948)

(Reviews are entered under the author of the book and under reviewer.)

	Volume	No.	Page
Alexandrova, Vera: <i>Pearl Buck's Talk About Russia with Masha Scott</i>	5	2	108
—The Soviet Family	5	2	74
—Ella Winter's <i>I Saw the Russian People</i>	5	2	108
Almedingen, E. M.: <i>Dasha</i> . Rev. by Nina Fedorova	5	1	126
Andrusyshen, C. H.: Clarence A. Manning's (trans. and ed. by) <i>Taras Shevchenko: Selected Poems</i>	5	2	112
Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries. Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky	7	2	41
American Intelligentsia and Russia of the N. E. P. Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	6	2	59
Babkin, B. P.: Sechenov and Pavlov	5	2	24
Background of the New Economic Policy, The. Ruth Fischer	7	2	15
Bakshy, Alexander: Latest Trends in the Soviet Theatre. — <i>Seven Plays of Maxim Gorky</i> (trans. and ed. by). Rev. by Francis Whitfield	5	1	80
Barghoorn, Frederick C.: <i>Joshua Kunitz Russia: The Giant That Came Last</i>	5	2	111
Barmine, Alexander: <i>One Who Survived</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff	7	2	92
Baykov, Alexander: <i>The Development of the Soviet Economic System</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff	5	2	105
Berdyayev, Nicholas: <i>Russia and the New World Era</i>	6	1	92
Bergson, Abram: <i>The Structure of Soviet Wages</i> . Rev. by Boris Stanfield	7	2	3
Berman, Harold J.: <i>The Restoration of Law in Soviet Russia</i>	5	2	106
Bertennson, Sergei: The Première of "The Inspector General"	6	1	3
Bertennson, Sergei and Jay Leyda: <i>The Musorgsky Reader: A Life of Modeste Petrovich Musorgsky in Letters and Documents</i> (ed. and trans. by). Rev. by Frederick Sternfeld	7	1	88
Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1945	7	2	100
Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1946. Peter Pertzoff. Bibliography	5	2	116
Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1947. Emily Carter and Mary Thompson. Bibliography	6	2	101
Buck, Pearl: <i>Talk About Russia with Masha Scott</i> . Rev. by Vera Alexandrova	7	2	103
	5	2	108

	Volume	No.	Page
Carr, Edward Hallet: <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i> . Rev. by Michael Karpovich	6	2	86
Casey, Robert Pierce: <i>Religion in Russia</i> . Rev. by Lucy E. Textor	6	2	90
X Chamberlin, William Henry: <i>Dostoevsky: Prophet and Psychologist</i>	7	2	34
—Soviet Race and Nationality Policies	5	1	3
—Turgenev, The Eternal Romantic	5	2	10
—U.S.S.R. and U.N.	6	2	37
Chapman, Donald: G. B. Cressey's <i>The Basis of Soviet Strength</i>	5	1	117
Coleman, Marion M.: Eugene Schuyler: Diplomat Extraordinary from the United States to Russia	7	1	33
—Twenty-Five Years of Teaching Russian at Columbia	6	1	84
Columbia's Russian Institute	5	2	97
Condoide, Mikhail V.: <i>Russian-American Trade</i> . Rev. L. M. Herman	6	2	91
Crane, Charles R., <i>Friend of Russia</i> . Albert Parry	6	2	20
Cressey, G. B.: <i>The Basis of Soviet Strength</i> . Rev. Donald Chapman	5	1	117
Dallin, David: <i>The Big Three</i> . Rev. by M. T. Florinsky	5	2	103
— <i>The Real Soviet Russia</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	5	1	114
Dana, H. W. L.: <i>Seven Soviet Plays</i> (Introductions by). Rev. by Katharine Strelsky	6	1	99
Dartmouth Collection of Historical Material on the Russian Revolution. Bibliography. Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	6	1	105
Dean, Vera M.: <i>The United States and Russia</i> . Rev. by Michael Karpovich	7	2	88
Dostoevsky: <i>Prophet and Psychologist</i> . William Henry Chamberlin	7	2	34
Dow, Roger: <i>Seichas: A Comparison of Pre-Reform Russia and the Ante-Bellum South</i>	7	1	3
Duggan, Stephen: Alexis R. Wiren	5	1	102
Eudin, X. Joukoff: Isabel de Palencia's <i>Alexandra Koltontay</i>	7	1	117
Eurasian Movement, The. Boris Ishboldin	5	2	64
Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law. Vladimir Gsovski	7	1	71
Fayer, Mischa: <i>Gide, Freedom and Dostoevsky</i> . Rev. by Helen Muchnic	6	1	100
February Revolution and the Russian Army, The. A. M. Nikolaieff	6	1	17
Fedorova, Nina: E. M. Almedingen's <i>Dasha</i>	5	1	126
Fedotov, G.: Arthur Koestler's <i>The Yogi and the Communist</i>	5	1	122
— <i>The Russian Religious Mind</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff	7	1	123

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

117

Page		Volume	No.	Page
	Fischer, John: <i>Why They Behave Like Russians</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh	7	1	111
86	Fischer, Ruth: <i>The Background of the New Economic Policy</i>	7	2	15
90	Fisher, Harold H.: <i>America and Russia in the World Community</i> . Rev. by Michael Karpovich	6	2	86
34	Florinsky, M. T.: David Dallin's <i>The Big Three</i>	5	2	103
3	—Russian Social and Political Thought, 1825–1855	6	2	77
10	Fredericks, Alexandra: <i>Pushkin for Americans</i>	5	2	83
37	Frederiksen, Oliver J.: Corliss Lamont's <i>The Peoples of the Soviet Union</i>	6	1	91
117	—Harrison Salisbury's <i>Russia on the Way</i>	6	1	91
33	—Frederick L. Schuman's <i>Soviet Politics</i>	6	1	91
84	—Nicholas S. Timasheff's <i>The Great Retreat</i>	6	1	91
97	Gapon and Zubatov: <i>An Experiment in "Police Socialism"</i> . Bertram D. Wolfe	7	2	53
91	Glagolin, B. S.: <i>Slovo za Rasputina</i> (In Defense of Rasputin). Rev. by D. Fedotoff White	5	1	124
20	Gorky, Maxim: <i>Reminiscences of Tolstoy, Chekhov, Andreyev</i> . Rev. by Vera Sandomirsky	6	1	102
117	Gotesky, Rubin: John Somerville's <i>Soviet Philosophy</i>	7	1	115
103	Grunwald, Constantin de: <i>La Vie de Nicholas Ier</i> . Rev. by D. Fedotoff White	7	1	120
114	Gsovski, Vladimir: <i>Family and Inheritance in Soviet Law</i>	7	1	71
99	Guins, George C.: <i>Russia's Prize in Manchuria</i>	6	1	43
	—Soviet Culture: Old Trends and New	7	1	24
105	Gumilev, Nicholas: Leonid I. Strakhovsky	6	1	37
88	—"The Trolley Car That Lost Its Way." Trans. by Leonid I. Strakhovsky	6	1	40
34	Guralsky, T.: Ivan Martynov's <i>Dimitri Shostakovich: The Man and His Work</i> (trans. by). Rev. by Frederick Sternfeld	7	2	100
3	Harper, Paul V. and Ronald Thompson: <i>The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper</i> (ed. by). Rev. by Michael Karpovich	5	1	118
102	Hecht, David: <i>Lavrov and Longfellow</i>	5	2	90
117	Herman, L. M.: Mikhail V. Condoide's <i>Russian-American Trade</i>	6	2	91
64	Hindus, Maurice: <i>The Cossacks</i> . Rev. by George Lantzeff	5	2	110
71	Hoover Institute, Fellowships for Slavic Study	7	2	126
100	Huntington, W. Chapin: <i>The Russian Translation Project Three Years Later</i>	7	2	76
17	Ipatieff, Vladimir N.: <i>The Life of a Chemist</i> . Rev. by D. Fedotoff White	6	2	96
122	Ishboldin, Boris: <i>The Eurasian Movement</i>	5	2	64
123				

	Volume	No.	Page
Iswolsky, Helene: Russian Emigré Literature in World War II	6	1	69
—Vladimir Soloviev and the Western World	7	1	16
Karpovich, Michael: Edward Hallet Carr's <i>The Soviet Impact on the Western World</i>	6	2	86
—Vera M. Dean's <i>The United States and Russia</i>	7	2	88
—Harold H. Fisher's <i>America and Russia in the World Community</i>	6	2	86
—Paul V. Harper's and Ronald Thompson's (ed. by) <i>The Russia I Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper</i>	5	1	118
—Max Laserson's <i>Russia and the Western World</i>	5	2	102
—Harriet Moore's <i>Soviet Far-Eastern Policy, 1931-1945</i>	5	2	102
—S. Kononov's (ed. by) <i>Russo-Polish Relations: A Historical Survey</i>	5	2	102
—Soviet Historical Novel	5	2	53
Kaun, Alexander and Charles E. Kany: <i>Elementary Russian Conversation; Intermediate Russian Conversation; Advanced Russian Conversation</i> (ed. by) Rev. by Peter Pertzoff	5	2	113
Kayaloff, Jacques: Arthur Millspaugh's <i>Americans in Persia</i>	6	2	92
Kerensky, Alexander: Russia on the Eve of World War I	5	1	10
Kirchner, Walther: Fritz Lieb's <i>Russland Unterwegs: Der Russische Mensch Zwischen Christentum und Kommunismus</i>	6	1	97
—A. Lobanov-Rostovsky's <i>Russia and Europe</i>	7	2	95
Koestler, Arthur: <i>The Yogi and the Commissar</i> . Rev. by G. Fedotov	5	1	122
Kohn, Hans: <i>Prophets and Peoples</i> . Rev. by Helen Muchnic	6	1	100
Kononov, S. and F. Seeley: <i>Russian Prose; Reader I: 19th Century Writers</i> (ed. by). Rev. by Peter Pertzoff	5	2	113
— <i>Russo-Polish Relations: a Historical Survey</i> (ed. by). Rev. by Michael Karpovich	5	2	102
Kunitz, Joshua: <i>Russia—the Giant That Came Last</i> . Rev. by Frederick C. Barghoorn	7	2	92
Lamont, Corliss: <i>The Peoples of the Soviet Union</i> . Rev. by Oliver J. Frederiksen	6	1	91
Lantzeff, George: Maurice Hindus' <i>The Cossacks</i>	5	2	110
—Leonid I. Strakhovsky's <i>Alexander I of Russia</i>	7	1	119
Laserson, Max: <i>Russia and the Western World</i> . Rev. by Michael Karpovich	5	2	102
Latest Trends in the Soviet Theatre. Alexander Bakshy	5	1	80
Lauterbach, Richard: <i>These Are The Russians</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	5	1	114

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

119

Page		Volume	No.	Page
69	Lavrin, Janko: <i>Dostoevski</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohren-	7	1	127
16	schildt	7	1	127
	Lavrov and Longfellow. David Hecht	5	2	90
86	Lenin and the Agent Provocateur Malinovsky. Bertram			
88	D. Wolfe	5	1	49
	Lenin, Stolypin, and the Russian Village. Bertram D.			
86	Wolfe	6	2	44
	Leonov, Leonid and the Party Line. Vera Sandomirsky..	6	2	67
	Leontief, Sr., W. W.: Soviet Planning: The Problem of			
118	Economic Balance	6	1	26
102	Lermontov: Four Poems by. Trans. by Vladimir Na-			
102	bokov	5	2	50
	Leyda, Jay and Sergei Bertennson: <i>The Musorgsky</i>			
102	<i>Reader: A Life of Modeste Petrovich Musorgsky in</i>			
53	<i>Letters and Documents</i> (ed. and trans. by). Rev. by			
	Frederick Sternfeld	7	2	100
	Lieb, Fritz: <i>Russland Unterwegs: Der Russische Mensch</i>			
113	<i>Zwischen Christentum und Kommunismus</i> . Rev. by			
	Walther Kirchner	6	1	97
	Lloyd, J. A. T.: <i>Fyodor Dostoevski</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von			
92	Mohrenschildt	7	1	127
10	Lobanov-Rostovsky, Andrei: Anglo-Russian Relations			
	<i>Through the Centuries</i>	7	2	41
	— <i>Russia and Europe</i> . Rev. by W. Kirchner	7	2	95
97	Longfellow and Lavrov. David Hecht	5	2	90
95	Mandel, William: <i>A Guide to the Soviet Union</i> . Rev. by			
122	Nicholas P. Vakar	6	2	88
	Mandelstam, Osip: the Architect of Words. Leonid I.			
100	Strakhovsky	7	1	61
	Manning, Clarence A.: William J. Pavék's <i>200,000,000</i>			
	<i>Slavs Need a New Alphabet</i>	6	2	99
	— <i>Taras Shevchenko: Selected Poems</i> (trans. and ed. by).			
113	Rev. by C. H. Andrusyshen	5	2	112
	—The Soviet Union and the Slavs	5	2	3
102	Mansvetov, Fedor S.: Tannu-Tuva—The Soviet "Atom			
	City"?	6	2	9
92	Martynov, Ivan: <i>Dimitri Shostakovich: the Man and His</i>			
91	<i>Work</i> . Trans. by T. Guralsky. Rev. by Frederick			
110	W. Sternfeld	7	2	100
119	Marshak-Sabotka, F.: <i>Taman</i> (ed. by). Rev. by Peter			
	Pertzoff	5	2	113
	Marshall, Herbert: <i>Mayakovsky and His Poetry</i> (ed. by).			
102	Rev. by Vera Sandomirsky	6	2	95
80	Mazour, Anatole G.: Helen Gray Pratt and Harriet			
	Moore's <i>Russia, A Short History</i>	7	1	120
114	Millspaugh, Arthur: <i>Americans in Persia</i> . Rev. by			
	Jacques Kayaloff	6	2	92

	Volume	No.	Page
Mohrenschildt, Dimitri von: American Intelligentsia and Russia of the N. E. P.	6	2	59
—David Dallin's <i>The Real Soviet Russia</i>	5	1	114
—Dartmouth Collection of Historical Material on the Russian Revolution. Bibliography	6	1	105
—Richard Lauterbach's <i>These Are the Russians</i>	5	1	114
—Janko Lavrin's <i>Dostoevski</i>	7	1	127
—J. A. T. Lloyd's <i>Fyodor Dostoevski</i>	7	1	127
—Edgar Snow's <i>The Pattern of Soviet Power</i>	5	1	114
—Lincoln Steffens and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution	5	1	31
—Edmund Stevens' <i>Russia Is No Riddle</i>	5	1	114
—Henry Troyat's <i>Firebrand: The Life of Dostoevski</i>	7	1	127
—Warren B. Walsh and Roy Price's <i>Russia, A Handbook</i>	7	2	92
—W. L. White's <i>Report on the Russians</i>	5	1	114
Moore, Harriet and Helen Gray Pratt: <i>Russia, A Short History</i> . Rev. by Anatole G. Mazour	7	1	120
— <i>Soviet Far-Eastern Policy, 1931-1945</i> . Rev. by Michael Karpovich	5	2	102
Muchnic, Helen: <i>An Introduction to Russian Literature</i> . Rev. by Vera Sandomirsky	7	1	125
—Mischa Fayer's <i>Gide, Freedom and Dostoevski</i>	6	1	100
—Hans Kohn's <i>Prophets and Peoples</i>	6	1	100
—Ivan Tkhorzhevsky's <i>Russkaya Literatura</i>	7	1	128
Nabokov, Vladimir: Four Poems by Lermontov (trans.)	5	2	50
Nazaroff, Alexander I.: Ernest J. Simmons' <i>Leo Tolstoy</i>	6	2	93
—Tikhon Polner's <i>Tolstoy and His Wife</i>	5	1	125
Nikolaieff, A. M.: The February Revolution and the Russian Army	6	1	17
—The Red Army in the Second World War	7	1	49
Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State, The. Nicholas Riazanovsky	7	1	96
Page From the Past, A.: Pierre Routsy	7	2	69
Palencia, Isabel de: <i>Alexandra Kollontay</i> . Rev. by X. Joukoff Eudin	7	1	117
Parry, Albert: Charles R. Crane, Friend of Russia	6	2	20
—Daniel Sargent's <i>Mitri, or the Story of Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin</i>	6	1	103
—George Soloveyitchik's <i>Potemkin: Soldier, Statesman, Lover and Consort of Catherine of Russia</i>	7	2	96
—Yankee Whalers in Siberia	5	2	36
Pavek, William J.: <i>200,000,000 Slavs Need a New Alphabet</i> . Rev. by Clarence A. Manning	6	2	99
Pertzoff, Peter: Books and Articles on Russia Published in 1946. Bibliography	6	2	101
—Charles E. Kany and Alexander Kaun (ed. by) <i>Elementary Russian Conversation; Intermediate Russian Conversation; Advanced Russian Conversation</i>	5	2	113

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

121

Page		Volume	No.	Page
	—S. Konovalov and F. Seeley's (ed. by) <i>Russian Prose; Reader I: 19th Century Writers</i>	5	2	113
59	—F. Marshak-Sabotka's (ed. by) <i>Taman</i>	5	2	113
114	—Nikander Strelsky's (ed. by) <i>Russian Reader</i>	5	2	113
105	—Francis Whitfield's <i>A Russian Reference Grammar</i>	5	1	127
114	Pinkowski, Edward: Soviet Trainees in U. S. A. in World War II	6	1	11
127	Podolsky, Edward: Some Achievements of Soviet Medical Research	6	1	77
114	Polner, Tikhon, <i>Tolstoy and His Wife</i> . Rev. by A. I. Nazarov	5	1	125
31	Posin, J. A.: Russian Studies in American Colleges	7	2	62
114	Pratt, Helen Gray and Harriet Moore: <i>Russia, A Short History</i> . Rev. by Anatole G. Mazour	7	1	120
127	Première of "The Inspector General," The. Sergei Bertensson	7	1	88
92	Price, Roy and Warren B. Walsh: <i>Russia, a Handbook</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt	7	2	92
114	Prokopowicz, S. N.: <i>Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets</i> . Rev. by N. S. Timasheff	6	1	92
120	Pushkin's Epistle to Prince Yusupov. Trans. by Eugene Raitch	6	2	55
102	Pushkin for Americans. Alexandra Fredericks	5	2	83
125	Pushkin's "I Loved You Then." Trans. by Ingeborg E. Smith	5	2	52
100	Raitch, Eugene: Pushkin's Epistle to Prince Yusupov (Translation)	6	2	55
100	Reavey, George: <i>Soviet Literature Today</i> . Rev. by Gleb Struve	7	2	98
128	Red Army in the Second World War, The. A. M. Nikolaieff	7	1	49
50	Restoration of Law in Soviet Russia, The. Harold J. Berman	6	1	3
93	Riazanovsky, Nicholas: The Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State	7	1	96
125	Rimsky-Korsakov, The Youth of. M. O. Zetlin	5	1	89
17	Ropes, E. C.: Russian-American Cultural Relations	6	2	3
49	Routsky, Pierre: A Page From the Past	7	2	69
96	Russia and the New World Era. Nicholas Berdyaev	7	2	3
36	Russia on the Eve of World War I. Alexander Kerensky	5	1	10
99	Russian-American Cultural Relations. E. C. Ropes	6	2	3
101	Russian Emigré Literature in World War II. Helen Iswolsky	6	1	69
113	Russian Social and Political Thought, 1825-1855. Michael Florinsky	6	2	77
	Russian Student Fund, 1920-1945, The. Alexis R. Wiren	5	1	104
	Russian Studies in American Colleges. J. A. Posin	7	2	62

	Volume	No.	Page
Russian Translation Project Three Years Later, The. W. Chapin Huntington.....	7	2	76
Russia's Attempts to Open Japan. Harry Emerson Wildes.....	5	1	70
Russia's Prize in Manchuria. George C. Guins.....	6	1	43
Russo-Polish Relations, A Chapter in. Gleb Struve.....	6	1	56
Salisbury, Harrison: <i>Russia On the Way</i> . Rev. by Oliver J. Frederiksen.....	6	1	91
Sandomirsky, Vera: From Soviet War Poets (Translations).....	5	1	42
—Maxim Gorky's <i>Reminiscences of Tolstoy, Chekov, Andreyev</i>	6	1	102
—Leonid Leonov and the Party Line.....	6	2	67
—Herbert Marshall's (ed. by) <i>Mayakovsky and His Poetry</i>	6	2	95
—Helen Muchnic's <i>An Introduction to Russian Literature</i>	7	1	125
Sargent, Daniel: <i>Mitri, or the Story of Prince Demetrius Augustine Gallitzin</i> . Rev. by Albert Parry.....	6	1	103
Schuman, Frederick L.: <i>Soviet Politics</i> . Rev. by Oliver J. Frederiksen.....	6	1	91
Schuyler, Eugene: Diplomat Extraordinary from the United States to Russia. Marion Coleman.....	7	1	33
Sechenov and Pavlov. B. P. Babkin.....	5	2	24
Seeley, F. and S. Kononov: <i>Russian Prose—Reader I: 19th Century Writers</i> . Rev. by Peter Pertzoff.....	5	2	113
Seichas: A Comparison of Pre-Reform Russia and the Ante-Bellum South. Roger Dow.....	7	1	3
Simmons, Ernest J.: <i>Leo Tolstoy</i> . Rev. by Alexander I. Nazaroff.....	6	2	93
— <i>U.S.S.R.: A Concise Handbook</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh.....	7	1	111
Smith, Ingeborg E.: Pushkin's "I Loved You Then" (Trans.).....	5	2	52
Smith, Samuel and Bernhard J. Stern: <i>Understanding the Russians</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh.....	7	1	111
Snow, Edgar: <i>The Pattern of Soviet Power</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt.....	5	1	114
— <i>Stalin Must Have Peace</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh.....	7	1	111
Soloveytchik George: Potemkin: <i>Soldier, Statesman, Lover and Consort of Catherine of Russia</i> . Rev. by Albert Parry.....	7	2	96
Soloviev, Vladimir and the Western World. Helene Iswolsky.....	7	1	16
Some Achievements of Soviet Medical Research. Edward Podolsky.....	6	1	77
Somerville, John: <i>Soviet Philosophy</i> . Rev. by Rubin Gotesky.....	7	1	115

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

123

Page		Volume	No.	Page
	Soviet Culture: Old Trends and New. George C. Guins..	7	1	24
76	Soviet Family, The. Vera Alexandrova.....	5	2	74
	Soviet Historical Novel. Michael Karpovich.....	5	2	53
70	Soviet Medical Research, Some Achievements of. Ed-			
43	ward Podolsky.....	6	1	77
56	Soviet Planning: The Problem of Economic Balance.			
	W. W. Leontief. Sr.....	6	1	26
91	Soviet Race and Nationality Policies. William Henry			
	Chamberlin.....	5	1	3
42	Soviet Trainees in U. S. A. in World War II. Edward			
	Pinkowski.....	6	1	11
102	Soviet Union and the Slavs. Clarence A. Manning.....	5	2	3
67	Soviet War Poets, From (Trans.) Vera Sandomirsky....	5	1	42
	Stanfield, Boris: Abram Bergson's <i>The Structure of So-</i>			
95	<i>viet Wages</i>	5	2	106
	Steffens, Lincoln and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution.			
125	Dimitri von Mohrenschildt.....	5	1	31
103	Stern, Bernhard J. and Samuel Smith: <i>Understanding</i>			
91	<i>the Russians</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh.....	7	1	111
	Sternfeld, Frederick: Jay Leyda and Sergei Bertenson's			
33	(trans. and ed. by) <i>The Musorgsky Reader: A Life of</i>			
24	<i>Modeste Petrovich Musorgsky in Letters and Docu-</i>			
113	<i>ments</i>	7	2	100
3	—Ivan Martynov's <i>Dimitri Shostakovich: The Man and</i>			
93	<i>His Work</i> . Trans. by T. Guralsky.....	7	2	100
111	Stevens, Edmund: <i>Russia Is No Riddle</i> . Rev. by Dimitri			
52	von Mohrenschildt.....	5	1	114
111	Stolypin, Lenin, and the Russian Village. Bertram D.			
	Wolfe.....	6	2	44
	Strakhovsky, Leonid I. <i>Alexander I of Russia</i> . Rev.			
114	by George Lantzeff.....	7	1	119
111	—Nicholas Gumilev.....	6	1	37
	—Gumilev's "The Trolley Car That Lost Its Way."			
96	(Trans.).....	6	1	40
16	—Osip Mandelstam: <i>The Architect of Words</i>	7	1	61
77	Strelsky, Katharine: H. W. L. Dana's (Introductions			
115	by) <i>Seven Soviet Plays</i>	6	1	99
	Strelsky, Nikander: <i>Russian Reader</i> (ed. by). Rev. by			
	Peter Pertzoff.....	5	2	113
	Struve, Gleb: <i>A Chapter in Russo-Polish Relations</i>	6	1	56
	—George Reavey's <i>Soviet Literature Today</i>	7	2	98
	Tannu-Tuva—the Soviet "Atom City?" Fedor S.			
	Mansvetov.....	6	2	9
	Textor, Lucy E.: Robert Pierce Casey's <i>Religion in Rus-</i>			
	<i>sia</i>	6	2	90
	Thompson, Ronald and Paul V. Harper: <i>The Russia I</i>			
	<i>Believe In: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper</i> (ed.			
	by). Rev. by Michael Karpovich.....	5	1	118

	Volume	No.	Page
Timasheff, N. S.: <i>Alexander Barmine's One Who Survived</i>	5	2	105
—Alexander Baykov's <i>The Development of the Soviet Economic System</i>	6	1	92
—G. P. Fedotov's <i>The Russian Religious Mind</i>	7	1	123
— <i>The Great Retreat</i> . Rev. by Oliver J. Frederiksen.....	6	1	91
—S. N. Prokopowicz' <i>Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets</i>	6	1	92
Tkhorzhevsky, Ivan: <i>Russkaya Literatura</i> . Rev. by Helen Muchnic.....	7	1	128
Troyat, Henry: <i>Firebrand: The Life of Dostoevski</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt.....	7	1	127
Turgenev: <i>The Eternal Romantic</i> . William Henry Chamberlin.....	5	2	10
Twenty-Five Years of Teaching Russian at Columbia. Marion M. Coleman.....	6	1	84
U.S.S.R. and U.N. William Henry Chamberlin.....	6	2	37
Vakar, Nicholas, P.: William Mandel's <i>A Guide to the Soviet Union</i>	6	2	88
Walsh, Warren B.: John Fischer's <i>Why They Behave Like Russians</i>	7	1	111
—and Roy Price. <i>Russia, A Handbook</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt.....	7	2	92
—Ernest J. Simmon's <i>U.S.S.R.: A Concise Handbook</i> ...	7	1	111
—Edgar Snow's <i>Stalin Must Have Peace</i>	7	1	111
—Bernhard J. Stern and Samuel Smith's <i>Understanding the Russians</i>	7	1	111
—Alexander Werth's <i>The Year of Stalingrad</i>	7	1	111
Werth, Alexander: <i>The Year of Stalingrad</i> . Rev. by Warren B. Walsh.....	7	1	111
White, D. Fedotoff: B. S. Glagolin's <i>Slovo za Rasputina</i> (In Defense of Rasputin).....	5	1	124
—Constantin de Grunwald's <i>La Vie de Nicholas Ier</i>	7	1	120
—Vladimir N. Ipatieff's <i>The Life of a Chemist</i>	6	2	96
—Edward H. Zabriskie's <i>American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics</i>	6	1	94
White, W. L.: <i>Report on the Russians</i> . Rev. by Dimitri von Mohrenschildt.....	5	1	114
Whitfield, Francis: Alexander Bakshy's (trans. and ed. by) <i>Seven Plays of Maxim Gorky</i>	5	2	111
— <i>A Russian Reference Grammar</i> . Rev. by Peter Pertzoff.....	5	1	127
Wildes, Harry Emerson: <i>Russia's Attempts to Open Japan</i>	5	1	70
Winter, Ella: <i>I Saw the Russian People</i> . Rev. by Vera Alexandrova.....	5	2	108
Wiren, Alexis R. Stephen Duggan.....	5	1	102

Index to Volumes 5, 6, and 7

125

Page		Volume	No.	Page
	—The Russian Student Fund, 1920-1945	5	1	104
105	Wolfe, Bertram D. Gapon and Zubatov: An Experiment in Police Socialism	7	2	53
92	—Lenin and the Agent Provocateur Malinovsky	5	1	49
123	—Lenin, Stolypin, and the Russian Village	6	2	44
91	Yankee Whalers in Siberia. Albert Parry	5	2	36
92	Zabriskie, Edward H.: <i>American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics, 1895-1914</i> . Rev. by D. Fedotoff White	6	1	94
128	Zetlin, M. O.: The Youth of Rimsky-Korsakov	5	1	89
127				
10				
84				
37				
88				
111				
92				
111				
111				
111				
111				
124				
120				
96				
94				
114				
111				
127				
70				
108				
102				

Fellowships for Slavic Studies

EARLY in 1946 Stanford University announced a program of research in the Slavic materials of the Hoover Library. A grant of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation made possible awards of fellowships to advanced scholars for the completion of significant research and for the advancement of training for academic or public service careers.

The Slavic materials in the Hoover Library are mainly in the fields of the humanities and the social sciences. Fellowship awards are made by a University committee composed of the deans of graduate study, humanities, and social sciences, the director of the program in Asiatic and Slavic studies, and the chairman and the vice-chairman of the Hoover Library.

Since the announcement of the program, twenty-six fellows have been appointed for periods varying from three months to one academic year. Work is in progress on such topics as: development of political theories in Russia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; cultural, psychological, and political conditions favoring the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks; Polish-Russian relations, 1919-1921; U. S. S. R. relations with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia; documentary history of Soviet foreign policy; the organization of the Third International; ideals and reality of Communist democracy; radical Panslavism of Herzen and Bakunin; the Lusatian Serbs and Panslavism; the party of the Socialist Revolutionists; Soviet monopoly of foreign trade; Russian relations with the Baltic countries; Russian architecture in the nineteenth century; Russian writers from Pushkin to the present day. Publication of several of these studies has already been arranged.

Fellowships are awarded only to applicants for whose investigations the materials in the Hoover Library offer special advantage. Awards ordinarily are made for the period of one academic year, but the term of a fellowship need not begin with the commencement of the academic year in the fall. All fellows are considered members of a seminar which meets weekly for reports on and discussion of current research projects.

Inquiries are invited from scholars interested in research in Slavic fields. Correspondence should be addressed to the Chairman of the Fellowship Committee, Hoover Library, Stanford University, Stanford, California.

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

BERDYAEV, NICHOLAS. *The Russian Idea*, New York, Macmillan, 1948. 255 pp. \$2.75.

DALLIN, DAVID and NICOLAEVSKY, BORIS. *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1947. 331pp. \$3.75.

La Revista de Estudios Eslavos, ed. by Boris Popovitzky. Vol. I, nos. 1-2, 1947. Mexico, D. F.

MAYNARD, SIR BERNARD. *Russia in Flux*, ed. and abr. by S. Haden Guest. New York, Macmillan, 1948, 564pp. \$6.50.

Russia in Translation (tr. of articles from Soviet magazines). Published by the Students of Russian at Brooklyn College. Vol. I, no. 2. February 1948. 42pp.

WALSH, WARREN. *Readings in Russian History*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1948. 549 pp. \$5.00.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Beginning with the next issue, which is to appear in January 1949, instead of November 1948, **The Russian Review** will be published quarterly in January, April, July, and October.

Annual subscription: \$4.00 in the United States; \$4.50 in Canada; foreign \$5.00; single copy \$1.00.

Early renewals would be appreciated.

New PITMAN Russian Texts

BEGINNER'S RUSSIAN READER—Lila Pargment

Illustrated with photographs Russian songs with music

285 Pages

Ready in May

About \$2.75

SCIENTIFIC RUSSIAN READER—Noah D. Gershevsky

Selected Modern Readings in Chemistry and Physics

270 Pages

Ready this summer

About \$3.00

For examination copies, write

2 West 45th Street
New York 19, N. Y.

PITMAN

**PUBLISHING
CORPORATION**



"A work so extraordinary in its penetration,

so philosophical in its approach and so poetic in its execution that the reviewer can even hope to do more than suggest the remarkable qualities and homely merits. Crankshaw has not written just another book on Russia. . . . Here is advanced a coherent and intellectual doctrine which explains not only the enigma of Russia, but the greater enigma which that involves—why we think of Russia as we do and why Russia reacts as she does to us."

By **EDWARD CRANKSHAW**

—HARRISON W. GILBERT, N. Y. Times

Hardcover \$5.00

RUSSIA and the RUSSIANS

THE VIKING PRESS, Publishers of the Viking English-Russian Reader

GOOD BOOKS ON RUSSIA

Barst, Ed. Edward—**A WANDERING STUDENT.** The student's own brilliant studies of Russia and its problems. Gives excellent background material for understanding present American-Russian relations. Cloth \$4.50

Blanchard, Mary—**RUSSIA'S POSTWAR ECONOMY.** A comprehensive survey of the present economic status of Russia from recent sources. Informative and authoritative. Paper \$1.50—Cloth \$1.50

Clark, Warren E.—**RUSSIA UNDER TSARS AND COMMUNISM.** A comprehensive bibliography of materials about Russia. Well annotated. Suitable for students of the subject. Paper \$1.00

Clark, Warren E. and Price, Roy A.—**RUSSIA—A WANDERING STUDENT.** A non-biased account of the Russian people and their land. Illustrated with numerous excellent maps. Paper \$1.20

Clark, Warren E.—**ESSAYS IN RUSSIAN HISTORY.** A collection of 70 brief to brief but excellent and difficult to get books. A valuable book for study groups and students of Russian and European history. Cloth \$4.00

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

210 Irving Avenue

Syracuse 10, New York

